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The purposes of this short monograph are, first, to introduce the general reader to the 
basic concepts of human development, seen as an all-embracing strategy of development, 
and, second, to devise guidelines for use by national policy makers, development 
specialists and international advisors in constructing development strategies which give 
high priority to human development. The intention is not to present a blueprint for human 
development that can be applied mechanically in every country but to raise the issues that 
must be addressed and to offer suggestions as to how these issues can be resolved. The 
point of departure for each country necessarily is distinct and reflects its history, culture, 
resource endowment and political institutions. Thus each country faces a unique set of 
problems, but also a unique set of opportunities and a unique set of feasible policies. 
There is more than one path to human development, and hence the need to consider 
alternative strategies, but any successful strategy will have to pay careful attention to the 
structure of incentives that guides economic activity, the allocation of public expenditure 
and the institutional arrangements that determine the distribution of wealth and income 
and the vulnerability of various sections of the population to events which can threaten 
their livelihood and perhaps even their life.  
Section 1 begins with an analysis of the essential features of a human development 
strategy which regards human development as the end or objective of development. It is a 
way to fulfil the potential of people by enlarging their capabilities, and this necessarily 
implies empowerment of people, enabling them to participate actively in their own 
development. Human development is also a means since it enhances the skills, 
knowledge, productivity and inventiveness of people through a process of human capital 
formation broadly conceived. Human development is thus a people centred strategy, not a 
goods centred or production centred strategy of development.  A people centred strategy of development has implications for the role of the state. Often 
the discussion is couched in terms of the degree of centralisation of the public 
administration, with most analysts favouring a highly decentralised system of 
governance. The appropriate degree of administrative decentralisation is a secondary 
issue. What really matters is the empowerment of local people to identify their own 
priorities and to implement programmes and projects of direct benefit to them. That is, 
development should be seen as a process that is not just for people but a process 
organized, guided and undertaken by people. This in turn implies the active participation 
of people in the development process and the consequent need to construct institutions 
that permit and indeed encourage that participation. A vigorous civil society, in other 
words, is an essential component of a successful human development strategy.  
The strengthening of civil society need not imply a smaller role for government. Indeed 
we argue that the volume of public expenditure is less important than its composition. 
Human development is partly about changing spending priorities not between the private 
and public sectors but within the public sector itself. What matters, in other words, is 
what government does, not how big it is. In most developing countries much can be done 
to promote human development by reallocating government expenditure without the need 
to raise additional revenue through taxation. Of course if government does more in some 
areas without raising taxes, it will have to do less in other areas. This in turn means that 
the distribution of the benefits and burdens of public sector activities will alter -- some 
groups will gain and others will lose -- and hence it will be necessary to build political 
support for human development by creating effective coalitions of potential beneficiaries. 
Human development is not politically neutral; it is not a technocratic solution to 
development problems; it requires broadly based popular support.  
Some policies however are likely to be politically more controversial than others and 
consequently more difficult to implement. Section 2 discusses the set of incentives faced 
by producers and consumers. In principle policies affecting incentives -- essentially 
changes in relative prices and barriers to access -- may often be less difficult to 
implement since they require neither a higher overall tax burden nor a major reallocation 
of public expenditure nor the creation of new institutions nor the mounting of new 
programmes. Even so, changes in the set of incentives can be expected to encounter 
resistance because any change in relative prices or in access will alter not only the 
allocation of resources but also the distribution of income, and in some instances the 
changes in the distribution of income can be considerable.  
The analysis in section 2 focuses on two things. First, it is important that the set of 
relative prices prevailing in the economy encourages the efficient use of the existing 
stock of human resources. People are assets -- in fact a country's most valuable assets -- 
and it is essential for human development that these assets be deployed sensibly. A 
defective incentive system can result in a waste of human resources and often, too, in a 
higher incidence of poverty and greater inequality in the distribution of income. Second, 
it is equally important that the set of relative prices encourage the growth of the stock of 
human resources. It is not enough to use existing resources wisely, we must also add to 
the existing resources through human capital formation. The set of incentives should thus be examined to determine whether or not it encourages the acquisition of skills and 
knowledge by all members of society, male and female, and whether it encourages the 
discovery and dissemination of new knowledge, for example by rewarding research and 
innovation.  
The focus shifts in section 3 from prices, incentives and opportunities to the allocation of 
public expenditure. It is argued that in many countries human development requires a 
radical change in the way government spending is viewed. The conventional 
classification of expenditure into capital construction and recurrent items is more than 
misleading; it is positively harmful. According to the conventional view the purchase of a 
physical asset, e.g. a school building, is regarded as capital accumulation which ipso 
facto contributes to growth and development whereas the payment of salaries, e.g. to 
teachers, is regarded as recurrent expenditure which has no impact on growth and 
development. In fact of course, depending on circumstances, the hiring of additional 
teachers may contribute more to development than the construction of additional school 
buildings. Thus governments which pursue a human development strategy will have to 
abandon old ways of thinking (which divide expenditure into public investment and 
public consumption) and adopt new ways based on new categories.  
A human development strategy frequently will entail a change in the sectoral composition 
of government expenditure and in particular a reallocation away from ministries 
concerned with "production" (industry, agriculture, commerce) and "law and order" 
(interior, defence) in favour of ministries concerned with the "social services" (education, 
health, labour). Again it is misleading to think of spending on education, health, 
occupational safety, maternal care, etc., as social services; rather they should be seen as 
contributing to human capital formation. Similarly, much spending by the so-called 
production ministries has relatively little to do with increasing output but instead, through 
subsidy policies, affects the distribution of income, often to the disadvantage of the poor.  
Finally, it is argued that in many countries the process of human development would be 
accelerated by a reallocation of spending within the ministries concerned with human 
capital formation. Most of the available evidence indicates that when all costs and 
benefits are taken into account, the return on investment particularly in countries at a 
lower level of human development, is higher at the base of a "pyramid of expenditure" 
than at the summit. Thus the return on primary education is higher than the return on 
secondary education, which in turn is higher than the return on university education. 
Similarly, the return on expenditure on primary health care and preventive medicine is 
higher than the return on investments in hospitals and curative medicine. Again, the 
return on basic vocational training and apprenticeship programmes is higher than the 
return on expenditures intended to produce lawyers, highly qualified business managers 
and certified public accountants.  
There is thus a predisposition within a human development strategy to spread government 
spending evenly at the base of a pyramid of expenditure, to favour small projects rather 
than large, to disperse expenditure widely over a geographical area and to encourage 
local participation in programme implementation. These features of a human development strategy have the added advantages of tackling poverty directly (rather than 
relying on the benefits of growth to trickle down) and of confronting head on major 
inequalities in education, health and training opportunities. Unfortunately, however, the 
actual pattern of public expenditure often is the opposite of that required by a human 
development strategy -- spending is concentrated at the summit of an expenditure 
pyramid, large and prestigious projects are favoured, investment is geographically 
centralised (often in the capital) and popular participation is discouraged, obstructed and 
even suppressed.  
In section 4 structural reforms are discussed, in particular changes in institutions, 
property rights and entitlements that can have major effects on human development, the 
incidence of poverty and the distribution of wealth and income. Precisely because their 
effects are so penetrating, however, structural reforms usually are politically highly 
controversial and often are resisted by those who gain most from the status quo. None the 
less, in many countries structural reforms are fundamental to the success of a human 
development strategy. It is not enough to improve the set of incentives and alter the 
allocation of public sector resources, it is also necessary to create an institutional 
framework which guarantees to everyone gainful employment, access to productive 
assets and sufficient food to lead a healthy and nutritious life. The poor should also be 
guaranteed a minimum of economic security.  
There are of course several ways these objectives can be achieved and the specific 
programmes presented in section 4 are intended to be illustrative: to show what has been 
tried, what works and what problems have been encountered. As in section 3, the reader 
is asked in this section to abandon old ways of thinking. The "welfare" programmes as 
found in the welfare states of western Europe and North America are not the concern of 
this discussion, nor are the "relief" programmes intended to alleviate temporary distress, 
as in the poor relief programmes of nineteenth century Europe, the Civilian Conservation 
Corps of the 1930s depression in the United States and the famine relief employment 
schemes of South Asia; nor, finally, are the purely redistributive measures intended to 
reduce inequality, such as progressive income taxation or means tested benefits. Instead 
the focus is a reforms that promote human development, that is, structural reforms that 
increase the capabilities of people directly or that increase the pace of human capital 
formation and hence the capabilities of people in future. Old policies and programmes 
may look rather different when seen in this new light.  
Lastly, in section 5, the question of financing human development is revisited. As should 
by now be clear, human development should not be used by the state as a justification for 
adding more to an existing framework, that is, for spending more and taxing more. Rather 
human development should be interpreted as requiring the state to do something 
different. The reallocation of public sector resources implicit in this approach need not be 
accompanied by an expansion in the general level of government expenditure, although 
in some cases this may well be desirable. By and large, however, human development 
puts no higher a burden on the public exchequer than alternative strategies of 
development. Moreover, the productivity of development expenditure is likely to be 
higher under a human development strategy than under other alternatives. The reason for this is that human development strategies channel resources to investment activities that 
are relatively neglected by other strategies but which enjoy above average rates of return 
when all costs and benefits are properly measured. Thus a well designed human 
development strategy should result in rates of growth of average income that are at least 
as high as could be achieved under a different strategy, and it should also result in a lower 
incidence of poverty and a greater degree of equality.  
Under the circumstances in which large numbers of developing countries find themselves 
there is unlikely to be a conflict between faster growth and greater equity in the 
distribution of the benefits of growth. This may not be true in all countries, however, or in 
all periods of history, and hence a brief word or two on possible "trade-offs" may be 
useful. First, there may be a conflict between increasing output or the rate of growth as 
conventionally measured and increasing human development, i.e., raising the capabilities 
of people. Since conventional growth of output is solely a means to development whereas 
increasing capabilities is the objective of development, if a conflict were to arise, the 
obvious choice is to sacrifice conventional growth in favour of human development. 
Second, there may be a conflict between raising the average level of human development 
(say, as measured by the human development index)1 and achieving a more equal 
distribution of capabilities among the entire population. Here the conflict would have to 
be resolved by introducing value judgements about the degree of equality to which the 
society in question aspires. In principle the human development index can be adjusted to 
reflect these normative preferences by incorporating distributional weights (e.g., for 
gender, ethnic groups, regions or the distribution of personal income), but it would be 
foolish to pretend that in practice it will be easy or even possible for policy makers to 
discover or create a consensus about the desired degree of equality. Finally, there may be 
a conflict between raising the average level of human development and reducing poverty, 
where the latter is regarded as an absolute concept. If such a conflict were to arise, then 
here again, value judgements would have to be introduced to resolve it. The interests of 
the poor, however, would almost always be better served by favouring a direct attack on 
poverty, even if this resulted in slower growth of conventional output or a slower average 
pace of human development or even, in some cases, in a fall in the average level of 
income per head. The indirect effects on poverty from a trickle-down of the benefits of 
growth seldom are sufficiently large or occur sufficiently fast to outweigh the direct 
benefits of redistributive policies. These three potential trade-offs, however, are rather 
hypothetical and in most countries one can be fairly confident that a human development 
strategy would not be in conflict with diminished poverty, greater equity or growth as 
conventionally measured.  
Finally, human development strategies are likely to be less intensive in the use of foreign 
aid than more conventional alternatives. The reason for this is that human development 
strategies require less imported capital equipment than alternative strategies and in 
general have lower demands for foreign exchange. Given that foreign finance is likely to 
be less readily available in future than in the past, this characteristic of human 
development is to be welcomed. Developing countries, whether they like it or not, will be 
forced by circumstances to become more self-reliant, less dependent on foreign 
assistance. Those countries that choose a human development strategy will find themselves in the happy situation of having changed a necessity into a virtue and they 
will thereby enjoy an added bonus.  
The strategy also has implications for foreign trade. Developing countries which adopt a 
human development strategy are likely to find that the basis of their comparative 
advantage in international trade shifts in favour of economic activities which use human 
capital relatively more intensively. Such countries will become inserted into the rapidly 
evolving global economy in a highly advantageous way, able to compete on equal terms 
with other nations while avoiding both the welfare reducing protectionism of import 
substituting industrialization and the vulnerability to external shocks associated with 
specialization on primary commodity exports.  
   
NOTES  
1. See, for example, UNDP, Human Development Report 1990, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990, chapter 1. Also see Appendix 1.  
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The essential features of a human development strategy  
Human development is the ultimate objective of economic development. It is also a 
means -- arguably the best means available -- for promoting development.  
   
   
Human development as an objective  
Viewed as an end in itself rather than a means, human development is about enriching 
human lives. Material enrichment -- producing a larger volume of goods and services -- 
may contribute to this but it is not the same thing. Indeed it is by now widely understood 
that there is no one-to-one correspondence between material enrichment (measured, say, 
by gross national product per head) and the enrichment of human lives (measured, say, by 
the human development index). The human development approach thus implies the 
dethronement of national product as the primary indicator of the level of development.  The objective of development is not to produce more "stuff", more goods and services, 
but rather to increase the capabilities of people to lead full, productive, satisfying lives.2 
A larger volume of output per head of the population may of course increase the 
capabilities of people, and thus should be warmly welcomed, but increased output should 
be seen for what it is, namely, an intermediate product that under appropriate 
circumstances can enhance human well being. Ultimately what is of concern is the ability 
of people to lead a long life (as measured perhaps by life expectancy at birth), to enjoy 
good health (as measured perhaps by morbidity rates), to have access to the stock of 
accumulated knowledge (as approximated by enrolment and literacy rates), to have 
sufficient income to buy food, clothing and shelter, to participate in the decisions that 
directly affect their lives and their community, and so on.  
In formulating development policies, programmes and plans it is important to put people 
first, to specify objectives in terms of the enhancement of human capabilities. The more 
disaggregated are programme and policy objectives, the better. In addition to 
disaggregation by capabilities, at a minimum one should also disaggregate by 
occupational group and social class, gender and region and distinguish between rural and 
urban areas. In some countries it might also be useful to classify people into separate 
ethnic, religious or language groups. The appropriate categories for disaggregation will of 
course vary from one country to another depending on its culture and history and the 
extent of social stratification.  
The human development approach does not replace one aggregate statistic (GNP) by 
another (HDI) and then seek to maximize the numerical value of the replacement. Rather 
it views the objective of development as inherently multi-dimensional. There are 
numerous constituents of a person's (or a society's) well being and in assessing progress 
towards development it is necessary to assess the constituent elements. This approach 
puts new and heavy demands on the statistical services -- new because most statistical 
bureaux have concentrated their efforts on collecting production, expenditure and income 
data for the conventional national accounting framework, and heavy because the desired 
degree of disaggregation implied by the alternative framework is high -- but the fact, 
where it is a fact, that human development cannot at present be accurately measured need 
not prevent a country from adopting human development as a strategy for development.  
   
Human development as a means  
The economic benefits received by people -- whether in the form of money income, 
material goods and services received in kind, self-produced items of consumption or 
production, or capabilities such as a long life and good health which may be only 
partially mediated by relations of production and exchange -- can be understood as flows 
originating from the stock of capital. The stock of capital, in turn, can be divided into 
three components: (i) the stock of natural capital, (ii) the stock of man-made physical 
capital and (iii) the stock of human capital.3  The stock of natural capital consists of the natural resources of the globe, including the 
atmosphere and oceans, the flora and fauna, the soils and mineral deposits and sources of 
fresh water. The stock of natural capital can be consumed (as when species become 
extinct), degraded (as when ground water supplies are polluted by agricultural 
chemicals), maintained at a constant level of productivity (for example by soil 
conservation) or augmented (for example by tree planting programmes). The stock of 
natural capital can also be transformed into physical capital, as when raw materials are 
combined to produce intermediate goods such as steel and electricity and capital goods 
such as machine tools and factory buildings.  
Much of environmental and resource economics is concerned with the use of the natural 
stock of capital, including instances (which unfortunately are numerous) when market 
forces fail to produce price signals which accurately reflect social costs and benefits. The 
literature on market failure, missing markets and the optimal discount rate addresses 
some of the most important issues in environmental economics, issues which have 
become prominent in policy debates in both developing and developed countries in recent 
years.  
The stock of physical capital consists of the produced means of production, i.e., the plant 
and equipment used in the agricultural, industrial and service sectors, the physical 
infrastructure (roads, bridges, ports, pipelines, railways, airports, irrigation canals) and 
the stock of dwellings. Just as natural capital can be consumed, degraded, maintained, 
augmented or transformed into other forms of capital, so too can physical capital. Much 
of traditional development economics in fact was primarily concerned with increasing the 
stock of physical capital, e.g., by creating incentives for businessmen to invest, by raising 
the savings rate or by establishing state owned enterprises. Investment or the 
accumulation of capital -- by which was meant the accumulation of physical capital -- 
was for a long time regarded as the engine of growth and development.  
The stock of human capital consists of the knowledge, skills, experience, energy and 
inventiveness of people. It is acquired in a variety of ways: through training and 
apprenticeship programmes, while on the job through learning by doing, in the formal 
education system, through informal contacts by word of mouth, through newspapers, 
radio and the information media generally, in institutions devoted to pure and applied 
research and through private study and reflection. The stock of human capital, like the 
stocks of physical and natural capital, will deteriorate if it is not maintained. Hence the 
importance of pre-natal and maternal care, school feeding and other nutrition 
programmes, the provision of safe drinking water, public health and disease control 
measures, guaranteed employment schemes and the like.  
It is now recognized that human capital plays a central role in the development process 
and this has heightened interest in the economics of education, health economics, labour 
economics and related sub-disciplines. It is important to note, however, that human 
capital is just one component of the stock of total capital. Potential output and incomes 
rise when the stock of total capital increases, and in principle this could take place 
through net additions to the stocks of either natural, physical or human capital, or some combination of the three. It is important of course that the total stock of capital be utilized 
efficiently, given the state of technology, for technology, whether embodied in physical 
capital or in the knowledge possessed by human beings, is a powerful motor of growth in 
its own right. Ideally, expenditures should be allocated where returns are highest so that 
ultimately the returns on the margin are the same whether investment is in human, 
physical or natural capital. This will require constructing a calculus of benefits and costs 
and devising methods that will enable reasonably accurate estimates to be made of all 
costs and all benefits associated with expenditure projects. 4 Meanwhile, there is a strong 
presumption that under conventional development strategies the costs associated with 
investments in natural capital have been greatly underestimated (partly because air, water 
and noise pollution and other negative externalities have been ignored)5 while the 
benefits of investments in human capital have been underestimated. This has resulted in a 
pronounced bias against human capital expenditures in favour of investments in physical 
capital and exploitation of natural resources.  
A distinctive feature of a human development strategy is the emphasis placed on human 
capital formation. This does not mean that additions to the stocks of natural and physical 
capital are ignored -- that would be a serious error -- but it does mean a major change in 
priorities in favour of human capital. The justification for this change in priorities is, first, 
that the returns on investing in people are in general as high as if not higher than the 
returns to other forms of investment, second, that investment in human capital in some 
cases economizes on the use of physical capital and the exploitation of natural resources 
and, third, the benefits of investing in people are in general more evenly spread than the 
benefits from other forms of investment. Thus a greater emphasis on human capital 
formation should result in as fast and perhaps even a faster pace of development, more 
sustainable development and a more equitable distribution of the benefits of 
development.  
Of course what is true of countries in general is not necessarily true of every particular 
country. In the absence of relevant country-specific data policy makers may be forced to 
rely on comparative data from other countries, at least in the early stages of policy 
formulation, but it obviously would be better for each country to collect the information 
necessary to estimate the rates of return on various types of investment and to calculate 
the distributive implications of alternative investment patterns. Suffice it to say here that 
the evidence from around the world is that those countries that have given high priority to 
human capital formation have performed relatively well in terms of growth, employment, 
reduced inequality in the distribution of income and the alleviation of poverty. 6  
A second distinctive feature of a human development strategy is the importance of 
complementarities among the various kinds of human capital expenditures.7 For 
example, expenditure on primary health care services should result in better health for the 
poor. This in turn should increase the efficiency with which the body transforms calories 
into improved nutrition, thereby increasing the benefits of maternal and child nutrition 
programmes, school lunch programmes and public food distribution schemes. Improved 
nutrition increases the ability of children to learn and is likely also to result in higher rates of attendance at school. There are thus strong complementarities among primary health 
care, nutrition and education expenditures.  
Similarly, there are linkages between expenditures devoted to improving the health of 
women and the amount of education women receive, their fertility and their life 
expectancy. There are linkages between literacy programmes, formal education and the 
productivity of labour as well as between literacy and health. Whenever 
complementarities such as these occur, the components of expenditure programmes 
should not be viewed in isolation but rather as a single package. That is, whenever 
complementarities are present, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.  
There are also complementarities between investing in people and investing in physical 
capital. Human capital is of course a direct input into the productive process. For 
instance, frequent illness lowers the productivity of labour while on the job and reduces 
the number of days worked. Hence programmes which result in improved health not only 
are valuable in themselves (human development as an end), they also have a positive 
impact on output (human development as a means). Similarly, the more skilled is the 
labour force, the higher will be its productivity. Skilled labour not only can do things 
beyond the competence of unskilled labour, it is likely also to be able to work faster, with 
less supervision, with fewer errors and to produce goods and services of a higher quality.  
The complementarity between human capital and physical capital arises from the nature 
of the production process. Machines require trained workers to operate them and trained 
mechanics to repair them. Modern, productive agriculture requires a literate agricultural 
labour force: workers who can read instructions on a fertilizer bag, absorb information 
contained in literature distributed by extension agents and understand the contents of a 
repair manual for agricultural equipment. Modern services (travel, finance, tourism) 
require numeracy: people who can make simple calculations quickly and accurately. A 
country that gives priority to physical capital while neglecting its human capital will soon 
discover that the returns to physical capital are lower than they need be. Finally, 
investment in people is necessary for technical change, which in combination with human 
capital is the driving force of economic growth. It is difficult to introduce improved 
methods of production, new ways of doing things and more complex and sophisticated 
products unless buyers, workers and consumers have sufficient training and education to 
enable them to understand the technology. Thus physical capital formation, the 
accumulation of human capital and technical change are closely interlinked.  
In summary, a human development approach has numerous advantages. First, it 
contributes directly to the well being of people. Second, it builds from a foundation of 
equality of opportunity. Third, it helps to create a more equal distribution of the benefits 
of development. Fourth, it enables the linkages between the various types of investment 
in people to be fully exploited and, fifth, it takes advantage of the complementarities 
between human and physical capital.  
   
The role of the state  These advantages, great as they are, do not materialise automatically. One institution, the 
state, must play a leading role in guiding the development process and intervening where 
necessary to ensure that the full benefits of human development are reaped. This does not 
imply that the state must be large in the sense of accounting for an unusually high 
proportion of total expenditure. Nor does this imply that the state should be relatively 
small, providing only minimal services and leaving the rest to the private sector. The size 
of the state is of secondary importance: what matters for human development is what 
functions the state performs, and how well it performs them, not how large it is.  
Sri Lanka, for example, is widely known for giving high priority to human development 
expenditures whereas Brazil has had different priorities and consequently a lower level of 
achievement. Central government expenditure in Brazil, however, was much higher than 
in Sri Lanka, namely, 36 per cent of gross national product in 1990 as compared to 28.4 
per cent, respectively. Similarly, while average incomes are broadly comparable in 
Tunisia and Costa Rica, central government expenditure differs markedly, being 37.2 per 
cent of GNP in Tunisia and 27.1 per cent in Costa Rica. Yet Costa Rica's performance in 
terms of human development is much superior to Tunisia's. A large public sector with the 
wrong spending priorities, as in Brazil and Tunisia, will do little to promote human 
development, whereas a smaller public sector with better priorities, as in Costa Rica and 
Sri Lanka, can have a large impact on human development.  
A second issue of limited relevance is the extent of decentralisation within the public 
administration. Many developing countries have highly centralised governments, often 
inherited from the colonial period when the primary concern of the authorities was to 
maintain control over a subject population. After independence the administrative 
structure frequently was retained with only minor modifications, even in countries where 
the size of the public sector increased dramatically and its range of functions widened 
considerably. The consequence was a sharp deterioration in the efficiency of public 
administration and a growing recognition that, regardless of the development strategy 
pursued, a less centralised bureaucracy was likely to be more effective. Thus a strong 
case for decentralisation can be made in many countries whether or not the country 
chooses to give high priority to human development. One should not push this argument 
too far however. Indeed it is argued in Section 5 that decentralization is unlikely to be 
effective unless it includes devolution of power.  
Admittedly the case for decentralisation gains added force when a human development 
strategy is adopted. The reason for this is that such a strategy tends to favour labour 
intensive rather than capital intensive projects, small and dispersed expenditures rather 
than large and geographically concentrated ones, and clusters of locally based 
programmes which are complementary to one another rather than homogeneous nation-
wide programmes. Central administrations located in capital cities are not well placed 
either to design or to implement development programmes with these characteristics. Put 
another way, human development strategies tend to be intensive in the use of local 
knowledge and governments adopting such strategies are more likely to be successful 
when the public administration has strong ties to the grass roots.  This in turn implies the need to organize people around local institutions so that they can 
actively participate in formulating and implementing development programmes. 
Participation is of course an end in itself and the empowerment of people -- giving them 
the capability to act in furthering their own interests -- should be a central objective of 
human development. Indeed the centrality of grass roots participation is an essential 
feature of the strategy and one which distinguishes it from other approaches. This does 
not imply that democratic participation will happen automatically, since democratic 
decision making is a learned skill, but grass roots organizations do provide ideal vehicles 
for acquiring such skills. Human development ultimately rests upon a vigorous civil 
society -- a host of non-governmental organisations that give people a voice and 
instruments for action -- and in countries where civil society is weak, it should be a major 
purpose of public policy to invigorate it. The degree of decentralisation of the public 
administration, while important, is a secondary matter.  
Quite apart from being an end in itself, participation has considerable instrumental value 
in a human development strategy. First, participation in representative grass roots 
organisations can make it easier to identify local opportunities for profitable expenditure 
and to specify priorities, identifying which projects are of primary importance and which 
can be postponed until additional resources become available. In other words, 
representative community-based institutions can help to define the content of 
development programmes at the local level and ensure that they accurately reflect local 
needs, aspirations and demands. Second, having helped to determine priorities and design 
development programmes, participation in functional organisations (irrigation societies, 
land reform committees, trade unions, women's groups, cooperatives) can then be helpful 
in generating support for national as well as local projects, programmes and policies. It is 
not sufficient for policy makers to be able to show that human development expenditures 
enjoy high returns, they must also show that there is sustained political support for such 
programmes from those who benefit from them.  
Finally, participation is a valuable component of a development strategy because it can 
help to reduce the cost of public services and investment projects by shifting 
responsibility from central and local government (where costs tend to be relatively high) 
to the grass roots organisations (where costs tend to be relatively low). In some countries, 
as discussed below, it may be possible to organise the beneficiaries of an investment 
project and persuade them to contribute their labour voluntarily to help defray some of 
the construction costs. This can occur, of course, only when the labourers do indeed 
become the principal beneficiaries of the completed project and this in turn may require 
that they become the owners of the assets they construct. In other cases some of the 
public services with a direct impact on human development (primary health care centres, 
nursery schools, food distribution points) can be organised, staffed and managed by local 
groups rather than by relatively highly paid civil servants brought in from outside the 
community. If the benefits of a particular service can be limited to an identifiable group -- 
a village, urban neighbourhood, lactating mothers -- it may be possible to organize the 
group so that its members bear at least part of the cost of supplying the service. In these 
ways participation can be both an end and a means of human development.  
   Creating a coalition to support human development  
Human development is partly about the empowerment of people. Interventions by 
government to change relative prices in favour of human development, elimination of 
discrimination against women, the creation of additional employment opportunities, the 
removal of barriers inhibiting the expansion of the informal sector, greater access of 
small business to formal credit institutions, a reallocation of public sector resources to 
support human capital formation, and structural reforms favouring greater equity, food 
security and a general reduction in insecurity: all these policy changes will alter the 
distribution of income, wealth and political power. Those who lose from these changes, 
relatively and absolutely, can be expected to resist them. Since the losers are likely to be 
those who have prospered under the status quo, they are unlikely to be the uneducated, 
the undernourished, the unemployed, the unprivileged and the poor. On the contrary, the 
losers are likely to consist largely of the educated, articulate, organised middle and upper 
classes. Their political influence almost certainly will be considerable and should not be 
underestimated; they have the capacity to block policies promoting human development 
or to transmute such policies into programmes which support their interests. Government 
allocations favouring higher education, middle class housing and urban hospitals are 
evidence of the ability of the powerful to control the public sector for their own ends.  
The success of a human development strategy is thus likely to be contingent upon the 
political support of those who expect to gain from the change in strategy. The more 
numerous are the beneficiaries and the stronger are their organisations, the more likely it 
is that they will be able to overcome the resistance of those opposing change. It is not 
enough to design programmes which if implemented will increase the well being of the 
great majority of people, it is also necessary to create the political conditions which make 
it possible actually to implement human development policies. Thus policy makers 
intending to introduce a human development strategy cannot afford to neglect the need to 
create a supporting coalition.  
This coalition may or may not be based partly on political parties, but even if it is, 
support from other organised groups will be needed as well. Indeed the points made 
above about the desirability of a vigorous civil society apply here too. Grass roots 
participation plays three roles: it is an end in itself, an instrument for increasing the 
productive potential of an economy and a means for generating and sustaining political 
support for human development. Locally based non-governmental organisations give 
hitherto unorganised people a voice, an opportunity to articulate their needs and 
preferences, their vision of a better society. Policy makers should view them not as 
hostile to government or in conflict with its objectives but as an essential feature of a 
human development strategy.  
   
NOTES  
2. See Amartya Sen, "Development as Capability Expansion," in Keith Griffin and John Knight, eds., 
Human Development and the International Development Strategy for the 1990s, London: Macmillan, 
1990.  3. For a demonstration of how this approach can be used to analyze human development in a specific 
country see UNDP, Balanced Development: An Approach to Social Action in Pakistan, Islamabad, 
Pakistan, 1992.  
4. The alternative to a benefit-cost approach is to specify specific targets (universal literacy, 75 per cent 
enrollment ratio in secondary education, reduction of the infant mortality rate by a quarter, etc.) and 
then to minimise the cost of attaining the targets. The advantages of specifying the targets in advance 
are, first, that the goals of the development strategy are clearly articulated and can be used to mobilise 
public support and, second, that the performance of the public administration can easily be monitored by 
comparing actual attainments with the specific targets. The disadvantages of target setting are that the 
targets often are arbitrary, the costs of attaining one objective are not compared with the costs of 
attaining other objectives, and consequently, the pattern of development expenditure may be inefficient 
and the overall rate of progress less than it otherwise would have been. See Appendix 2.  
5. Methods for estimating environmental costs of economic activities are surveyed in Maureen L. 
Cropper and Wallace E. Oates, "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. XXX, No. 2, June 1992.  
6. See Keith Griffin, Alternative Strategies for Economic Development, London: Macmillan, 1989.  
7. Paul Isenman, "Basic Needs: The Case of Sri Lanka," World Development, Vol. 8, No. 3, March 
1980.  
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The structure of incentives  
The structure of incentives in an economy has a pervasive influence on the pace and 
pattern of development. Public expenditure is of course important, in some cases 
decisive, but in the great majority of developing countries the public sector employs 
directly only a small fraction of the labour force and produces substantially less than half 
of all goods and services in the economy. Most people obtain their livelihood outside the 
public sector, in the private sector, and most goods and services originate there. What is 
produced, how much is produced and what methods of production are used are questions 
decided largely in the private sector and primarily in response to the set of incentives 
which the private sector faces. The set of incentives, in turn, is strongly influenced by 
public policy, both directly and indirectly, and hence in formulating a human 
development strategy a good place to begin is by examining the structure of incentives.  It is often assumed that the structure of incentives in an economy can be fully described 
by the set of relative prices that prevails and some economists reduce the incentives issue 
to exhortations about "getting prices right". The view taken here however is that prices 
constitute only a part, albeit an important part, of the structure of incentives. Equally 
important are barriers which exclude people from participating in some markets, as 
happens with licensing regulations; or features of an economy which restrict the ease of 
access of some people to markets, such as the restricted access of small businesses to 
formal sector credit markets; or overt discrimination which reduces occupational mobility 
and income enhancing opportunities of some people because of their racial, ethnic, 
gender or other characteristics, such as the customary discrimination against 
"untouchables" in India. Also important are cases of missing markets, where economic 
activity occurs without market mediation and consequently the output that is produced is 
not explicitly valued. An important example is labour performed by females within a 
household economy.  
Thus the structure of incentives includes all activities whether mediated by the market or 
not. And in the case of market mediated activities, it includes discrimination, barriers to 
entry, market access and of course relative prices. The non-price aspects of the incentive 
system often are overlooked, yet as we shall see, they can have very large implications 
for human development.  
   
Employment and the labour market  
Women account for approximately half of the population, yet in the developing countries 
as a whole they represent less than a third of the labour force. In many countries the 
majority of women of working age are not classified as being in the labour force, i.e., 
according to official statistics they are not performing useful work. This of course is 
nonsense. The "missing" female workers are engaged in a multiplicity of tasks -- 
nurturing infants, educating pre-school children, caring for the sick, collecting water and 
fuel, preparing meals, managing the household. What distinguishes these activities from 
others is that the persons performing the work (women) are unpaid and the output 
produced (goods and services consumed within the household) is not valued by the 
market. This is a massive instance of missing markets.  
Because of the statistical invisibility of much work performed by women, many human 
development projects with potentially high returns fail to be implemented. These include 
projects which economise on the time of women and thereby reduce costs as well as 
projects which enable women to produce more in a given period of time and thereby raise 
total output. Examples include investments in village water supplies (which save time 
spent fetching water), in fuel-efficient stoves (which save time collecting wood), in 
schooling for girls (which ultimately raises the productivity of women workers and 
reduces fertility rates) and in nutrition programmes (which improves the health and 
ultimately the productivity of all members of the household). The present structure of 
incentives is strongly biased against investment in these and similar areas and governments wishing to promote human development would do well to bring under the 
calculus of benefits and costs the many activities undertaken where markets are missing.  
Apart from unpaid women producing unpriced goods and services, there are also women 
classified as being economically active, i.e., as being members of the labour force, but 
who receive no remuneration for their work. The most important example is in 
agriculture. In some parts of the world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, women supply 
most of the labour used to grow food crops. The output of women's labour (cereals, 
pulses, vegetables, root crops) may well be valued by the market even when most of the 
production is for consumption within the household, but the labour of the women may 
not be valued by the market because, for example, it is applied to land owned by the male 
head of household or tenanted by the male head of household. The structure of incentives 
in this case may not be biased against the crops grown by women but it is biased against 
innovations which reduce the time and effort spent by women in cultivation, since the 
labour of women is treated as if it had no cost. Thus the returns on investments in 
improved hand implements used by women are overlooked, as are possibilities for 
substituting draft animal power for digging sticks, improved harvesting methods, better 
storage and food processing techniques, etc.  
Where the structure of incentives treats the labour of women as a free good, women 
become an "invisible input" in the process of production. This phenomenon is widespread 
and has led to a pattern of development expenditure that is neither efficient nor equitable. 
Once again, governments wishing to promote human development would do well to 
recognize the full implications of the missing market for female labour.  
Not infrequently labour markets are characterized not only by missing markets but also 
by obvious discrimination. The basis of discrimination can be almost anything -- gender, 
race, ethnicity, language, religion, citizenship -- and seems to be limited only by the 
imagination of humankind in devising plausible criteria for distinguishing one group 
from another. Discrimination need not of course be restricted to the labour market and in 
fact economic discrimination often is reinforced by discrimination in the political and 
social spheres of life. In the economic sphere with which we are here concerned however, 
discrimination can be understood to serve two purposes: to reserve certain well paid, 
highly desirable occupations to a privileged minority and to confine certain groups to low 
paid, undesired occupations. That is, discrimination reduces the upward occupational 
mobility of the unprivileged groups, increases competition among them for the jobs for 
which they are eligible, and thereby increases the supply of workers at the lower end of 
the job ladder and reduces the wage rate. At the top end of the job ladder, discrimination 
reduces the supply of competing labour, restricts competition and raises the wage rate.  
The most elaborate system of discrimination is that of rural India, where occupational 
segregation is intimately connected to the caste hierarchy. Elsewhere discrimination may 
be based on race, as in South Africa where blacks are largely restricted to mining, 
agricultural labour and low skilled jobs in urban areas. Even in Brazil, where overt 
discrimination is illegal, informal discrimination is widespread and there is a close 
correlation between skin colour and rungs on the job ladder, with black skinned persons on the lowest rungs and light skinned persons on the highest. In parts of east Africa and 
Southeast Asia discrimination is based on ethnic origin, with persons of south Asian 
origin being discriminated against in east Africa and persons of Chinese origin being 
discriminated against in southeast Asia.  
Discrimination of course restricts choice and reduces opportunities; it makes it difficult 
and sometimes impossible for people to enlarge their capabilities and achieve their full 
potential. It is thus antithetical to the goals of human development. More subtle than 
overt discrimination are barriers to entry into certain occupations. In Andean America, 
for instance, those who speak an indigenous language (Aymara, Quechua) and wear 
native costume find it difficult to enter relatively well paid urban occupations or to obtain 
jobs in the public administration; they are effectively confined to the rural areas and to 
the informal urban sector. European dress and a knowledge of Spanish are used as 
barriers to entry into formal sector occupations, and the language barrier in particular can 
be quite formidable when low public expenditure on primary and secondary education in 
the countryside leads to low enrolment rates among the children of indigenous peoples.  
Many occupations are in practice reserved for men -- politics, the legal profession, senior 
positions in the public administration, the police and armed forces -- and even when 
formal barriers to entry are absent, women often encounter "glass ceilings" which prevent 
them climbing to the top of the job ladder. Formal sector employment for women often is 
limited to filing clerks, shop attendants and domestic service and in countries where 
competition for urban jobs is especially keen, as in south Asia, even these sources of 
employment are reserved for men. The gender division of labour sometimes is defended 
on grounds that it reflects the culture of a particular country, but when women are denied 
choice, opportunity and avenues to enlarge their capabilities, "culture" should be seen not 
as a distinctive and valuable mark of civilization but as ideology sanctioning barriers to 
the human development of women.  
The price component of the structure of labour market incentives, i.e., the set of relative 
wage rates, has received much attention. The thrust of the argument is that in general 
wage rates in the urban formal sector have been too high in the sense that the cost of 
labour to employers has exceeded its opportunity cost, i.e., the value of the output 
produced by the next best alternative use of labour. Many reasons have been advanced 
for the relatively high cost of formal sector labour: the wage policies adopted by the 
government itself for public sector employees, minimum wage legislation, the ability of 
labour unions to push wages above a market clearing level, etc. There is little doubt that 
in many occupational categories there is an excess supply of labour at the going wage 
rate, although the belief that these wages are inflexible downwards has been undermined 
by the sharp fall in real wages that occurred in the formal sector in east Africa during the 
severe economic crises of the 1980s .8  
Whenever there is an excess supply of people seeking work at the going wage rate, there 
is at least a suspicion that employment opportunities could be increased, and human 
development thereby promoted, by lowering formal sector wages. This apparently simple 
remedy is more complex than first appears however. Whether some wages are "too high", even non-market clearing wages, depends on the context and the forces operating in the 
various labour markets. The labour "market" in developing countries is highly 
fragmented. In some cases markets are missing; in others there are numerous barriers to 
entry; in still others there is covert or overt discrimination. In addition, labour markets are 
segmented, with workers in the urban informal sector and rural occupations receiving 
very low remuneration and workers in the urban formal sector usually enjoying relatively 
high wages. These high wages, in turn, often are a result of decisions by firms to pay 
wages above the market clearing level to reduce turnover or, they are a direct result of 
government policy.  
These fragmented and segmented labour markets should be seen as a whole, as a system 
of labour control. The structure of incentives within this system restricts the occupational 
and social mobility of a large portion of the population: it keeps people, men and women, 
"in their place". At the same time, it sometimes produces relatively high incomes for a 
very small but privileged minority of the labour force. That is, the structure of incentives 
leads simultaneously to an inefficient use of labour and an unequal distribution of 
income. Thus the issue confronting those who wish to promote human development is not 
that the price of formal sector labour is too high (i.e., above its opportunity cost), but that 
the structure of the labour market operates in such a way that a disproportionately large 
fraction of the labour force is compelled to seek a livelihood at the bottom of the 
occupational hierarchy, with the result that the remuneration of most workers is lower 
than it otherwise would be and in some cases (particularly for women) is zero. The policy 
implication is not to raise or lower a particular wage or set of wages but to reform the 
system of labour control.  
None of this should be taken to imply, however, that a highly "fluid" labour market, with 
high turnover and little sense of loyalty or commitment between employer and employee, 
is preferable to a more "rigid" labour market in which formal sector workers enjoy 
security of employment. A combination of relatively high wages (to reduce labour 
turnover) and job security (to encourage workers to invest in firm specific human capital 
and to cooperate in the introduction of technical innovation), as in Japan, may actually be 
more efficient in the long run than labour markets which conform to the textbook 
descriptions of perfect competition.9  
   
Access to finance capital  
Many of the issues that arise in trying to understand the structure of incentives in the 
labour market also arise when studying the capital market. In many developing countries 
the most prominent feature of the capital market is its structural dualism, i.e., its division 
in two parts, a formal and an informal sector. The formal financial sector contains 
commercial banks, insurance companies, perhaps a stock market, a government 
established and operated development bank, and perhaps a housing finance institution. 
These institutions cater to the needs of large, well established industrial and service 
enterprises (domestic and foreign), the wealthy (for personal loans), the upper middle 
class (in the case of mortgages) and, in the rural areas, large farmers, ranchers and plantation companies. The informal credit market -- the black, grey and curb markets -- 
consists of pawn shops, money changers operating on city sidewalks, professional rural 
money lenders, shopkeepers who also provide credit for their trusted customers, large 
landowners who provide credit for their tenants, and friends and relatives who 
occasionally come to the rescue of those in distress. The informal credit market thus 
serves the majority of the population, small businesses in general, the urban informal 
sector, peasant farmers, the poor.  
The formal credit market differs from the informal credit market in terms of price and 
ease of access. Prices charged in the formal credit market are relatively low. Nominal 
rates of interest are modest, sometimes below the rate of inflation, and consequently real 
rates of interest may even be negative. The low cost of credit to borrowers leads to 
enormous excess demand in the market and hence severe credit rationing. Those who 
succeed in obtaining cheap credit, however, have a strong incentive to invest in 
mechanised techniques of production, i.e., to economise on the use of labour and human 
capital generally. The result is an inefficient allocation of finance capital (an excessive 
degree of mechanisation) combined with an unequal distribution of income (because the 
chosen factor proportions shift value added away from wages towards profits and rents).  
The rate of interest in the informal credit market varies over an enormous range. In some 
cases it is zero (e.g., occasional loans among relatives); in other cases real rates of interest 
can be extremely high (e.g., seasonal credit supplied by money lenders to small 
landowning peasant cultivators); while in other cases the rate of interest is indeterminate 
(as when factor markets are interlinked and landowners, say, offer their tenants a 
"package" of land use, credit and marketing services in return for a share of the crop 
intended to cover rent, interest and transport costs).10 In general, however, the cost of 
credit in the informal capital market is a multiple of the cost in the formal capital market 
and this provides a strong incentive for borrowers to adopt excessively labour intensive 
methods of production, with the result that the productivity of labour and hence labour 
incomes are lower than they would otherwise be. That is, incentives generated in the 
formal credit market encourage borrowers to reduce the employment of labour, whereas 
incentives generated in the informal credit market force borrowers to adopt techniques 
which reduce the productivity of labour and the earnings of working people, including the 
self-employed. In both cases the set of incentives is inimical to human development.  
This outcome arises from persistent differences in ease of access of different groups of 
people to the formal and informal credit markets. If the two markets were closely 
integrated discrepancies in interest rates and in the cost of capital in general would be 
reduced by arbitrage to differences in risk, transaction costs and the cost to lenders of 
acquiring information. Actual differences in the cost of capital between the informal and 
formal credit markets, however, are much greater than can be justified by risk premia and 
the costs of doing business. The differences are so great because the degree of integration 
is low; for practical purposes the two markets are virtually separate. Illiterate farmers, 
self-employed itinerant vendors, fishermen, rural artisans, small shopkeepers, urban 
informal sector producers and workers, small businessmen engaged in urban or inter-
provincial transport, and women in general have little or no access to the commercial banking system. They are forced to rely on the informal credit market and many persons 
are unable to obtain credit even from that source. They are excluded by their inability to 
read and write, by unfamiliarity with administrative procedures, by lack of collateral and 
by insecure legal titles to their property.  
A human development strategy should seek to improve access to credit markets not by 
passing so-called anti-usury laws but by increasing the supply of credit channelled 
through the informal credit markets and by changing the characteristics of informal sector 
borrowers so they become more credit worthy. Anti-usury laws directed at money lenders 
and other informal sector suppliers of credit, far from lowering interest rates, will instead 
reduce the supply of credit, raise costs of lending and actually push up informal sector 
interest rates. Such legislation will only make matters worse. Instead the government 
should work with the informal sector lenders, channelling funds through informal sector 
institutions in order to increase the availability of credit and lower its cost. There is no 
need, however, for the government to go to the opposite extreme and subsidize credit by 
lending at artificially low interest rates.  
In some societies women have particular difficulties obtaining loans for small scale 
economic activities, partly because they are not allowed to own or in practice do not 
possess property that can be used as collateral. In many parts of the world, but 
particularly in Africa, women have attempted to overcome discrimination against them in 
the credit market by forming rotating savings and credit associations or other cooperative 
arrangements. 11 In other cases banks have been formed which combine small loans and 
technical assistance to women, the loans being secured by the commitment of a group of 
women to assume responsibility for each other's debts. The most famous example is the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.12 Government support for such initiatives can go part 
way to increasing the supply of credit in informal capital markets.  
Access to credit can be improved through increased literacy (which enables borrowers to 
enter into formal loan contracts), by expenditure on primary and secondary education in 
rural areas (which builds self-confidence and familiarity with routine administrative 
formalities) and by providing secure titles to land and other assets. In many developing 
countries, especially in Latin America and parts of southeast Asia, private land tenure is 
insecure. This affects small cultivators in particular and notably those on the margins of 
the cultivated area who have cleared forests to bring more land under the plow. 
Adjudication of ownership claims often takes years and meanwhile property rights are 
insecure. This, in turn, has three effects. First, insecurity of tenure discourages long term 
investment in immovable assets. It creates a disincentive to increase the stock of natural 
capital -- land improvements, conservation measures -- and to invest in certain types of 
complementary physical capital -- fences, barns and other structures. Thus the set of 
incentives actually encourages environmental degradation. 13 Second, insecure titles 
reduce the price which land can fetch in the market, and this provides an incentive for the 
wealthy, who can afford the time and cost of adjudicating property claims, to purchase 
land from the poor at a discount. This then leads to increased inequality in the distribution 
of wealth. Third, insecurity makes it difficult for small farmers to raise credit from the 
commercial banks because formal sector lenders are reluctant to supply capital to those without clear titles.14 Thus a weakness in the land market, namely insecure private 
tenure, raises a barrier to entry into the formal sector capital market.  
Looking beyond capital markets to the distribution of investment opportunities, it is often 
assumed that one of the things that distinguishes the informal sector of the economy from 
the formal sector is an absence of barriers to entry. In the informal sector -- characterised 
as it is by small, labour intensive enterprises, self-employment and low skilled services -- 
it is taken for granted that competition is intense and there is freedom of entry and exit. 
And at a certain level of analysis this description is undoubtedly correct. It is also the 
case, however, that informal sector enterprises often are prevented by law from 
competing with formal sector enterprises. A host of barriers to entry have been erected to 
protect the formal sector from competition from the informal sector. These barriers take 
the form of licenses, regulations, city ordinances and other controls which exclude 
informal sector enterprises from profitable activities in urban transport (taxis, buses, 
minivans), construction and food services and regulate competition by sidewalk vendors 
with formal sector retail establishments. The ostensible reasons for these regulations and 
controls are the health, safety and convenience of the public, but given that most of the 
public are poor people who would benefit from the freedom to compete and seek a better 
livelihood in highly profitable, protected activities, it seems that the real reason lies 
elsewhere, viz., in protecting the incomes of the relatively well-to-do.  
Governments seeking to promote human development should re-examine their regulatory 
systems with a view to removing restraints on the growth and development of the 
informal sector. The structure of incentives faced by members of this sector tends to 
perpetuate poverty and inefficiency and to retard the overall rate of growth of the 
economy. Liberating the private sector could usefully begin by removing shackles which 
hobble the expansion and diversification of activities which potentially are attractive to 
people with only limited access to capital.15  
   
Land, natural capital and comparative advantage  
When designing a human development strategy, it is not enough to scrutinize labour and 
capital markets for possible malfunctioning; other markets should also be examined, 
particularly markets that supply widely used inputs that influence the structure of costs in 
a variety of economic activities. The land market is a case in point.  
It has already been argued that insecure land titles contribute to the difficulties faced by 
small farmers in obtaining credit. The problems associated with land management and 
land use, however, go beyond the issue of private property rights. Publicly owned land 
often has been managed inefficiently, has accentuated environmental degradation and has 
benefited disproportionately the upper income groups. Encroachments on public lands 
(forests, grazing land, mountainous areas) is common. Because of poor management, 
public land often is treated as a free good; the resource base is "mined" and 
environmental damage can be extensive; the "tragedy of the commons" is the result. In 
southeast Asia timber pricing policies on public land have led to a waste of forest resources and a failure to replant.16 In Brazil, government subsidies and tax incentives 
have led to extensive clearing of the Amazon forest. Indeed, the only way to obtain title 
to land in the Amazon is by removing the trees from the land. 17 Similar problems arise 
with respect to the use of publicly owned subsurface water: it is often treated as a free 
good, is consequently used wastefully and the rate of extraction usually exceeds the 
recharge rate, thus ensuring that the process ultimately is unsustainable.  
Heavy government expenditure on subsidies to fuel, chemicals and water has tilted 
incentives away from human capital in favour of intensive exploitation of natural capital. 
Fertilizer has been heavily subsidized in India and the other countries of south Asia with 
the result that surface water (rivers, lakes) and ground water supplies have become 
polluted. Subsidies to pesticides (and also to some extent herbicides) have led to a 
concentration of toxic chemicals in water and land, and in a few instances this has 
threatened to reduce biological diversity. Subsidies to fuel have encouraged agricultural 
mechanization at the expense of employment of labour. Perhaps most serious of all has 
been massive public investment in managed irrigation systems and the provision of water 
to farmers by the state at prices well below cost. In Egypt, irrigation water from the Nile 
is free; in Brazil and other parts of Latin America, the price of government supplied 
irrigation water does not even cover the variable costs of the irrigation system, let alone 
the capital costs; the same is true of publicly managed irrigation systems in north Africa, 
the Middle East and south Asia.  
The set of incentives created by government intervention in market processes has had 
four unfortunate effects. First, it has damaged the environment and led to the depletion of 
the natural stock of capital through soil salination, deforestation, water pollution, etc. 
Second, as we will see in section 3, the government subsidies which underpin the set of 
incentives have absorbed a significant portion of the public revenues potentially available 
to support human development. The benefits of the subsidies have accrued not to the poor 
but primarily to upper income groups. Third, the structure of incentives has led to an 
inefficient use of resources; it has sent false signals to producers and helped to entrap 
developing countries in a pattern of production which is economically disadvantageous. 
The structure of incentives has led countries to adopt the wrong comparative advantage, 
to concentrate on products which are overly intensive in the use of natural capital and to 
neglect their potential comparative advantage in products which are intensive in the use 
of human capital. As a result, the shift out of primary commodity exports has been slower 
than it might have been and the creation of new comparative advantages in skilled labour 
intensive manufactured products and services has been delayed. Finally, the structure of 
incentives has led not only to static inefficiency in resource allocation and a pattern of 
trade that fails to reflect long run comparative advantage, it has also led to a pattern of 
investment that tends to perpetuate the status quo. That is, government subsidies to fuels, 
fertilizer, pesticides, water, timber and land affect not only the use of the existing stock of 
capital, whether natural, physical or human, they also generate political pressure from the 
beneficiaries of the subsidies for additional public investment in related areas (irrigation, 
state owned fertilizer plants, highways to open up virgin forests) and for ever larger 
subsidies to inputs. Once embarked on this road, it is difficult to change direction: vested 
interests can be expected to exert pressure to sustain existing programmes. Hence the need for reform-minded governments actively to build coalitions to support human 
development.  
   
Human capital and dynamic comparative advantage  
As suggested in the previous paragraph, compared to conventional strategies, a human 
development strategy is more conducive to promoting the long term comparative 
advantage of a developing country. Some developing countries may be endowed with an 
abundance of natural resources, but the costs associated with trying to exploit this 
comparative advantage for international trade have invariably been underestimated. 
When the true domestic opportunity costs of environmental degradation have been 
ascertained, many countries may not indeed be blessed with a real comparative 
advantage, certainly not at the rate at which they are exploiting their natural capital. 
Rather, their long term comparative advantage may be better cultivated by investing in 
human capital. If the development policies of governments have not reflected such an 
orientation, one of the major reasons is that the benefits of investment in human capital 
have not been fully recognized.  
During the 1980s many developing countries still relied heavily on the export of primary 
commodities and confronted sharply declining terms of trade for these products.18 Those 
countries which succeeded in making the transition to exporting labour-intensive 
manufactures fared better. But even the terms of trade for manufactured exports began to 
show signs of decline.19 This underlines the importance for developing countries of 
developing a long run, dynamic view of their comparative advantage. If countries are to 
compete in a global economic environment undergoing dramatic change, driven in part 
by rapid technological innovation, it is essential that they continuously upgrade the skills 
and education of their workforce. For most countries this will require a significant 
reallocation of public sector resources towards programmes promoting human capital 
formation. One of the reasons that there is a low social rate of return on highly skilled 
labour in developing countries is that employment sometimes is not available for many of 
the people who complete a tertiary education. While there may be deficient demand for 
scientists, engineers, computer specialists, and other professionals now, if developing 
countries concentrate on enhancing their long run comparative advantage, these skills 
will be in increasing demand in future.  
Enhancing a country's long run comparative advantage requires an activist state. This 
may not be a state which engages in large public investment projects, but it must be a 
state which attempts to influence the allocation of resources in the direction which best 
promotes the long term growth and development of the economy. Especially with regard 
to human development expenditures, which are characterized by many positive 
externalities and complementarities, the private market mechanism tends to under-
allocate resources for such purposes. It is incumbent on the state to ensure that there is 
adequate financing for human capital formation, not only to increase present income 
flows, but also to ensure future high rates of growth.  If a developing country concentrates on human capital as the basis for its long run 
comparative advantage, this does not imply that it should follow an export-promoting or 
export-biased trade strategy. An export-promoting strategy biases domestic output 
towards supplying external demand rather than domestic demand and thereby subjects a 
country to the fluctuations and uncertainties of the international market. This strategy 
could be risky during a period in which protectionism has been on the rise in developed 
countries, the rate of the growth of the global economy has been slowing, and potentially 
exclusionary trading blocs are emerging.  
A more sensible policy is one which fosters an open economy, but open in the sense that 
it biases production neither towards exports nor towards domestic demand.20 The 
exchange rate is not deliberately under-valued in order to boost exports artificially. Such 
a policy of undervaluation may enable a country to export a greater volume of labour-
intensive manufactures based initially on its endowment of low-skilled labour, but it does 
not engender the competitive pressures that compel a country to make the transition to 
more human-capital-intensive exports.  
Under an open economy trade regime neither is the exchange rate over-valued, since this 
would enable a country artificially to cheapen the import of capital and intermediate 
goods. Over-valued exchange rates have been characteristic of import substitution trade 
regimes. The policies of import substitution -- over-valued exchange rates, high tariffs, 
physical import controls, restrictions on foreign exchange and capital movements, and 
cheap rationed financial capital -- have fostered a capital-intensive structure of 
production in many developing countries and undermined their potential comparative 
advantage in labour-intensive exports. In general, the policies have biased investment 
towards physical capital and away from human capital. Pakistan represents a classic 
example of the distortions in resource allocation which result from import substitution 
policies.21  
A trade orientation based on a comparative advantage arising from a relative abundance 
of human capital is not only likely to engender a more rapid rate of long term growth than 
one based on physical capital or natural capital, but it is also likely to distribute the 
benefits of such growth more equitably. In most developing countries ownership of land 
and other natural resources is unequally distributed, as is the ownership of physical 
capital. Exports intensive in the use of natural resources or physical capital mainly serve 
to enlarge the share of rents or profit in national income, whereas labour-intensive 
exports help to increase the share of wages.  
   
Complementarities between public and private investment  
Governments affect the set of incentives to which private producers respond and, because 
of the dynamics of the political process, state investment also is likely to respond to the 
set of government influenced incentives. In principle this is not undesirable. After all, if 
the set of incentives provides correct signals for resource allocation, it would be desirable 
for both the private and public sectors to respond to the same signals. If the signals are misleading, perhaps in the ways suggested above, this is an argument for changing the 
structure of incentives, not for reducing the level of government activity. That is, a 
defective set of incentives caused partly by government subsidies and other forms of 
intervention should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence of "government failure" 
resulting from incompetence or ignorance; it might simply reflect a different set of policy 
goals.  
Many cases can be found -- Haiti is a glaring example -- where governments have been 
prepared to sacrifice efficiency, protection of the environment, growth and poverty 
alleviation for higher incomes for their supporters. The structure of incentives necessary 
to achieve this result may be highly successful in its own terms and it would be a mistake 
to claim that in such cases public policy is prone to "government failure" and future 
governments should abstain from interfering with the market. Moreover, even in genuine 
cases of government failure, it does not follow that the best solution is to reduce the scale 
of government activities. It might be more sensible to correct the failure, e.g., by 
increasing the information available to the government, by devoting resources to training 
programmes for civil servants, or by reforming the public administration to make it more 
accountable to the general public.  
A human development strategy is likely to require an activist state. First, it will have to 
intervene to correct the bias in favour of products and processes of production which are 
intensive in the use of natural capital. If left to its own devices the market tends to ignore 
many costs which damage the environment. Second, it will have to intervene to correct 
the bias against human capital formation. If left to its own devices the market tends to 
ignore many of the benefits associated with expenditure on human development. Third, 
the state will have to be active in financing and undertaking investment broadly 
conceived, including expenditure on research and development, education and training, 
health and nutrition, as well as investment in many forms of physical capital such as 
transport, power and urban infrastructure.  
It is sometimes claimed that public expenditure "crowds out" private expenditure and that 
the returns on private investment are greater than the returns on public expenditure. This 
is then used as an argument to reduce taxation and state spending. In the case of a human 
development strategy, however, this argument clearly is wrong: public investment, 
broadly defined, is complementary to private investment. We have here a case of 
"crowding in", not "crowding out".  
Precisely because human development expenditures generate positive externalities -- 
benefits that are not fully captured by the market mechanism -- the state must take the 
lead in a wide range of activities from child nutrition programmes to investments in 
scientific research and technology. Once these state investments are in place, the private 
sector can appropriate the external benefits through investments of its own and in so 
doing obtain a higher rate of profit than would otherwise be possible. That is, the rate of 
profit on private investment varies positively with public expenditure on human 
development. At the same time, the benefits of public expenditure on human 
development are realised partly as a result of employment generated by private investment. Public and private investment thus are complementary to one another. The 
larger is expenditure on human development, the larger is likely to be the volume of 
private investment. In addition, the larger is expenditure on human development, the 
more even will be the distribution of income, everything else being equal, and partly 
because of its effects on private investment, the faster will be the overall rate of growth.  
   
Summary  
The structure of incentives refers not only to the set of relative prices that prevails in an 
economy but also to the degree of access to markets, barriers to entry and discrimination. 
In many developing countries the structure of incentives is in conflict with the objectives 
of human development and it will be important in designing a human development 
strategy to consider how best the structure of incentives can be improved.  
Human development is much concerned with correcting market failures, particularly 
failures of factor markets. If left to its own devices the signals generated by an 
unrestricted market would lead to systematic underinvestment in the stock of human 
capital, including expenditures on training and apprenticeship programmes, all three 
levels of formal education, basic health care, pre- and post-natal maternal and child care 
and nutrition programmes. All of these activities have some of the characteristics of 
"public goods" and generate positive externalities. The market would also lead to 
underinvestment in research in science and technology -- because private firms cannot 
capture the full benefits of their expenditure on research and development (despite 
patents and copyright laws), because investment in scientific research is "lumpy" and 
characterized by economies of scale over a considerable range, and because individual 
research projects viewed in isolation often are risky and consequently are unattractive 
unless pooled in a large national research programme.  
Labour markets in developing countries often are far from efficient. They are highly 
fragmented and sometimes segmented into non-competing or only partially competing 
groups. Discrimination against women and other groups in society is common. There are 
many barriers to entry into high paying occupations and access to formal sector 
employment is restricted. Wage rates fail to reflect the opportunity cost of labour, being 
too low at the lower end of the job hierarchy and too high at the top end. There is thus a 
strong case for a government committed to a human development strategy to become 
actively involved in improving the functioning of labour markets.  
Broadly similar issues arise in the case of financial and capital markets. The price of 
finance capital in formal sector markets often is below the opportunity cost of capital, 
thereby discouraging investment in human capital and the creation of formal sector 
employment. In the informal sector, the price of finance capital varies widely but in 
general exceeds the opportunity cost of capital in the economy as a whole and this leads 
to the adoption of excessively labour intensive methods of production, low productivity 
and low earnings from employment. Here again, a strong case can be made for 
governments to intervene to improve the structure of incentives.  Market failures also produce adverse unintended effects on the environment. In the 
market for land government subsidies often reinforce and exacerbate pressures for the 
intensive exploitation of natural capital. Part of the problem arises from a neglect by 
private sector actors of negative externalities associated with production; another part 
arises from poor management of publicly owned land and its treatment as a free good; yet 
another part arises from poorly defined property rights (whether public or private) 
governing the use of many natural resources. Governments not only fail to correct the 
distorted incentive structures which damage the natural stock of capital, they intensify the 
problem by subsidizing fuel, chemicals and irrigation water used by farmers. These 
policies also place a heavy burden on government budgets and lead countries to follow a 
comparative advantage based on the intensive use of natural capital rather than human 
capital. Instead of alleviating the poverty which is a major cause in some countries of 
environmental degradation, government subsidy programmes enrich upper income 
groups and increase inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. One of the 
important lessons that has emerged from the current discussions on future directions for 
development is that human development is neither desirable nor possible without 
sustainable development. There is no inherent conflict between these two seemingly 
different objectives. In fact, compared to other strategies, a human development strategy 
relies on an incentive structure which is more compatible with protection and 
enhancement of the natural environment.  
While the costs associated with the exploitation of natural capital have been 
underestimated, so have the benefits of investing in human capital. A failure to perceive 
this has led governments when formulating their trade strategies to neglect potential long 
run comparative advantage based on a skilled, educated labour force able to learn and 
apply technological innovations. Such a trade strategy requires an active state which 
takes into account the positive externalities generated by human capital formation and 
which by restructuring private incentives or by direct expenditure compensates for the 
tendency of the private sector to under-invest in human capital. The appropriate trade 
strategy is one which promotes an open economy, artificially biased neither towards 
export promotion nor import substitution. Such a trade regime is the most supportive of 
human development in the long run.  
Defects in the incentive system often reflect not market failure but the policies of 
government itself. Special attention has been paid in the discussion to subsidies for water, 
fertilizer and fuel, although the full range of subsidies must also be considered when 
designing a human development strategy for a specific country. It is tempting to 
characterize policy interventions inimical to human development as examples of 
government failure, but this would be wrong. The government may simply have pursued 
different objectives and it would be pointless to accuse it of failing to achieve goals it did 
not seek.  
Where there is genuine government failure, the best remedy may not be to reduce 
government intervention in the economy, as usually advised, but to correct the failure so 
that future interventions will do more good than harm. Government intervention and 
government expenditure are not regarded as desirable in themselves but because the very nature of a human development strategy requires an activist state capable of playing a 
leading role. Human development seldom is served by reducing public expenditure, but it 
often could be served by altering the composition of public expenditure. The strategy 
requires not that the government do fewer things but that it do different things. This is the 
topic of the next section.  
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Reallocation of public sector resources  
The structure of incentives generates the signals that guide the allocation of resources and 
influence the division of investment among natural, physical and human capital. The 
structure of incentives cannot however determine the speed of response -- the elasticity of 
supply -- to economic opportunities. That depends on other things: initial conditions, 
institutional arrangements, the capabilities of people and government initiatives. The 
following section focuses on the role of government and in particular on the way 
government expenditure can contribute to human development.  
A human development strategy does not necessarily imply that the state will control a 
larger share of the economy's resources than would occur under a more conventional 
strategy, but it does imply that the state will use its resources in a fundamentally different 
way. The strategy is not inherently more costly to the exchequer than conventional 
strategies, neither in the short nor in the long run. A government that chooses to 
emphasize human development will have to reallocate its expenditure in favour of human 
capital activities, but this need not lead to the swollen budgets and enlarged bureaucracies 
associated with some forms of the welfare state in developed economies. Human 
development is not a euphemism for the wide array of social policies one typically finds 
in western Europe; it is a growth and development strategy intended to improve the well 
being of people in as short a time as possible.  
Implementation of the strategy will require a change in the composition of government 
spending. First, the percentage of the budget earmarked for activities which do not 
contribute to development should be reduced to a minimum. This includes spending on 
the military and internal security (which often have little to do with defending the state 
from external enemies), subsidies for some public enterprises (particularly those -- 
airlines, luxury hotels, breweries -- which cater primarily to upper income groups), 
excessively large bureaucracies in the public administration (which sometimes have been 
used to reduce unemployment among the urban educated youth) and external debt service. The revenues thus saved should be used to raise the proportion of expenditure 
devoted to human development, including greater spending on education and training, 
basic health and nutrition, fresh water supplies, etc.  
Second, within the broad category of human development spending there should be a 
reallocation toward those activities which benefit the largest number of people. Spreading 
resources evenly over large groups rather than concentrating them on small groups is 
likely to yield a higher rate of return. It will also be more equitable and more consistent 
with democratic aspirations. In many developing countries this implies giving higher 
priority to programmes of particular benefit to women and to such things as child 
nutrition programmes, rural education, small medical clinics and paramedical personnel 
and to small scale irrigation projects and other locally based development schemes.  
Third, the elaborate, expensive and comprehensive pension and social security systems as 
found in the West should be avoided, and where they already exist in embryo, their 
further development should be postponed until they can be extended to the entire 
population and particularly to those most in need. Most social security schemes in 
developing countries benefit the urban elite and cannot be justified within a human 
development strategy. This does not mean however that measures to increase economic 
security must be postponed indefinitely, but it does mean that policies adopted in the 
developed countries should not be imitated or replicated without careful consideration of 
costs and benefits and distributive equity. Some feasible programmes for developing 
countries, oriented towards the poor, are discussed in Section 4.  
Finally, a human development strategy must walk a fine line between selectivity in public 
expenditure and the provision of universal services. The conventional wisdom today is 
that public expenditure should be carefully targeted on selected beneficiaries: leakages to 
non-beneficiaries should be avoided as much as possible on grounds of economy. Insofar 
as government spending can be accurately targeted on the rural and urban poor, there is 
something to be said for the conventional wisdom. There are however several problems 
with this approach. First, in many cases relevant to a human development strategy it is 
not possible to restrict the benefits of public expenditure to specific groups. A farm-to-
market road, for example, can be used by anyone in the vicinity, rich and poor alike. A 
publicly supported secondary school must be accessible to all children in the community 
on similar terms; tuition charges for the children of the rich are not really feasible. 
Second, where selectivity is possible, it often is costly to enforce. Large and elaborate 
administrative structures may be necessary to exclude undesired beneficiaries or to 
discriminate positively in favour of intended beneficiaries. The benefits of selectivity 
may accrue in part to the bureaucrats who administer the programmes, surely not a target 
group. This is not to deny, for instance, that in some cases user fees for the non-poor and 
scholarships for the poor are possible, but one should not expect too much of 
discriminatory charges and subsidies. Third, it may be politically advantageous for tax 
supported human development programmes to be universal, open to everyone who 
wishes to take advantage of them. The gains in terms of national solidarity, full 
commitment and widespread participation in nationwide development programmes may 
outweigh the additional costs of organising universal, non-targeted services and projects. This will be especially true if the services are universal in terms of eligibility but are 
designed to be attractive primarily to certain groups only, so that the intended 
beneficiaries are largely self-selected. This is a topic revisited in Section 4.  
The reallocation of public expenditure implied by a human development strategy does not 
entail a trade-off between efficiency and growth. On the contrary, provided an 
appropriate structure of incentives is put in place, public expenditures in support of 
human development should increase both allocative efficiency and the rate of growth of 
personal incomes properly measured. The social rates of return on human development 
expenditures, when all benefits and costs are taken into account, are quite high. The per 
capita costs of primary health care and, say, the first twelve years of education are much 
lower than the costs of university education and urban hospitals. Moreover, the social 
benefits of investment, when correctly calculated, are usually higher at the base of an 
expenditure pyramid (e.g. primary education) than at the peak (e.g. doctoral programmes 
at universities). Thus expenditure on human capital formation can be a very efficient way 
to promote development.  
A healthy, literate, skilled labour force is the foundation of a country's long term growth. 
Sharp bursts of growth can be experienced by exploiting natural resources that happen to 
be in great demand, but unless the economic rents from natural resource extraction are 
transformed into human capital, such growth is unlikely to be sustainable. The experience 
of some oil exporting countries is testimony to this. As the world economy becomes 
increasingly integrated, the comparative advantage of developing countries, particularly 
the larger and more populous ones, is likely to rest on the skills, education and technical 
competence of their labour force. In addition, the existence of a highly skilled and 
educated labour force will affect the transfer of technology, making it easier to absorb 
technical knowledge produced in economically more advanced countries. Similarly, the 
presence in a developing country of a highly skilled and educated labour force will make 
it easier for the country to attract foreign capital. Thus in numerous ways a human 
development strategy is likely to increase the global opportunities open to developing 
countries. Ultimately, people are a country's principal asset. The benefits of investing in 
people however go beyond the increase in the productivity of labour and access to global 
opportunities: a healthy, well educated citizenry contributes to the social cohesion of a 
country and imparts a dynamism to all aspects of life and culture.  
Human development became an attractive policy alternative in reaction to the heavy 
social costs incurred under orthodox stabilization and structural adjustment programmes. 
That is, human development was seen as a way to achieve "adjustment with a human 
face".22It can better be understood, however, as a long term strategy with important 
implications for short and medium term stabilization programmes.  
Adjustment, stabilization, restructuring -- call them what you will, they mean much the 
same thing -- are tactical responses to external shocks and internal macroeconomic 
disequilibria. These tactical responses should not be allowed to undermine the 
foundations for long term development -- as occurred in Africa and Latin America during 
the "lost decade" of the 1980s -- by reducing the rate of human capital formation. If it is necessary in the short term to cut government expenditure, then those items which are of 
secondary importance should be eliminated and human development expenditures 
protected. Put another way, human development expenditures constitute the core of a 
government's development strategy. They are neither luxury items to be added on to 
conventional development strategies when resources permit, nor are they expendable 
items that can readily be discarded during periods of retrenchment. They are the heart and 
soul of government efforts to improve the well being of a nation's people.  
A human development strategy however, like any development strategy, requires political 
support to sustain it. The reallocation of public expenditure that accompanies the 
introduction of a human development strategy will create both losers and gainers, and in 
designing the strategy the reaction of potential losers should be anticipated. There is an 
asymmetry during the transition period: those who gained from conventional 
development strategies and can be expected to lose relatively and perhaps absolutely 
from a change of strategy are likely to constitute an articulate, well organized and 
powerful opposition; the potential beneficiaries, in contrast, while numerically large, are 
likely to be less articulate, unorganized and politically less influential. Their support for 
change, moreover, is based merely on an expectation of gain, a gain that bitter experience 
may have told them is uncertain and possibly long delayed, whereas the opposition of the 
minority is based on a virtual certainty of loss, and a loss that will be felt immediately. 
Thus while there is potentially a broad base of support for policies of human 
development, these policies must be carefully selected and crafted to minimize opposition 
and avoid alienating those in the middle whose net gains or losses will be relatively 
small.  
Political and economic considerations hence point in the same direction: government 
plans for human development should avoid long lists of desirable but vague objectives 
which provide little guidance to operational ministries as to how to achieve the 
objectives. Human development objectives are not moral imperatives. They should be 
carefully selected on the basis of (i) rigorous technical analysis which weighs benefits 
and costs, (ii) a political calculation of the number and strength of potential supporters 
and opponents, and (iii) an assessment of the feasibility and desirability of using some of 
the benefits to compensate the losers. Whenever a policy change results in a net 
improvement in the form of a rise in average incomes but is accompanied by a fall in the 
incomes of some groups, it is in principle possible for the losers to be compensated by the 
gainers while still leaving the latter better off. Whether compensation should in fact be 
paid depends, we suggest, on two things: whether the distribution of income after the 
policy change is preferable to the previous distribution and, if so, whether none the less, 
the losers must be "bribed" to acquiesce in the change and not use their political power to 
frustrate it.  
Consider public expenditure on education as an example. It is often said, quite rightly, 
that human development accords highest priority to primary education, but this 
generalization is not a universally established truth and in considering a possible 
reallocation of public expenditure in favour of primary education, the contributions of 
secondary and tertiary education should not be overlooked. The social rate of return to different levels of education is something that must be determined, not assumed, and this 
must be done while taking into account the complementarities that exist among the 
different levels of education. One example of complementarities is the role of universities 
in producing well trained and highly motivated teachers for primary and secondary 
education. Apart from the interlinkages among the three tiers of the formal education 
system, there is a political reason for not neglecting university education, namely, the 
need to secure the cooperation of the educated classes upon whom much of the success of 
a human development strategy depends. Moreover, the educated middle classes should be 
natural allies of human development since the strategy gives high priority to education at 
all levels, to scientific research and development and to technical change as sources of 
growth and international competitiveness.  
In choosing specific objectives for human development and the sequence of policy 
initiatives, it is important to take into consideration the degree to which human 
development programmes can be used to mobilize the participation of the intended 
beneficiaries. Human development is participatory development and the more people can 
become directly involved as agents of change, the more successful the overall strategy is 
likely to be. Campaigns to promote literacy, basic health care, primary education, 
immunization of children against epidemic diseases are ideal vehicles for active 
community participation. Local financial, material and labour resources can be mobilized 
in support of clearly defined goals and local communities can be organized on a 
permanent basis to monitor progress and ensure that the volume and quality of services 
are maintained once the campaigns are over.  
All of this depends of course on selecting goals that are feasible, i.e., capable of being 
achieved with the resources and administrative capabilities at hand. Excessively 
ambitious targets should be avoided and careful attention should be paid to the sequence 
of projects and programmes. One of the distinguishing features of policies that promote 
human development is that they tend to reinforce one another because of 
complementarities and positive externalities. As a result, the social benefits of policies 
frequently exceed by a substantial margin the private benefits, the margin sometimes 
depending on the order in which projects are undertaken. That is, some policies deserve 
priority because they facilitate the successful implementation of other policies. Providing 
access to potable water, for example, is important in its own right and also because it has 
"multiplier effects" on such things as the ability to assimilate nutrients from the intake of 
food, a person's ability to maintain good health and engage in productive activity, and the 
ability of children to learn. In both the Pakistan and Bangladesh human development 
reports the education of women was underlined as being critical in attaining a number of 
other objectives -- improved child nutrition, decreased incidence of disease, and lower 
growth of the population.23 The presumption, in both these illustrations, is, first, that the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts and, second, that the sequence in which the parts 
are assembled affects the benefits of the package as a whole.  
   
The shape of the education pyramid  The education sector absorbs more public resources than any other human development 
activity in developing countries and the issues raised in allocating tax revenues to 
education are similar to those that arise in other sectors. Thus it should be possible to 
apply our analysis to other expenditure programmes with only minor modifications. 
Formal education, however, is only one way people acquire knowledge. Much knowledge 
and information are passed on to children, informally, by parents, other relatives and 
friends. Much is learned through experience, a process at the individual level of learning 
by doing, of trial and error, experimentation. In some countries skills may be acquired in 
apprenticeship programmes run by master craftsmen. In others there may be a number of 
formal training schemes, partially or wholly supported by government. And in still other 
countries, some of the larger companies may organize their own on-the-job training 
programmes. Because of the externalities associated with education, and the public goods 
feature of some forms of education, governments pursuing a human development strategy 
should always compare the benefits and costs of supporting apprenticeship programmes, 
public sector training schemes and private sector on-the-job training programmes with 
the benefits and costs of expenditure on the formal, conventional education system. In 
what follows below, however, we concentrate on formal education.  
In many developing countries budgetary allocations for the formal education system have 
the shape of an inverted pyramid in which secondary and tertiary education receive more 
than four times as much public resources as primary education. 24 In many cases primary 
schools are starved of financing while universities receive heavy subsidies. The majority 
of the population, particularly the poor, may lack adequate educational facilities, or may 
find that the opportunity cost of attending school exceeds short run private benefits, while 
the children from middle and upper class backgrounds benefit from comparatively 
generously financed university education. 25  
Not only is this inversion of the financial pyramid not equitable, it is also not efficient. 
Particularly in the poorest developing countries, where primary education has been most 
neglected, 26 the social rate of return on investing in basic education is high. 27 In 
addition to high returns, investing in primary education has the advantage of bringing 
government closer to the people it serves while simultaneously giving people greater 
control over their own lives and a basic institution of the communities in which they live. 
Primary schools are easier for local communities (villages, small towns, urban 
neighbourhoods) to control than secondary schools, colleges and universities. There is 
more opportunity for participatory development, for the active involvement of people in 
education and hence there is a greater likelihood that educational programmes will enjoy 
sustained support from the community.  
Contrary to common belief, public expenditure on education in developing countries has 
not in general been an equalizing factor, providing equal opportunities to all social 
classes and groups. There are important exceptions, but more often than not, the 
educational system is no more egalitarian than the society of which it is a part. The 
inverted educational expenditure pyramid mirrors the stratification, privilege and 
discrimination against women and other groups which is characteristic of the society at 
large. This is hardly surprising, but it suggests that while it might be easy technically to design policies for reallocating resources from tertiary to primary and secondary 
education, it might be difficult politically to implement such policies. The commitment of 
the government evidently is crucial, but this in turn depends on securing popular support 
for human development.  
In some circumstances it may be advisable to reallocate expenditure in stages, thereby 
minimizing opposition until a political coalition can be formed to support more wide 
ranging measures. In the initial phases of a human development strategy the demand for 
education by the poor may be low while the middle and upper classes may fully 
appreciate the advantages of secondary and higher education and press for additional 
funding. In such circumstances a massive reallocation of resources in favour of basic 
education should be delayed until the urban and rural poor can be organized to demand a 
change in priorities.  
Even if primary education is free, the opportunity cost to poor families of sending their 
children to school can be high. In addition to the cost of books and supplies, transport and 
school uniforms, there is the loss of child labour and resulting decline in household 
income. At very low levels of income, discount rates may be high and households may be 
reluctant to give up current income for the sake of a higher income in future. One way of 
overcoming this problem while adding to human capital formation is to combine an 
expansion of basic education in poor areas with the introduction of school feeding and 
child nutrition programmes.  
The demand for education by the poor may be depressed for a second reason, namely, a 
perception that for low income households the returns to education are low. There is in 
fact evidence that in both urban and rural areas there are positive connections among 
additional education, an increase in the productivity of labour and higher incomes. 28 
These connections however may not be widely understood and it may be necessary as 
part of a human development strategy to supply the relevant information to the general 
public.  
One aspect of social stratification in developing countries is that not all groups have equal 
access to formal education, and even in cases where there apparently is equal access, 
there are enormous variations in the quality of education offered. The rich have greater 
access than the poor. The urban population has greater access than the rural. There is thus 
a strong prima facie case for reducing the concentration of educational expenditure on 
high cost urban colleges and universities and instead distributing resources broadly 
among the entire population. This implies in particular a reallocation of expenditure 
toward primary and secondary schools, and particularly to schools located in rural areas, 
where most of the poor are located and where historically education has been severely 
neglected.  
Discriminatory access to education by gender is highly evident throughout the developing 
world. Women are systematically under-represented at all levels of education. On 
average in the developing countries the literacy rate of women is only 69 per cent as high 
as the rate for men. Women receive only 54 per cent as many years of schooling as men. Their enrollment rate in primary school has risen sharply and is now 93 per cent of the 
men's, but in secondary and tertiary education women lag behind, their enrollment rates 
being 73 and 53 per cent, respectively, of the men's enrollment rates. 29 In Pakistan the 
situation is much worse than the average: three-quarters of the girls have dropped out of 
primary school before the final year. In the rural areas, among the poorest 20 per cent of 
the population, over 97 per cent of the women are illiterate, and even among the richest 
20 per cent of the rural population, 87 per cent of the women are unable to read and write. 
The virtual absence of educational opportunities for women in Pakistan is responsible for 
the poor educational performance of the country as a whole. 30 Although Pakistan is an 
extreme case, the situation of women in other developing countries such as Bangladesh 
and Ghana is broadly similar. 31  
Quite apart from educational biases against women, the poor, and rural areas, there is a 
bias in favour of spending on physical capital and against human capital -- teachers, 
lecturers, instructors, professors. It is sometimes said in the United States that the ideal 
education consists of Mark Hopkins on one end of a log and a student on the other. 32 
The tutorial system at Oxford embodies the same ideal. In many developing countries, 
however, more emphasis is placed on the log and less on Mark Hopkins. The reason for 
this is an artificial division of public expenditure between capital and recurrent items 
combined with a belief that only capital expenditures contribute to development. The 
resulting bricks-and-mortar approach to education leads to a misallocation of resources, 
placing excessive emphasis on school construction (public investment) and insufficient 
emphasis on teachers and school supplies (spending on which is classified as public 
consumption). Governments switching to a human development strategy must be careful 
not to become victims of the way expenditures are classified. Conventional systems of 
classification make little sense, especially when priority is given to human capital 
formation.  
Returning to the example of Pakistan, its situation suggests that in that country too many 
resources are devoted to physical capital and as a result insufficient resources are left to 
produce qualified teachers. Existing school buildings are not used efficiently and the 
teachers are poorly trained and motivated, unable to provide an education of high quality. 
Approximately a quarter of all teachers in Pakistan are untrained and the problem is 
particularly severe in the rural areas where low morale, low pay and few opportunities for 
advancement have resulted in widespread absenteeism by teachers. Before the students 
can be educated, something must be done about truancy among the teachers!  
One indication of the low efficiency of the educational system in the developing 
countries as a whole is that in the mid-1980s it took on average nine years of schooling to 
get one person through grade five. High drop-out rates and high repeat rates represent a 
waste of resources. It is obvious that in many countries the efficiency of the educational 
system could be raised by placing less emphasis on building more schools and recruiting 
more untrained teachers and placing a great deal more emphasis on improving the 
average quality of primary and secondary education. This implies giving more attention 
to raising the quality of instruction, lowering the drop-out and repeat rates of students, 
allocating more money to teaching materials and in general raising the average educational achievements of the stock of human capital represented by students. In other 
words, in many cases the human and physical resources already allocated to education 
can be used more intensively and more efficiently.  
Developing countries potentially have a comparative advantage in education because 
teaching is a labour intensive activity and labour is relatively abundant in developing 
countries. Of course education requires skilled labour and that is often in short supply, 
but this is a reason for altering the allocation of investment to enable developing 
countries to exploit their potential comparative advantage, not a reason for perpetuating 
the status quo. That is, compared to other "industries", education uses a factor of 
production, viz. educated labour, that potentially is rather cheap in developing countries, 
particularly in countries committed to a human development strategy. Thus education 
often is and certainly could be a low cost industry in developing countries. This is 
reflected in the rate of return on educational investment. Actual and potential future 
returns on expenditure on education are attractive in part because the benefits are high 
and in part because the costs are low.  
Despite this, there has been underinvestment in education. In 1985, for instance, public 
expenditure on education was only $27 per inhabitant in the developing countries as 
compared to $515 in the developed countries, a ratio of 1:19. That is, relative to income, 
the developing countries spend far less on education than the developed countries. Within 
the education budget, the developing countries spend proportionately much less on 
teaching materials. In Japan, for example, 6.5 per cent of the education budget is 
allocated to teaching materials; in India, only 1.3 per cent. Finally, within the education 
budget, and relative to the distribution of students across primary, secondary and tertiary 
education, the developing countries spend proportionately much less than the developed 
countries on the first two tiers of the pyramid. In Japan, for example, 38.2 per cent of the 
education budget is allocated to primary education, where 50 per cent of the students are 
enrolled. Thus the expenditure/enrollment ratio is 0.8. The ratios in secondary and 
tertiary education in Japan are 0.9 and 1.1, respectively. In Nigeria, in contrast, the 
expenditure/enrollment ratio is 0.2 at the primary level, 2.0 at the secondary level and 
21.7 at the tertiary level. 33 There is thus tremendous scope for improving the average 
quality of education in developing countries even within the existing inadequate 
budgetary allocations.  
In the short term the most cost effective way of improving primary education may be to 
use existing facilities more intensively and provide additional training for existing 
teachers. Quality could be improved and student drop-out rates reduced if teachers were 
to become accountable to the communities they serve, and not solely to ministries of 
education in distant capital cities. A human development strategy should attempt to 
transform local primary and secondary schools into centres of community action, with 
parents and other members of the locality taking an active role in educational and other 
activities concerned with human development, such as literacy campaigns, the 
construction and maintenance of health clinics, the construction of sanitation facilities 
and the provision of potable water supplies.  There are also financial benefits of actively involving members of the community in local 
education. Under appropriate circumstances parents, friends and neighbours can help to 
reduce the costs to the exchequer of primary education, for example, by donating their 
labour and local materials for construction and school maintenance activities. The 
essential objective is to mobilize local talents, skills and energy to accelerate human 
capital formation in the locality for the benefit of everyone, children and adults alike. 
This will not happen spontaneously but will require the creation of an institutional 
mechanism which fosters cooperation between teachers and the rest of the community, 
which motivates and rewards good teachers and gives them stature in the community, and 
which encourages widespread participation by the community in educational and other 
development activities. Only in this way is it possible to ensure that investments in 
education meet the genuine needs of the people.  
Even if more resources cannot be allocated to the education sector as a whole, the 
allocation of additional resources to primary education at the expense of the other two 
tiers of the pyramid need not inflict serious harm on secondary and university education. 
Costs per student-year in primary education typically are only a fraction of the cost per 
student-year in secondary and university education and consequently a marginal 
redistribution from the upper tiers to the lower could make a more than marginal 
improvement in primary education possible. This would be particularly true if, at the 
same time, repeat rates in primary education could be reduced. In Brazil, for example, the 
"unit cost" in tertiary education was 7.5 times that in primary education in 1985. Thus, if 
the number of student-years at university were reduced by 100 it would be possible to 
provide at the same cost 750 additional student-years of primary education. If at the same 
time the primary school repeat rate in Brazil could be reduced from 20 percent (in 1988) 
to, say, 2 per cent (the rate in the Philippines) an additional 135 children could be given a 
primary education. Thus the opportunity cost of 100 university places in this example is 
885 primary school places.  
It should be clear from the above illustration that the diversion of even modest sums from 
universities and colleges can have magnified effects on primary education. Moreover, 
since the beneficiaries of higher education often come from families able to pay for all or 
part of their education, it may be possible to recover some of the costs of tertiary 
education by imposing (or raising) tuition fees. In this way public expenditure on primary 
and secondary education could be increased without a corresponding reduction in public 
and private revenues available for university education. There is hence a strong case to be 
made for introducing an equitable system of fees and loans to replace the heavy subsidies 
now received by higher education.  
The level of expenditure that can be justified for each of the three tiers of the education 
pyramid depends in part on considerations of equity and in part on the social rates of 
return on expenditure at each tier. The latter in turn depend on the balance of supply and 
demand for different types of human capital, a balance that will vary with the level of 
development. Every developing country obviously needs trained scientists, engineers, 
managers and teachers -- and other people with professional and technical skills. The issue, thus, is not whether resources should be devoted to tertiary education, but how 
large an allocation of limited public revenues should tertiary education receive.  
Many highly educated people in developing countries lack opportunities to apply their 
skills and talents. This suggests a relative excess of supply and an inefficient use of the 
existing stock of human capital. Poor utilization of highly educated people lowers both 
the private and social rates of return on expenditure on tertiary education, compared to 
the return to primary and secondary education. Many educated people either become 
unemployed or emigrate to developed countries. This "human capital flight" or "brain 
drain" constitutes a loss of resources to developing countries and a poor investment of 
public funds. The correct response to this problem is to change the composition of public 
expenditure toward areas where returns are higher while also introducing measures to 
ensure that all available human capital is productively employed. Policies which lead to 
an open economy can be particularly helpful. Countries which exploit dynamic 
comparative advantages based on the skill, technical sophistication and education of its 
workers will be well placed to create remunerative employment for its university 
graduates and other highly skilled people.  
   
Access of all to primary health care  
As with education, so too in health: there is an inverted expenditure pyramid in most 
developing countries. About three-quarters of all public expenditure on health is for 
expensive medical care that benefits a small minority of the population living in the urban 
areas. A high proportion of the budget for health, 80 to 90 per cent in some countries, is 
spent on hospitals, almost all of which are located in the cities. At the same time, only 
about 60 per cent of the people have access to primary health care. A high proportion of 
the poor, and of those living in rural areas, are not reached by the health care system and 
are forced to rely on home remedies and traditional medicine.  
It is impossible to justify the pattern of expenditure one encounters in most developing 
countries. Viewed from the perspective of human development, the budgetary allocations 
are both inefficient and inequitable, and a major change in priorities clearly is desirable. 
What is needed are two things: a switch from hospitals to primary health care and a 
change of emphasis from curative to preventive medicine. Such a change in health 
strategy should make it possible to provide access of all to basic health at a cost the 
country can readily afford.  
Indeed, by emphasizing primary health care it often will be possible to improve the 
average health of the population quite considerably while simultaneously reducing total 
expenditure on health programmes. It is possible to get more health for less money 
precisely because existing resources are used so blatantly inefficiently. There are a 
number of inexpensive preventive health programmes which if implemented on a 
nationwide basis can reduce the need for more expensive curative health care. Examples 
include mass immunization against communicable diseases, pre-natal care combined with 
post-natal maternity and child care programmes, and sanitation programmes designed to eliminate water-borne diseases. Introduction of such relatively simple public health 
measures could lead to a sharp reduction in the need for hospitals, doctors and medical 
technicians, expensive equipment and medicines and consequently to large savings of 
government revenue.  
Beyond the immediate, direct effects of an expanded public health programme, there are 
longer term benefits in the form of fewer days lost from work because of illness, a higher 
productivity of labour and increased household incomes, a part of which can be saved 
and invested in growth promoting activities. The adverse consequences of poor health are 
sometimes irreversible, persisting over an entire lifetime and beyond. Unlike most 
educational deficiencies, which often can be corrected later, serious health problems early 
in life sometimes cannot be corrected in later years and their negative effects on 
productivity, incomes and general well being can last indefinitely. Indeed the effects of 
disease and malnutrition can be passed from one generation to the next. For example, the 
low birth weight and poor nutrition of an infant girl can cause her later as a mother to 
bear children with low birth weight or poorly developed mental capacities. The costs of 
preventing such things are low and represent an investment in human capital with a high 
pay-off. Not to spend the money would be inhuman.  
Thus the argument for reallocating public expenditure from costly curative care (hospitals 
and doctors) to inexpensive preventive care (local health clinics staffed by paramedical 
personnel) is powerful. Indeed, because an expansion of preventive health measures 
reduces the need for expenditure on curative health measures, the case for a reallocation 
of resources in favour of primary health care may be even stronger than the case for 
reallocating resources in favour of primary and secondary education.  
This reasoning cannot be pushed too far. The design of human development strategies 
puts a premium on lateral thinking, on breaking down old categories and on seeing 
connections that previously had been overlooked. The strong complementarities between 
expenditures on health and education are a case in point. Students who enjoy good health, 
for example, also benefit from an increased ability to learn. At the same time, people who 
enjoy a good education also are likely to know how best to maintain good health. 
Causality thus runs in both directions. Hence a reallocation of public expenditure to both 
primary health care and primary education can have a beneficial impact on each area of 
activity which is mutually reinforcing. Once again, the whole is likely to be greater than 
the sum of its parts.  
There are considerable advantages therefore in concentrating on primary health care and 
the two lower tiers of the education pyramid in the early stages of a human development 
strategy. Spending on preventive health measures is particularly attractive because it 
represents a low cost way of combating many of the most common diseases found in 
developing countries. In Bangladesh, for instance, half of all deaths are among children 
under five years of age and two-thirds of these deaths, namely those caused by diarrhoea, 
measles and tetanus, could be prevented at negligible cost, by immunization or simple 
treatments. In fact a recent child immunization campaign in Bangladesh was remarkably successful and about 70 per cent of all infants were reached. The cost of this programme, 
which surely will save a great many lives, was only 0.3 per cent of total public revenue.  
The basic components of a primary health care system are few in number, simple to 
implement and inexpensive. The six key elements are (i) immunization against the six 
most common communicable diseases, namely, measles, diphtheria, whooping cough, 
polio, tuberculosis and tetanus, (ii) nationwide availability of about 15 to 20 essential 
generic drugs, (iii) widespread availability and use of oral rehydration therapy, (iv) a 
family planning, midwifery and pregnancy management programme, (v) improved water 
supply and sanitation and (vi) health education. The immunization programme costs only 
about $1.20 per child; the per capita cost of the generic drugs programme is about half 
that amount; and a dose of the simple mixture used in oral rehydration costs only $0.10. 
Given the low costs and high effectiveness of these first three elements of a basic health 
programme, they obviously should be given very high priority in a human development 
strategy. Implementation does not require hospitals and large numbers of doctors; 
paramedical personnel will suffice; and diffusion can occur through mass grass roots 
campaigns.  
To be fully successful, however, these initiatives should form part of a wider set of 
interventions which include the provision of clean water supplies, improved sanitation 
and infant nutrition programmes. Also important are family planning programmes which, 
by providing information, education and contraceptive supplies, can considerably 
improve the well being of families, and particularly women, by enabling them to choose 
the number of children they bring into the world. None of these need be expensive when 
compared to conventional health expenditure programmes in developing countries and 
the ratio of benefits to costs will be a great deal higher.  
Clean water is essential for improved public health. Diarrhoeal disease, the single most 
important cause of infant and child deaths, cannot be effectively combatted without it. 
Moreover, inexpensive, technologically appropriate methods for supplying potable water 
to the urban and rural poor exist and can readily be introduced: public tube wells, rain 
water collectors, gravity fed water distribution systems and hand pumps. Hand pumps are 
a particularly attractive solution because they are low in cost while being simple to 
install, use and maintain. None of these technologies however is expensive and it has 
been estimated in Asia that it should be possible to provide potable water to everyone at 
an annual cost of about $2.00 per person.  
Basic sanitation also is essential for good health. Particularly in the humid tropics where 
average temperature and humidity levels are high, and high population densities bring 
people into close proximity, disease is easily spread. Yet in many countries in the humid 
tropics basic sanitation is woefully inadequate. In Bangladesh, for example, only about 
10 per cent of the population have sanitary ways to dispose of human excreta. There has 
been a small government programme since the 1950s to supply subsidized pit latrines, but 
even after four decades only about six per cent of households have them. Given the 
appalling sanitary conditions and the lack of success of past policies, the country clearly 
needs a "sanitation revolution" as recommended in a recent human development report. 34 Rather than rely on subsidized latrines supplied by the central government, it is 
recommended that the new approach centre on the active involvement of local 
communities, including non-governmental organizations and private enterprise.  
The details of the technology and the delivery system will of course vary from one 
country to another. What is important to notice is that in the two cases of potable water 
and adequate sanitation, improvements in health are not directly related to increased 
public spending on conventional health programmes. In these two cases, indeed, the 
average health of the population would rise if fewer resources were allocated to the 
ministry of health (for spending on hospitals, etc.) and more were allocated, say, to 
ministries concerned with water supply and drainage.  
A similar situation arises in the case of nutrition. Malnutrition is a major cause of poor 
health in developing countries and even in the United States 25 million people threatened 
by hunger receive "food stamps" under a national anti-poverty programme. In developing 
countries, as in developed ones, hunger and malnutrition have relatively little to do with 
the aggregate supply of food but instead reflect the way society is organized and 
particularly the distribution of wealth and income that flow from that organization. 35 
People are hungry because either they lack the productive resources -- land, other fixed 
assets, water -- to grow enough food for themselves or the money to buy it. The 
fundamental solution to the problem of malnutrition thus has much more to do with 
creating productive employment and achieving a more even distribution of income and 
wealth than with increasing public expenditure on health. Nonetheless, short of the 
structural reforms discussed in Section 4, the problem can at least be ameliorated by 
school feeding programs and food subsidies directed to lactating mothers and infants.  
The experience of Thailand is instructive. 36 In 1981 about 51 per cent of the country's 
pre-school children suffered from protein-energy malnutrition. The following year a 
series of reforms were introduced which changed priorities in favour of (i) preventive 
health measures, (ii) primary health care, with an emphasis on nutrition, clean water and 
sanitation, essential drugs and immunization, and (iii) community involvement in 
administration, financing and decision taking through village committees and village 
health communicators and volunteers. The results were spectacular. By 1989, protein-
energy malnutrition had fallen to 21 per cent, the infant mortality rate had declined from 
41 per 1000 in 1981 to 28 per 1000, access of households to clean water had risen from 
32 per cent in 1982 to 78 per cent and 98 per cent of all villages were participating in the 
primary health care programme.  
A human development strategy entails the construction of a basic health care system 
accessible to all and this, in turn, implies a reallocation of public expenditure away from 
expensive curative equipment, urban hospitals, the training of large numbers of doctors 
and the payment of their high salaries once they start to practise conventional medicine. 
Thailand shows it can be done. This will happen, however, only if the government is 
strongly committed to the strategy and understands that both the social rate of return and 
equity would be improved by a reorientation of policy. After all, expensive, curative 
oriented and inequitable health systems exist in developing countries because the political and economic elites demand it. What is needed is a countervailing demand from the 
beneficiaries of a human development strategy for a low cost, prevention oriented and 
more equitable public health system.  
This does not imply that there is no role for private medicine in developing countries, but 
the thrust of the health care system must be preventive measures organized by the state. 
The private sector can then fill in the gaps and supply the more elaborate and expensive 
treatments to those who can afford them. At present, the poor spend proportionately more 
of their income on health services than the rich while suffering much worse health. In 
Bangladesh, for instance, the poorest families spend about five per cent of their income 
on private health whereas the richest families spend only about 1.8 per cent. This occurs 
despite the fact that public health facilities are virtually free in Bangladesh. The reasons 
are that most people do not have access to public facilities because the facilities are 
located in the cities and, moreover, those who do have access receive a low quality of 
care. As a result only one patient in four seeks treatment from them. That is, the 
government is spending its health care money on the wrong things, and doing them badly.  
A government committed to human development obviously has to construct facilities in 
the rural regions of the country. Equally important, it must ensure that these facilities are 
adequately staffed with properly trained paramedical personnel, that a few basic 
medicines and other supplies are available and that there is an active outreach programme 
to inform the people of what is on offer and how the services can best be used.  
As with expenditures on formal education, governments commonly regard construction 
of facilities as capital expenditure (and hence contributing to development) and spending 
on staff, medical supplies and health education as recurrent expenditure (and hence not 
contributing to development). While it would be wrong to reverse the assumptions, some 
recurrent expenditure should be regarded as contributing to human capital formation. In 
Pakistan, however, about three-quarters of recurrent health expenditure is allocated to 
hospitals and medical training -- despite the fact that the country has an excess supply of 
doctors (at prevailing salaries) and many secondary hospitals have low occupancy rates. 
This pattern of spending is neither equitable nor efficient.  
A significant proportion of recurrent costs could be recovered by imposing 
discriminatory user fees and the funds thereby released could be channeled to primary 
health clinics for the benefit of, say, mothers and children, or the residents of rural areas 
or the poor in general. There should be little difficulty in principle in designing a 
structure of user fees so that they are progressive, with only a modest burden falling on 
the poor. The easiest way to do this is not to devise a structure of charges based on the 
ability of specific users to pay but instead to levy uniform charges on those services 
largely consumed by upper income groups. For example, in countries such as Pakistan, 
where there has been a relative over-investment in producing doctors, students wishing to 
acquire a medical education should be required to bear the full cost, perhaps assisted by a 
government funded loan. Similarly, charges for medical services at teaching hospitals 
could be higher than elsewhere, since such hospitals cater disproportionately to upper income urban residents. Lower charges would occur at secondary hospitals and services 
at basic health clinics could be free.  
The structure of fees would thus provide a strong incentive to people to use the health 
clinics rather than hospitals. Pecuniary incentives will not suffice however; community 
involvement in basic health programmes also is critical to success. Bangladesh, for 
example, is self-sufficient in oral rehydration salts, but oral rehydration methods are used 
in only 15 to 20 per cent of the relevant cases. The problem in this instance is not supply 
but effective demand. People need to become educated in basic health issues and to 
become actively involved in primary health care. Grass roots organizations and local 
government, not central government, are likely to be most effective in ensuring that basic 
services actually reach those most in need. In the area of health care, as in many other 
areas of human development, a strategy based on development by the people, not just for 
the people, is likely to be most successful in attaining its objectives.  
   
Reducing low priority public expenditure  
A human development strategy naturally tends to call attention to the potential benefits of 
reallocating public resources in favour of human capital, such as basic health services and 
primary education. Within the education and health budgets both equity and efficiency 
often can be increased by shifting priorities from services at the top of the pyramid 
(which usually favour upper income groups disproportionately) to those at the bottom 
(which favour lower income groups). These inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral reallocations 
pose the question of what areas of public expenditure should bear the burden of 
substantial reductions. This question cannot of course be answered in the abstract since 
the details of government spending obviously will vary from one country to another, but 
areas worth investigating include debt servicing, military expenditure, internal security 
and subsidies to the rich. In some countries it may also be possible to reduce public 
spending on state enterprises either by privatizing some of them or reducing their deficits, 
or by a combination of the two. (i) debt servicing  
The external debt of developing countries more than doubled between 1980 and 1990. By 
1989 repayment of interest and capital on the debt was $171 billion, of which interest 
alone was more than $64 billion, and the total would have been larger still had not many 
countries fallen into arrears. Because of these heavy debt service payments, during the 
second half of the 1980s there was a net transfer of resources from poor countries to rich 
of almost $200 billion, resources which in principle could have been used to promote 
human development.  
In a number of countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, debt 
servicing has become a major item of government expenditure. Indeed debt repayment 
often is even greater than military expenditure. More important, the burden of servicing 
the external debt has fallen disproportionately on the poor, the working class in general 
and on sections of the middle class. In order to make resources available for debt 
servicing governments have been forced to reduce their deficits and they have often done this by cutting expenditures on human development. As a result, the role of the state in 
actively promoting development has been curtailed. Overwhelmed by external debt and 
unable to raise taxes sufficiently, many governments have increased their domestic 
indebtedness to the banking system or resorted to inflationary finance through the central 
bank.  
In order to amass the foreign exchange necessary to service the external debt, many 
countries have felt compelled to adopt a "neo-mercantilist" policy, maximizing exports 
and minimizing imports by restricting aggregate demand, imposing import restrictions 
and devaluing the exchange rate; in addition, some export incentives have been 
introduced. Since the neo-mercantilist policies have coincided with a period of recession 
in the developed countries (including the ex-socialist developed countries), the effect has 
been to worsen the commodity terms of trade of the developing countries, thereby 
aggravating their economic hardship. The developed countries, in turn, have responded 
by increasing their own protectionist barriers, thereby reducing the rate of growth of 
world trade.  
Perhaps even more serious in the long run, some developing countries have used 
contractionary monetary and fiscal policies to lower real wage rates in an attempt to 
become more competitive in international markets. Competitiveness based on 
compressed real wages, however, is at best short lived. In the long term it weakens an 
economy's ability to shift resources into activities where higher productivity and higher 
incomes are possible. What is needed instead is an activist state committed to human 
development which gives highest priority to ensuring that the labour force is literate, 
skilled and well educated.  
One reason why the governments of developing countries became so deeply embroiled in 
disputes over debt repayments is that they unwisely agreed to guarantee (and in some 
cases take over entirely) foreign loans extended to private domestic corporations and 
banks. A situation of "moral hazard" was created whereby neither the overseas lender nor 
the local borrower had an incentive to act prudently. By guaranteeing the liabilities of 
private enterprises, the governments of developing countries in effect granted enormous 
subsidies to the private sector and when the liabilities became payable the general public 
was expected to foot the bill. When the debt crisis erupted in Mexico in 1982, for 
example, the government nationalized the private banks, in part to relieve them of their 
debt repayment difficulties. Something similar occurred in Chile a year later. 37 These 
problems were not limited to the private sector however: in many countries the 
government also guaranteed the foreign debts of public and semi-public corporations.  
In some cases external borrowing led directly to capital flight. That is, external debts 
were incurred in order to finance the accumulation of external assets by wealthy private 
citizens. In the Philippines, for instance, a revolving door seems to have operated: foreign 
loans were obtained in order to acquire foreign assets; these foreign assets were then used 
as collateral for more foreign loans to acquire more foreign assets. It has been estimated 
that in the Philippines capital flight was equivalent to about 70 per cent of the foreign debt, and the proportions are thought to be even higher in Argentina, Venezuela and 
Mexico. 38  
The most seriously indebted developing countries would have to experience 
unprecedentedly rapid growth in the 1990s just to recover the ground lost in the 1980s 
and place themselves in a position to resume the trend rate of growth enjoyed in the 
fifteen years after 1965. The basis for accelerated growth during this decade, however, is 
lacking because investment in human and physical capital was neglected during the years 
of economic crisis. The much discussed structural adjustment policies, far from laying the 
foundation for future growth as their advocates claim, have actually weakened 
development prospects. 39  
Given the situation facing the most heavily indebted countries, particularly the very low 
income economies in sub-Saharan Africa, the prospects for human development almost 
certainly will be meagre unless some relief is forthcoming. Three broad possibilities are 
conceivable. First, there could be a very substantial increase in foreign aid in the form of 
grants, so that the negative resource transfer becomes positive and large enough to permit 
adequate funding of a human development strategy. Alternatively, second, the foreign 
debt could be cancelled, in whole or in large part, and the loan in effect converted into a 
grant. Failing the above two remedies, some developing countries may have no 
alternative but to default. This is clearly a measure of last resort, although one with many 
historical precedents, and if forced to choose between paying foreign creditors and 
preventing further suffering of their own people, some governments may take debt relief 
into their own hands. This would be a pity, since the cost of solving the foreign debt 
problem of Sub-Saharan Africa and many of the other heavily indebted countries is 
relatively modest. (ii) expenditure on the military and internal security  
In many developing countries expenditure on the military and internal security represent 
a massive diversion of public resources to socially wasteful purposes. Considering just 
military expenditure, and ignoring expenditure on internal security, there appears to be a 
rough inverse association between the level of human development and the percentage of 
total income absorbed by the military. For example, in 1989 the developing countries 
classified by UNDP as "high human development" allocated 3.1 per cent of their gross 
domestic product to military expenditure. The "medium human development" countries 
excluding China allocated 4.5 per cent and the "low human development" countries 
excluding India allocated 4.8 per cent. There is thus a prima facie case for enquiring in 
every country contemplating adopting a human development strategy whether it would be 
possible to reduce the resources allocated to the army, navy, air force, intelligence 
services and secret police, paramilitary units, local police, etc., in order to increase 
outlays on more productive activities.  
Military expenditure and debt servicing account for a high proportion of total expenditure 
in many developing countries and the two items often are closely connected. In fact more 
than a third of the total external debt of developing countries was incurred to acquire 
military equipment. Moreover, recent research suggests that the availability of external 
loans actually increases the propensity of governments to spend on the military. 40 Foreign aid, in this case, makes no contribution to development, unless of course military 
expenditure is thought, rather implausibly, to contribute indirectly to human 
development. It is not uncommon for military expenditure and payments on the foreign 
debt to absorb 40-80 per cent of current government revenue. For example, in 1987 these 
two items accounted for 55 per cent of government revenue in Sri Lanka, 61 per cent in 
Pakistan, 64 per cent in the Philippines, 65 per cent in Colombia and 85 per cent in 
Jordan. 41  
Between 1960 and 1988 military spending in developing countries increased five-fold in 
constant U.S. dollars and grew twice as fast as income per head. 42 In the late 1980s the 
rate of growth of spending on the military declined somewhat, but it could well increase 
again in the 1990s. Conflicts within states rather than conflicts between states are likely 
to increase as sub-nationalist movements challenge the legitimacy not only of specific 
governments but of the state itself. Indeed in 1988, of the 111 conflicts in the developing 
world, 90 per cent were intra-state struggles. 43  
Rivalry between the two superpowers once provided the stimulus to militarization in 
developing countries, but since the collapse of the Soviet Union a new impulse has 
become important, namely the quest of arms manufacturers to seek out new or expanded 
markets in developing countries to compensate for the loss of markets in the developed 
countries. There is a danger that the end of the Cold War will foreshadow not an era of 
global peace but an explosion of sub-nationalist conflicts throughout the world. In the 
final years of the Cold War imports of military equipment and supplies accounted for 
seven per cent of total imports in developing countries44 and between 1978 and 1988 
developing countries accounted for more than three-quarters of all arms traded 
internationally. 45 The risk today is that these percentages will increase.  
Military expenditure already is a major obstacle to human development. Indeed military 
spending in developing countries is greater than spending on education and health 
combined. Despite an evident decline in external threats to national security, many 
governments continue to spend large sums on the armed forces and on internal security. 
Providing security to its citizens is one of the first responsibilities of a government and a 
lack of internal security can be a severe brake on development. Spending on internal 
security however often is intended not to enhance the security of the citizenry but to 
protect the government or the state from its own people, or to enable small minorities to 
suppress the majority and retain political power. In many countries spending on the 
armed forces serves no purpose other than keeping the armed forces in power at the 
expense (financially and politically) of the civilian population. The experience of Costa 
Rica, which has managed to do without a military establishment, is enlightening.  
Accurate information on the amount of resources allocated to internal security is difficult 
to obtain. In countries racked by ethnic and religious conflicts -- Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, 
India, Somalia, Angola -- expenditures on internal policing and suppressing rebellion are 
substantial, often greater than central government expenditure on human development 
activities. Some of this is inescapable, and the difficulties of containing domestic conflict 
in pluralist states should not be minimized, but much domestic violence could be avoided by encouraging democratic political participation by all groups and, where the aspirations 
of sub-nationalist movements prove to be irreconcilable, by peacefully acceding to 
secessionist demands. The non-violent separation of Czechoslovakia into two states 
shows how it should be done.  
Democracy and internal security often go hand-in-hand. That is, in many countries it will 
not be possible to reduce expenditure on internal security unless democratic practices are 
introduced throughout the political life of the country. This is recognized in the human 
development report on Colombia, where a distinction is made between "negotiable" and 
"non-negotiable" violence. 46  
Since the eruption of "la violencia" in 1948 after the assassination of a political leader of 
the populist left, Colombia has attempted, unsuccessfully, to cope with widespread social 
violence by suppression. Recently, however, there has been a change of approach and 
"negotiable" violence has been reduced by extending a political amnesty to members of 
the various guerrilla movements and integrating the ex-combatants into the electoral 
process. So far at least, greater democracy in Colombia appears to have succeeded in 
reducing political violence. On the other hand, "non-negotiable" violence, i.e., violence 
that has its roots in such structural problems as poverty, unemployment and lack of 
human development, persists. Here the solution is neither suppression (internal security) 
nor democratization but a frontal assault on the structural causes.  
In the case of non-negotiable violence, human development may be necessary to permit a 
reduction in expenditure on internal security. We thus have a possible virtuous circle: 
expenditure on human development weakens the structural causes of non-negotiable 
violence; this leads to reduced social conflict, which in turn allows a reduction in 
spending on internal security; less spending on internal security releases resources for 
human development, which further weakens the structural causes of non-negotiable 
violence. In the course of this virtuous circle the role and influence of the military and 
security forces can be progressively reduced as their raison d' être diminishes. (iii) public 
sector enterprises  
In many developing countries the losses of public sector enterprises constitute a 
substantial drain on central government revenues and it is natural to consider whether the 
drain can be reduced and the resources thereby released used for other purposes. The sale 
of state enterprises to either domestic or foreign buyers is one possible option -- and a 
rather fashionable one at present -- but this is not the only option and the full range of 
possibilities should be considered before embarking on a particular course of action.  
State enterprises in developing countries have a long history. They first became a 
conscious instrument of development in Turkey, spread to Latin America (Mexico, 
Brazil, Chile) in the 1930s and then became the dominant form of property ownership in 
the socialist countries (China, Cuba, Vietnam). The role they have played has varied 
enormously and it would be quite wrong to assume that whenever state enterprises 
operate at a loss, human development would best be served by disposal of these assets. 
Whenever a sale is contemplated one should first ask three questions: (i) Is it desirable to subsidize the enterprise and, if so, why? (ii) Which groups in society benefit from the 
subsidy? (iii) If a subsidy is desirable neither on grounds of economic efficiency nor of 
equity, would it be possible to eliminate the subsidy by lowering costs or raising revenues 
and, if so, would this be better than an outright sale?  
The answers to these questions should be determined on a case by case basis. For 
example, a subsidy may be justified on efficiency grounds where there is a market failure. 
If a state enterprise organizes training programmes that benefit other employers too or a 
research programme which produces knowledge which is not entirely firm specific, 
benefits are produced for society as a whole which are not fully captured by the firm's 
revenue stream. In such cases a subsidy to cover the gap between social and private 
benefits would be appropriate. Note, however, that market failure can be used to justify a 
fixed level of subsidy only, not losses of indefinite magnitude.  
Similarly, even if there is no market failure, a subsidy may be justified on income 
distribution grounds. Often, however, subsidies are in fact used to cover the losses of 
state enterprises that provide services mainly consumed by the middle and upper income 
groups. Examples include urban telephone services, luxury hotels and national airlines. 
Clearly improvements in the distribution of income cannot be used as valid reasons for 
subsidies in cases such as these. Moreover, even if the subsidies do benefit largely the 
poor, and hence diminished inequality can reasonably be adduced, one must still consider 
whether the distributional objectives could not be achieved at lower cost by some other 
means. Only if it is impossible for political or technical reasons to redistribute income 
through the tax and transfer systems would it be sensible to use the deficits of state 
enterprises to redistribute income to the poor.  
Assuming that continued subsidy by the state cannot be justified, policy makers must 
decide whether to transfer state enterprises to the private sector or to reform the state 
enterprises while keeping them in the public sector. The possibility of reform should not 
be ruled out. If the losses are due to government imposed prices below a market clearing 
level, it might be possible to eliminate the subsidies by allowing state enterprises to set 
their own prices. If the losses are due to unnecessarily high costs, such as those caused by 
over-manning, then a possible solution is to terminate the subsidies and encourage state 
firms to cut their costs. It would be arbitrary to assume that under no circumstances are 
state enterprises able to cover their costs and earn a profit for their owners, the taxpayers.  
Ultimately the decision between private and public ownership should depend on the 
social rate of return. If the assets will earn a higher social rate of return in the private 
sector, they should be sold; if not, they should be kept in the public sector. In practice a 
human development strategy is likely to entail some transfer of state enterprises to the 
private sector, namely, those loss making enterprises which cater primarily to the rich. At 
the same time there could well be an expansion of public sector enterprises providing 
services that are essential for human development but that cannot be supplied efficiently 
by the private sector. 47 Examples include the supply of electric power to rural areas, an 
underground urban transport system, urban water and sewage.  
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4.Structural reforms and safety nets  
•  - guaranteed employment 
•  - the distribution of productive assets 
•  - food security 
•  - economic security 
  
   
Structural reforms and safety nets  
The discussion in section 2 emphasized the importance for human development of the set 
of incentives, i.e., of ensuring that price signals accurately reflect costs and benefits, of 
guaranteeing access to markets to everyone on equal terms and of lowering barriers to 
entry where there is discrimination. Section 3 underlined the role of government in 
achieving human development objectives and emphasized the large potential gains that 
could be realized by a reallocation of public expenditure. In a few countries 
improvements in incentives and in the composition of government spending will suffice, 
but in most developing countries these are necessary steps that will have to be reinforced 
by structural reforms and institutional changes.  
In this section a small number of structural reforms are discussed: guaranteed 
employment, an equitable distribution of productive assets, food security and nutrition, 
and economic security and welfare. These structural reforms are not substitutes for 
reforms of incentives and government spending, they are complementary to them. In 
combination they should go a long way toward ensuring that all members of society have 
opportunities to fulfill their potential as human beings.  
The structural reforms singled out for discussion have been carefully selected. In some 
sense they are fundamental for if everyone capable of productive work has an opportunity 
of employment, if all households have a share in society's productive assets, if every 
child, woman and man is assured of enough food to sustain an active life and if the lame, 
the sick and the infirm are entitled to a minimum of economic security then it can truly be 
said that a basis exists for rapid and sustained human development. This does not imply 
that in some countries other reforms, such as a reform of the system of governance, may 
not merit higher priority, and to that extent our list should be regarded as illustrative only, 
but the issues raised here are ones which every society sooner or later must confront.  
   
Guaranteed employment  
Employment is fundamental to a human development strategy. Employment provides 
people with a source of income, it contributes to the output of goods and services and it 
gives workers a sense of dignity by enabling them to participate in the activities of the 
community and to contribute something of value. 58 Equally important, employment is 
necessary to reap the full benefits of investment in human capital. The returns to human 
development expenditure will fall dramatically if those who embody human capital are 
unable to put their energy, skills, knowledge and initiative to productive use.  
Well conceived macroeconomic policies can help to create an economic environment 
conducive to rapid employment creation and a higher average productivity of labour. The 
structure of incentives, discussed in section 2, obviously has a role to play. Three things are worth a special mention here. First, it is important that policy makers ensure that there 
is a positive real rate of interest in the formal sector capital markets so that borrowers 
have an incentive to substitute abundant labour for scare capital. Second, an overvalued 
exchange rate should be avoided so that there is no incentive to substitute imported 
foreign equipment for domestic labour. Third, obstacles to the smooth functioning of the 
labour market should be removed, including the elimination of discrimination against 
women and other groups, the removal of all barriers to entry into markets and the 
weakening of factors which restrict access.  
These microeconomic policies have obvious implications for the volume of employment. 
In addition, there are trade and budgetary policies. We have placed considerable 
emphasis on the importance of grasping global opportunities and the role a human 
development strategy can play in making this possible. Of course the opportunities must 
be there to be grasped and the international environment for job creation must be 
favourable. The developed countries, which dominate global trade, have clear 
responsibilities for maintaining an open trading system and a bouyant world economy. 
Given the international environment, however, it is up to the government of each 
developing country to ensure that its trade regime encourages an efficient use of the 
country's existing human capital and provides encouragement to further human capital 
formation. This can usually best be done by exploiting actual and potential comparative 
advantages in employment intensive and human capital intensive activities. In addition, 
the government should manage its budget in such a way that the pressure of aggregate 
demand on total available resources is neither so great as to cause rampant inflation nor 
so small as to cause excess productive capacity, depressed investment incentives and 
open or disguised unemployment of labour. These are the core employment policies and 
other policies and programmes discussed below should be regarded as supplementing 
where necessary these core policies.  
Beyond macroeconomic policies and the structure of incentives, the expenditure policies 
of the state are important. First, the need to create employment should be taken into 
account when determining the composition of expenditure. Some activities are inherently 
more capital intensive than others--for example, air transport is more capital intensive 
than secondary education--and differences in employment intensity should be considered 
when allocating resources among various activities. It fortunately is the case that those 
government activities which promote human development--discussed in section 3--often 
are relatively labour intensive and hence there is no conflict between the need to choose 
an appropriate composition of public expenditure and the need to generate employment.  
Second, in cases where government departments and state enterprises are insulated from 
market forces, steps should be taken to ensure that methods of production reflect the real 
cost of labour and are not excessively mechanised. This point applies in a great many 
fields where there is some choice among alternative techniques. Examples include 
construction, materials handling, transport and irrigation. Third, it is equally important 
that in countries which have a large public sector investment programme, the criteria used 
to evaluate public sector investment projects take account of the opportunity cost of 
labour and the desirability of generating employment. Especially in projects financed by foreign aid, capital may be underpriced and a strong implicit bias against labour may 
inadvertently be introduced. The same problem can arise when funds to finance state 
investment projects are raised through taxation and allocated through administrative and 
budgetary processes. The implicit price of capital may appear to the implementing 
agency or ministry to be low or even zero, since it is allocated a lump sum as part of a 
project budget, and hence a strong bias against the employment of labour may be 
introduced.  
In a large majority of developing countries the future growth of employment will 
originate in the private sector and much of this will be concentrated in small scale 
enterprises, whether in the informal sector or not. Particular attention should therefore be 
paid to ensuring that small enterprises are able to exploit their potential to the maximum. 
The future of employment lies not with the private oligopolies and large state monopolies 
that dominate the formal sector but with household enterprises, small privately owned 
firms and cooperatives in the urban and rural areas. The microeconomic policies 
mentioned above clearly are relevant here. In addition, the government should do what it 
can to remove any administrative obstacles--licenses, regulations, discriminatory taxes, 
city ordinances, police harassment--which prevent the expansion of household enterprises 
and other small businesses. Beyond this, it may be possible to provide positive assistance 
in the form of improved access to credit (but not a preferential interest rate), training and 
short courses (for example in bookkeeping) and marketing (perhaps by helping to 
organize marketing cooperatives). A bit of imagination and experimentation will be 
required, but the payoff to a successful initiative could be high.  
Even if all these measures were adopted, however, the employment situation might be so 
serious, and the role of employment in a human development strategy so important, that a 
major structural reform in the form of a guaranteed employment scheme should be 
considered. There is nothing particularly novel about this. Many governments have 
experimented with public works projects as a way to reduce seasonal or year round 
unemployment while creating useful assets. 59 In China the mobilization of surplus 
labour within the commune system -- disbanded after 1978 -- was a key mechanism for 
rural capital construction which succeeded in large part in transforming the countryside. 
60 And in the state of Maharashtra, India a successful employment guarantee scheme has 
been in operation in the rural areas since 1975. 61 In Bangladesh there has been a large 
food-for-work programme for about three decades and in the second half of the 1980s it 
provided approximately 15 days of work per year for households which owned less than 
0.5 acres of land. 62  
The point of departure of an employment guarantee scheme is recognition of the right of 
everyone to work, i.e. to guaranteed employment for performing unskilled manual labour. 
This right applies to women as well as men, to those who reside in urban as well as rural 
areas, and to all able bodied persons age, say, 15 or above. A programme for guaranteed 
employment would thus be open to anyone who applied. It would in effect act as the 
residual source of employment and would place a safety net under those most in need. 
The wage rate would be the same for women and men, although some regional variation could be introduced if the price of wage goods differed substantially from one part of the 
country to another or between rural and urban areas.  
The programme should concentrate on the construction of productive assets, including 
investments in infrastructure projects, that can be expected in future to contribute to 
sustained higher levels of output and income. That is, the guaranteed employment 
programme should not be regarded as a short term measure to provide relief in an 
emergency or during a period of readjustment and restructuring; nor should it be regarded 
as an income transfer or welfare programme. Rather it should be seen as a mechanism for 
mobilizing otherwise unused resources for capital formation and growth. It is thus a 
component of a long term human development strategy and the employment scheme 
should be closely integrated into the government's overall policy framework.  
In areas where unemployment is chronic, particularly in some urban areas, it may be 
necessary to organize the scheme on a permanent, year round basis. In many rural areas, 
however, the problem of unemployment is largely seasonal and the employment 
guarantee scheme would have to be designed to mesh into the agricultural cycle and 
supplement normal earnings from crop cultivation. But whether seasonal or permanent, 
the programme should emphasize labour intensive, low cost infrastructure and other 
capital construction projects. Obvious candidates include small scale irrigation works, 
soil conservation, afforestation and orchard planting, housing and water supply, and 
construction of primary schools, primary and health stations rural roads. The creation of 
assets intended to raise future incomes should be a primary objective. (i) the wage rate  
Any able bodied person seeking employment and willing to do manual work should be 
guaranteed a job at a subsistence wage. The daily wage rate or piece rate should be set at 
a level which does not attract workers from other jobs, since the purpose of the scheme is 
to provide work to those who have no other source of gainful employment. In the rural 
areas this means that the wage should be set marginally below, say 10 per cent below, the 
wages received by hired agricultural workers in the lowest income regions of the country. 
Such a wage probably would reflect fairly closely the opportunity cost of labour and 
would allay any fears that the guaranteed employment scheme would raise labour costs 
and damage employment prospects in other sectors of the economy.  
Projects should be designed in such a way that labour costs account for a high proportion 
of the total. As a guideline one might aim for projects in which the costs of employment 
represent about two-thirds or more of total project costs. The experience of Maharashtra 
indicates this is realistic. If for any reason work cannot be provided to those who seek it, 
and the government is in fact unable to guarantee employment, unemployment 
compensation should be paid at a rate equivalent to the daily wage rate on works projects. 
This will provide an incentive to government to design and implement useful projects 
since, if not, the workers will be entitled to a wage payment in any case. (ii) financing the 
programme  
In a macroeconomic sense the programme should be self-financing in the long run, since 
if the investment projects are selected carefully they should generate a stream of future benefits the discounted value of which exceeds the costs of construction. Nevertheless 
there may be a problem of public finance if the government is unable to cover its outlays 
through taxation of either the additional income generated or the additional wealth 
created. In the rural areas costs could be recovered through a tax on land and in the urban 
areas through a value added tax on transactions. In practice, however, it is unlikely to be 
possible to ensure that the ultimate beneficiaries bear the full tax burden. This 
programme, like virtually all government activities whether related to human 
development or not, will have to be financed out of general government revenues, 
national or provincial.  
The difficulty of doing so should not be exaggerated. The large employment guarantee 
scheme in Maharashtra, for example, accounts for only eight per cent of total state 
expenditure. It thus comes down to a question of priorities. If the provision of 
employment to all is sufficiently important, it should be possible either to raise additional 
public revenue or reallocate public expenditure from low priority to high priority 
activities. (iii) distribution of the benefits  
If a guaranteed employment programme is a success, a number of valuable assets will be 
created. These assets will raise both rural and urban land values and hence the incomes 
and general well being of those who own the land. Since the landholders will in virtually 
all countries be better off to begin with than the unskilled and otherwise unemployed 
labourers who work at subsistence wages to create the assets, the effect of the 
employment programme, paradoxically, could well be to increase inequalities in the 
distribution of income and wealth. This clearly would be an unintended consequence of 
the programme and specific remedies should be introduced to counter it.  
The workers who participate would receive two types of benefits from an employment 
scheme. First, they would receive subsistence wages during the period when the work is 
undertaken. In Maharashtra more than three-quarters of the beneficiaries are landless 
workers or small farmer households; about 40 per cent of those employed are women. 
The subsistence wages in some cases account for between one-third and two-thirds of 
total household incomes. Thus the direct benefits accrue largely to the poor and are not 
negligible when seen from their perspective.  
Second, to the extent that the assets created under the scheme generate a permanently 
higher demand for labour, the workers should enjoy in future some combination of higher 
market wage rates and more employment opportunities. Most of the benefits however are 
likely to accrue to landowners in the form of lower costs (e.g., if farm-to-market roads 
lower the cost of transport), higher yields (e.g., from irrigation projects), higher land rents 
and hence higher land prices. Moreover, the benefits to landowners are likely to vary 
more than proportionately with the size of holding. This would occur, for instance, if a 
project lowers transport costs and the marketable surplus increases with the size of farm.  
One way to overcome the problem of an unequal distribution of benefits would be to 
impose a progressive land tax. A more imaginative way would be to transfer ownership 
of the assets created by unemployed workers to the workers themselves. This could readily be done by forming a multi-purpose cooperative or worker-managed enterprise, 
the shares in which would be proportional to the number of days worked on the 
construction projects. The cooperative would then be responsible for maintaining the 
assets, managing them and distributing profits among the shareholder-cooperators. 
Unemployed workers would thereby gradually be converted into assetholders, although 
they should be free to cash in their shares with the cooperative if they wished.  
Not all assets created by the employment programme could be managed in this way, but 
considerable scope exists for simultaneously transforming idle labour into physical 
capital and workers into shareholders in cooperative enterprises. The impetus this would 
give to human development could be quite considerable. For example, a cooperative 
could be organized around an irrigation project and water sold to farmers; a timber, 
firewood or fruit cooperative could be organized around a tree planting project; a toll-
charging company could be organized around a bridge building project; a fishing or duck 
cooperative could be based on an artificial pond, and so on. These individual 
cooperatives could then be grouped into a multi-purpose cooperative that would have 
overall responsibility for managing the collectively constructed assets. Such an approach 
could have an enormous impact, provided of course the projects are selected carefully. 
(iv) project selection  
The projects selected for a guaranteed employment programme should ideally satisfy 
several criteria. First, we have already emphasized that they should be highly labour 
intensive since a primary purpose of the scheme is to act as the residual source of 
employment for those who otherwise would be unemployed and without an income. 
Second, again as previously emphasized, the projects should result in the creation of 
permanent assets which can raise future output and incomes. Third, whenever possible 
the projects should be located near the homes of the workers, be they residents of rural or 
urban areas. Fourth, insofar as possible, the projects should form the nucleus of a 
cooperative or workers' enterprise to ensure that the benefits of the project accrue largely 
to those who work on it. Alternatively, fifth, projects should be located in areas where 
local organizations of peasants and workers already exist which can take responsibility 
for the management and maintenance of the assets created. That is, the projects should be 
used to encourage participation of the otherwise unemployed and to empower them. 63 
Finally, failing this, projects should be located in areas of the countryside or parts of 
cities where the distribution of land ownership is relatively equal.  
If these criteria of selection are satisfied a guaranteed employment programme should be 
able to reduce unemployment substantially, alleviate poverty in the short run by 
providing a subsistence income to those most in need, contribute to a faster rate of growth 
by creating productive assets and, in the long run, improve the distribution of income and 
the ownership of productive wealth. In addition, an employment scheme can serve as a 
catalyst for institutional change, facilitating participation at the local level in economic 
affairs and empowering those who at present are the poorest and have the least amount of 
power. (v) administration  Overall financial administration obviously will have to be the responsibility of the central 
or a provincial government, from where the funds presumably will originate. Selection 
and implementation of projects however should occur at the local level. Those seeking 
employment should have designated places at which to register, near to where they live, 
and it would then be the responsibility of the local authorities to provide employment 
within, say, two weeks. If no work is offered within that period the local authorities 
would be required, as suggested above, to pay all registered workers an unemployment 
allowance. This would provide an incentive to the authorities to make certain that work is 
in fact offered, since in any event they would have to pay labour costs, and it would also 
make certain that the poor receive a subsistence income even if the authorities are unable 
to provide productive employment.  
The projects themselves could be implemented by the local government, by peasant 
organizations, by trade unions or by other non-governmental organizations. The objective 
should be to involve as many institutions as possible in the identification and design of 
suitable employment creating projects and in the actual organization of the work. The 
only condition should be that those entrusted to implement the programme are technically 
competent to undertake labour intensive investment projects. A monitoring system should 
be introduced by the local authorities to prevent corruption and misuse of funds.  
The guaranteed employment scheme could perhaps begin on a small scale as an 
experiment. Once experience is gained it should then be extended to the entire country. 
The results of such schemes in the two largest developing countries, China and India, 
indicate that they can contribute a great deal to human development. It is likely that many 
other countries can gain from the experience of China and India and apply the lessons to 
their own specific conditions.  
   
The distribution of productive assets  
Even if everyone seeking a job is able to obtain productive employment, the pace of 
human development is likely to be very slow if the distribution of income generating 
wealth is highly unequal. The reason for this is that the flow of income originates from 
the stock of natural, physical and human capital. Even if human capital is spread fairly 
evenly across the entire population, e.g., because of public provision of essential services 
such as education, health, sanitation and clean water, income as a whole will be 
distributed unequally, and human development frustrated, if the ownership of natural and 
physical capital is concentrated in a few hands. A household's income depends on the 
amount of capital it possesses (human, natural and physical) and on the rate of return 
earned on its capital. If the household owns neither natural nor physical capital, it will be 
forced to rely entirely on its income from human capital and experience throughout the 
developing world demonstrates that in most cases this is not enough to prevent large 
numbers of people falling into poverty.  
The connection between poverty and the distribution of wealth is seen most vividly in the 
rural areas. The poorest of the poor almost always are members of households that are assetless. Indeed the absence of productive assets is a sure sign of poverty, often dire 
poverty. Landlessness usually is the primary cause of economic distress in the 
countryside, but landlessness typically goes hand-in-hand with an absence of other 
productive assets, namely, livestock, implements and other equipment, barns and other 
immovable assets. Particularly in Latin America and parts of Asia, land ownership tends 
to be highly concentrated and the large landowners tend to possess most of the other 
productive assets as well. It is hardly surprising that many of the great agrarian rebellions 
of the twentieth century have occurred in these two regions: Mexico and Bolivia, China 
and the Philippines.  
In countries which have not had a sweeping agrarian reform poverty and income 
inequality are closely associated with inequality in the distribution of land. In 
Bangladesh, for instance, small farms (those up to 2.5 acres in size) account for 70 per 
cent of all farms, yet small farms account for only 29 per cent of the cultivated land. At 
the other extreme, farms over 10 acres in size account for only five per cent of all farms 
but 26 per cent of all land. 64 The distribution of land in the other countries of South Asia 
is broadly similar. In India in 1982, two-thirds of all farms were an acre or less, yet they 
accounted for only six per cent of the cultivated land; 11 per cent of the farms were larger 
than 15 acres and they accounted for 61 per cent of the land. 65 In Pakistan 
landownership is heavily concentrated: in 1976 farms larger than 50 acres accounted for 
58 per cent of the land in the Sind province and about 82 per cent of the land in the 
Punjab, the richest province in the country. 66  
Self-reliant human development in the rural areas can often be achieved most quickly 
through the careful design and implementation of a land reform. A redistribution of 
property rights in land and water, accompanied as necessary by technical assistance, 
credit to small farmers and improved marketing, is very likely to improve allocative 
efficiency67 as well as the distribution of income and there is no evidence that it reduces 
the long term rate of growth of agricultural output. Indeed the experience in Asia and 
elsewhere indicates that rapid agricultural growth does not necessarily lead to higher 
incomes of the very poor or to human development in general, and where growth has 
been translated into higher incomes of the poor, the incomes of the non-poor usually have 
risen relatively faster, with the result that inequality has increased. The reason that the 
benefits of growth do not reach the poor or fail to reach them in full measure is that 
landless labourers, tenant farmers and small peasant cultivators participate only 
marginally in the benefits of technical change, the source of long run agricultural growth. 
Their lack of productive assets means that at best they have only a weak link with growth 
generating mechanisms (e.g. investments in physical and natural capital) and because of 
their high dependence on the remuneration of labour for their livelihood, they do not 
share in the higher profits and rents that accompany growth.  
In principle it is possible to imagine massive and sustained state intervention intended to 
compensate the poor for their lack of productive assets. Policies to redistribute income, 
provide health and education services, mother and child care programmes, and ensure 
adequate nutrition, etc. obviously have a role to play but they cannot be expected to carry 
the full burden of great inequality in the distribution of wealth. First, the costs would be too high, for in effect the state would be attempting to compensate for the inability of 
large segments of the rural population to provide for themselves. Second, as long as the 
distribution of productive assets is unequal, the distribution of primary incomes will be 
unequal and those who receive the larger portion of the primary incomes can be expected 
continuously to resist government efforts to redistribute part of their income to others via 
taxation. The rich resist, often successfully, the removal of handsome subsidies that 
favour them. They will resist even more strongly attempts to take away part of their 
income. Thus on political as well as economic grounds there is a case for a once-for-all 
redistribution of assets.  
Land reform in particular is likely to accelerate human development because of its effects 
on agricultural production and the employment of labour. Output per hectare tends to be 
higher on small farms than on large because small farmers use their land more intensively 
(have a higher cropping ratio) and utilize more labour intensive techniques of production. 
A redistribution of large landholdings in favour of the landless and those with very small 
holdings will bring about not only a more equitable distribution of income but also a 
higher level of income and output. In addition, because small farmers economize on land 
and physical capital relative to labour, employment per hectare also should increase. Thus 
two of the major causes of rural poverty, namely landlessness and underemployment, can 
be largely overcome by a comprehensive land reform.  
In some countries water reform is almost as important as land reform. State owned tube 
wells could be "privatized" by turning them over to groups of landless people who would 
then have the right to pump and sell irrigation water and the responsibility to maintain the 
wells and pumps. The beneficiaries could be organized into cooperatives similar to those 
recommended for the management of assets created under guaranteed employment 
schemes. One local non-governmental organization has experimented with such an 
arrangement in Bangladesh and its experience has demonstrated that the idea is viable. 
With a bit of imagination it might be possible to design similar arrangements for the 
management and control of surface waters, thereby redistributing the ownership of part of 
the natural stock of capital to those who possess few productive assets.  
It is sometimes argued that because of high population densities in some countries, the 
amount of land potentially available for redistribution is so limited that a land reform is 
not worthwhile. This view is not correct: whenever landownership is highly unequal there 
are gains to be had from redistribution, although where land is in very short supply it 
might be argued that cooperative or communal forms of organization become relatively 
more attractive. Even where land-man ratios are exiguous, however, human development 
can be advanced in rural areas by allocating to each family at least enough land to erect a 
house, cultivate a kitchen garden of vegetables and fruit and raise small livestock 
(chickens, ducks, pigs, rabbits). This is the bare minimum to which everyone should be 
entitled.  
Where economies of scale can be exploited, small farmers should be encouraged and 
assisted to develop institutional arrangements--mutual aid societies, specialized 
cooperatives, irrigation associations, communes, etc.--which enable them to pool resources and undertake activities at the most efficient scale of operation. As we have 
seen earlier in this section, the most valuable asset of the poor often is their own labour 
power and rural employment programmes can mobilize seasonally available labour to 
create new physical and natural capital--irrigation and drainage facilities, earth roads and 
dams, small bridges, and land improvements such as hillside terraces, orchards and fuel 
wood planting projects. In many cases the assets created could become the property, 
individual or collective, or those whose labour created them. This would have the 
advantage of providing a permanent source of income for the poor and an incentive to 
protect that source of income through regular repair and maintenance of the asset. Apart 
from pooling labour, small farmers can join together to purchase and operate agricultural 
machinery that is too costly for an individual farmer and requires a larger area for 
efficient operation than is typical of a small farm. Such machinery cooperatives can help 
to raise the productivity of labour by overcoming any diseconomies of small plots that 
may arise. Similarly, credit and marketing cooperatives may have a role to play in 
supplementing the services offered by the private sector.  
Land reform has been most successful in countries such as Japan, China, South Korea 
and Taiwan province, China where the rural population is well organized and is able to 
implement the reform after it has been adopted as national policy. Thus the experience of 
land reform is consistent with a wider proposition that informs this analysis, namely, that 
human development proceeds most rapidly when the people concerned participate fully 
in the process. In the specific case of land reform, participation is critical for success 
since land reform is impossible unless it is accompanied by a change in the balance of 
political forces. Once land reform has been implemented, the beneficiaries--landless 
labourers, tenant cultivators and small owner-operators--should be encouraged to create 
new institutions which permit them to play an active role in economic affairs and in the 
political life of the community.  
Among capitalist economies, Taiwan and South Korea are notable for putting priority on 
a redistribution of productive assets before the growth of output. In both cases a land 
reform was the key redistributive measure. In Taiwan the land reform occurred between 
1949 and 1953. Nearly a quarter of the cultivated land was transferred to the poorest 48 
per cent of the rural population and this redistribution was equivalent to about 13 per cent 
of Taiwan's gross national product at the time. 68  
The land reform in Taiwan was comprehensive and led to the creation of an egalitarian 
small peasant farming system. The degree of local participation in the reform process was 
high: authority to implement the reforms was entrusted to each village and farmers were 
encouraged by the government to form associations to provide credit, storage, marketing 
and extension services. In addition, irrigation cooperatives were formed so that farmers 
could manage the irrigation systems that served them. As a result of all this, a 
considerable degree of economic democracy prevailed at the local level although the 
national regime was politically authoritarian. The land reform, however, shaped the 
subsequent development trajectory in Taiwan and helped create a relatively egalitarian 
society with a capacity for broadly based human development. One indication of this is 
the evolution of the Gini coefficient of the distribution of household income. In 1953 it was 0.56; by 1964 it had fallen dramatically to 0.32 and it then fell further to 0.28 in 
1980. Inequality then began to increase slightly, but by 1987 the Gini coefficient still was 
only 0.30, i.e., the distribution of income still was one of the most egalitarian in the 
world. Land reform contributed to this process in two ways, viz., by removing major 
inequalities in the countryside and by increasing the opportunity cost of rural labour (and 
hence real wages) of those who migrated from the countryside to the cities. The effect of 
land reform on urban wages was one of the key factors which led to a dramatic rise in the 
share of wages in national income.  
The land reform in South Korea during the late 1940s and early 1950s was similar to that 
in Taiwan. Prior to the reform, land ownership was highly concentrated but operational 
holdings were distributed fairly equally among tenants. Indeed about half of South 
Korea's farmers were tenants and were effectively assetless. Thanks to the reform, 80 per 
cent of all land under tenancy and virtually all land owned by absentee landlords was 
transferred to small peasant farmers. The beneficiaries, in turn, were subject to an 
ownership ceiling: they were not allowed to possess more than three hectares of land. 69 
In both South Korea and Taiwan sweeping land reform was made easier politically by the 
weakening of the landlord class--either because the landowners were Japanese or because 
indigenous landowners collaborated with the Japanese colonial authorities. When the 
Japanese were expelled at the end of the Second World War the landowning class found 
itself vulnerable to attack and without defenders. There were thus particular historical 
circumstances that made structural reforms possible in these two cases. Obviously the 
situation was and is very different in other countries. This points not to the exceptional 
difficulty of introducing structural change and institutional reform but to the need to 
consider the uniqueness of each situation and to exploit whatever opportunities exist.  
Unlike Taiwan, the distribution of income in South Korea began to worsen from the mid-
1960s. The main reason for this was widening income differentials between rural and 
urban areas. In the immediate post-land reform period rural incomes were roughly the 
same as urban, but by 1970 they were only 67 per cent as high. 70 The government 
responded to growing rural-urban inequality with a series of measures--greater 
investment in rural areas, better terms of trade for agriculture, and the launching of a New 
Village Movement to raise household incomes and improve living conditions in the 
countryside.  
But South Korea's problem of rising inequality between the cities and the countryside has 
occurred in many other countries that have experienced industrialisation and rapid 
growth. This common problem suggests that one should take a broad view of the 
redistribution of productive assets. Development policy often has concentrated on 
promoting industrial expansion, with the result that agriculture has been severely under-
capitalised, the countryside has lacked basic physical infrastructure (roads, power, 
communications) and rural development has withered for lack of finance. The outcome 
often has been deprivation, poverty and an absence of human development in the 
countryside. If human development is to become a reality in the rural areas, governments 
must reverse their policies, stop the squeeze on agriculture and stem the flow of capital 
from the countryside. This will require a substantial redistribution of effort and of public investment in favour of rural areas. The social rates of return on such investments in 
natural, physical and human capital are likely to be high.  
The land reform introduced in China, beginning in 1978, was similar in some respects to 
the earlier reforms in South Korea and Taiwan, although the initial conditions obviously 
were very different. In each case the final outcome was an egalitarian agrarian structure 
centred around small peasant holdings. In the case of China, however, the reforms of the 
late 1970s were not a once-for-all measure but merely the latest stage in a long sequence 
of reforms that began in the 1940s--a sequence that included the formation of mutual aid 
teams, small and then large production cooperatives and the commune system. The most 
recent reforms included a dismantling of the communal tenure system and reorganization 
of brigade and commune level enterprises. In the process of reform some of the 
advantages of the commune system were lost, e.g. the pooling of labour for investment, 
the provision of basic services and the maintenance and expansion of some capital assets 
such as irrigation facilities. On the other hand, the incentive system was improved, output 
became more diversified and small scale rural industry enjoyed exceptionally rapid 
growth. Both agricultural and industrial output increased and average household incomes 
in the rural areas rose dramatically.  
The distribution of wealth that emerged after all these changes is remarkably equal. The 
Gini coefficient for the distribution of net worth in rural China was 0.31 in 1988, which 
surely represents one of the most equal distributions of wealth in the world. 71 The 
largest component of total assets, namely land, was distributed among households on an 
equal per capita or in a few cases on an equal per worker basis. Hence the distribution of 
land after the reform was extraordinarily uniform and this virtually guaranteed that the 
overall distribution of wealth would be egalitarian. In addition, unlike other countries, the 
distribution of fixed productive assets (livestock, farm and non-farm machinery and tools, 
buildings) actually has an equalizing effect on the distribution of total assets in China. 
One reason for this is the way specialized economic activities have developed in the rural 
areas. Some households have moved out of farming in order to concentrate on industrial 
and service activities. They may possess little or no land or farm capital, but they do own 
non-agricultural assets, including their own homes. The assets of these specialized 
households are comparable in value to the assets of farm households and hence marked 
differences in wealth between farming households and those engaged in non-farm 
occupations have failed to emerge. As long as this pattern persists rural China may be 
able to combine an equitable distribution of wealth and income with increased 
diversification of production and rapid growth of total output. This, in turn, would augur 
well for future human development.  
   
Food security  
Food security is of course essential for life and even where there is enough food to 
prevent death by starvation, individuals may not consume sufficient food to enable them 
to lead a full life or achieve their maximum productivity. In this sense they may be 
undernourished. There is abundant evidence that growth alone does not necessarily result in better nutrition. 72 As in developed countries, there is in developing countries many a 
slip between the cup and the lip, between a rise in aggregate average incomes and an 
improvement in the nutritional well being of the population. On the other hand, where a 
permanent improvement in nutrition does indeed occur, in the form of a higher weight-
for-height ratio, there is evidence that this results in a higher productivity of labour and in 
higher wages. 73 Thus food security, and specifically adequate nutrition, is one of the 
ends of human development while also being a means to human development.  
It does not follow from this however that food security need be an explicit objective of 
public policy. In principle, food security could occur as an indirect result of policies 
intended primarily to achieve other objectives such as faster growth or a more equal 
distribution of income. Indeed if the policies and programmes previously discussed are 
fully implemented--primary health care (including family planning), basic education 
(including health and nutrition education), guaranteed employment and a relatively equal 
distribution of income and wealth--then the problem of chronic food insecurity should be 
a relatively minor one. Growth within such a framework would be equitable; the poor 
would have sufficient purchasing power to enable them to acquire a nutritionally 
adequate diet and the problem of hunger, at worst, would be reduced to infrequent threats 
of famine.  
Unfortunately, however, we live in a far from perfect world and governments may need 
to intervene to ensure that everyone has access to a minimum amount of food. The form 
of intervention can vary enormously--from food stamps in the United States, extensive 
food rationing in China, food supplementation schemes in Tamil Nadu, India to food-for-
work programmes in Bangladesh--and the most appropriate form of intervention will 
depend on a number of factors, including the nature of the nutrition problem and the 
range of other related policies already in place. 74 Even assuming a fairly ambitious 
public food distribution programme, the cost to the government need not be very large, 
provided the government has adopted a human development strategy and at least some of 
the basic components of the strategy have been implemented.  
One way of estimating the costs of famine prevention, following Amartya Sen, would be 
to calculate the proportion of national income required to "re-create" the income of 
potential famine victims so that they could purchase the amount of food necessary to 
prevent serious hunger. Sen argues that "the costs of such public action for famine 
prevention are typically rather modest even for poor countries, provided they make 
systematic and efficient arrangements in good time." 75 What these "systematic and 
efficient arrangements" might be will be discussed in a moment, but first let us continue 
with a consideration of costs. Sen assumes, as an upper limit, that 10 per cent of the 
population will be potential victims of famine and because they are the very poor, they 
would normally account for no more than three per cent of the country's gross national 
product. Their normal share of food consumption would be no greater than four or five 
per cent of the national total. "Thus the resources needed to re-create their entire income, 
or to resupply their entire normal food consumption, starting from zero, do not have to be 
very large." 76 Moreover, since famine victims seldom are completely wiped out but 
usually have some resources, the net resource requirement that will have to be provided by the government will be less than three per cent of GNP or five per cent of total food 
consumption. A famine prevention or food security policy thus is feasible if a sufficiently 
high priority is given to it.  
The best way to ensure systematic and efficient arrangements for food security is to 
introduce a self-targeting food rationing scheme. 77 The purpose of the scheme would be 
to provide the entire population, in rural and urban areas, with guaranteed access to a 
minimum amount of a staple food (usually a foodgrain) at a price which even the poor 
can afford. Thus the scheme, first, would be permanent and not mounted hastily on an ad 
hoc basis during an emergency. Second, it would be universal in coverage and not 
restricted to particular groups identified in advance as needing public assistance. Third, 
the rationed staple distributed under the scheme would be sold at a subsidized price. The 
extent of the subsidy could vary from time to time depending on circumstances and 
indeed could fall to zero if there were no serious threat of hunger.  
Fourth, the amount of the staple each individual would be entitled to purchase at a 
subsidized price would be determined in such a way that at the aggregate level the total of 
rationed supplies plus purchases obtained on the free market would cover the minimum 
needs for food. The quantities distributed under the scheme could vary from time to time, 
falling when the situation of the poor improves and increasing when the possibility of 
famine rises. Finally, the rationing system should in practice strongly discriminate in 
favour of the poor by distributing a staple food that normally is purchased predominantly 
by low income groups. In practice this means supplying "inferior" cereals, i.e., those with 
a negative income elasticity of demand, or staples with low quality grades not acceptable 
to buyers at the top end of the market. It is this last feature of the scheme which contains 
the self-targeting element. Although everyone, rich and poor alike, is entitled to a given 
quantity of the rationed staple at a given price, only the poor are likely to take advantage 
of the entitlement since it is only they who consume the staple in large quantities. Self-
targeting, in other words, would help to limit the size of the programme and keep total 
costs low. Moreover, as growth proceeds and the incidence of poverty declines, sales of 
low quality products and staples with a negative income elasticity of demand will fall, the 
need for food rationing will diminish and the scheme will in effect become self-
liquidating. Attention can then shift to less ambitious programmes designed to eliminate 
residual malnutrition in well defined and very small groups of the population.  
   
Economic security  
Throughout this essay two aspects of human development have guided the discussion, 
namely, human development as an end in itself and human development as a means for 
achieving increased well being. A third aspect of human development, also requires 
attention, namely, its role in preventing severe deprivation. The objective in this case is 
protection rather than promotion. That is, the objective is to sustain people's capabilities 
to lead a minimally acceptable life. 78  Individuals and families in all societies are vulnerable to unexpected events, e.g., the 
death of an income earner, unemployment, sudden physical disability, incapacitating 
illness, or destruction of a crop (by flood, drought, storm, pests) on which one's 
livelihood depends. People are also subject to long term disabilities such as congenital 
handicaps or the infirmities of old age. The question that arises in developing countries 
and elsewhere is whether public policy can play a useful role in mitigating the effects of 
catastrophe, and if so, given the other possible claims on public resources, whether it 
would be wise to allocate revenues to that purpose.  
It should be said straight away that a central objective of policies to ensure economic 
security should be to create the conditions in which individuals and families can help 
themselves. The human development policies discussed earlier in this monograph do 
precisely that. If everyone is assured of basic health care services, food security, a job and 
an equitable share of the country's income and wealth, the conditions in which self-help 
can flourish will have been created. The residual needs for protection should be rather 
modest and the cost of meeting those needs rather low. Self-help combined with self-
selection (in the cases of guaranteed employment and food rationing) should suffice for 
the great majority of people.  
Some might argue that the residual economic insecurity can be left to the market for 
solution: no further public policy measures should be necessary. If the expected flow of 
people's income over time fails to coincide with the flow of desired or planned 
expenditure, the difference can be reconciled through the capital market. That is, people 
can save (or lend) their surplus funds when expenditure is less than total income and they 
can borrow funds during periods when income is less than desired expenditure. Thus 
actual expenditure can be brought into balance with "permanent" income even in periods 
when "permanent" and actual income differ. Similarly, the market can significantly 
reduce the consequences of catastrophe. Insurance markets, after all, are designed to cope 
with risk: life insurance is concerned with the risk of death, crop insurance with the risk 
of drought, and similarly with marine insurance, automobile insurance, earthquake 
insurance, unemployment insurance. Provided the credit and insurance markets function 
efficiently, the residual economic insecurity that remains after the basic human 
development policies have been put in place should be of little consequence.  
The rub however is in the proviso. Capital markets, particularly in developing countries, 
work far from perfectly and it is the lowest income groups who are most vulnerable to 
unexpected events and who have least access to credit and insurance markets. This 
suggests that in the first instance measures to increase economic security should focus on 
the poor. That is, the poor face a case of market failure and consequently there are 
grounds for governments to act in effect as lender and insurer of last resort. Whether this 
can be done at an acceptable cost is an empirical matter to be determined in each country, 
but in principle the net transactions costs to government--the subsidy required out of 
general tax revenues--for providing residual economic security in instances of severe 
deprivation should be very modest indeed.  If the market cannot be relied upon to solve the problem of economic security, perhaps 
some might argue that the solution is economic growth. Severe deprivation has 
disappeared in developed countries, it might be claimed, because average incomes are 
high and people consequently are able to provide for themselves when unforeseen events 
occur. Public intervention, according to this view, is not necessary.  
This view, however, is a caricature of reality. Growth in the rich countries certainly has 
helped reduce severe deprivation, but growth alone has not been sufficient. Public policy 
in the advanced capitalist and socialist countries alike, in the form of a wide range of 
welfare measures, has played a prominent role both in raising the well being of the 
weakest and poorest members of society and in protecting the accustomed living 
standards of the population from unexpected as well as predictable declines. The 
achievements of the welfare state should not be underestimated. 79 Even so, deprivation 
remains in many rich countries such as the United States in the form of high 
unemployment (especially among minority groups), poverty (especially among children), 
hunger and lack of access to medical assistance.  
Thus relatively well functioning markets and decades of growth of per capita incomes 
have not eliminated the need for governments to assume some responsibility for 
economic security, even in very rich countries. Indeed public expenditure on the welfare 
state, i.e., spending on all cash benefits plus public expenditure on health care, varies 
from 11.9 per cent of gross domestic product in Japan to 28.3 per cent in the Netherlands. 
80 The major benefits, which of course vary from one country to another, are medical 
and sickness benefits, unemployment compensation, old age pensions, family allowance 
and social assistance to the needy. These welfare programmes clearly have succeeded in 
reducing poverty and inequality significantly and they have thereby increased economic 
security. It is estimated, for example, that in Australia and the United States, two 
countries that spend relatively little on welfare programmes, the number of people living 
in poverty was reduced by 49.3 and 22.6 per cent, respectively, as a result of the tax and 
transfer system. In contrast, in Germany and Sweden, two high spending countries, the 
reduction in poverty was 76 and 82.2 per cent, respectively. 81 Similarly, in a ranking of 
eight countries by the degree of inequality post-tax-and-transfer, the United States ranked 
as the most unequal, followed by Australia, whereas Sweden ranked as the most equal, 
followed by Germany. 82  
The ideal way to achieve economic security no doubt would be through a combination of 
growth and what has been called a "social security strategy".83 Growth would provide 
the resources while the "social security strategy" would ensure that some of these extra 
resources are used to reduce deprivation. The question this raises is whether developing 
countries can afford a social security strategy or whether, to put it slightly differently, 
there is a conflict between accelerating growth and providing social security. Several 
points can be made about this alleged conflict.  
First, social security, or as we prefer to call it, economic security is an objective in itself. 
It is one of the ends of human development. Growth is merely one means--an important 
means to be sure--towards achieving that end. Second, many of the components of a "social security strategy" have already been discussed above and defended as efficient 
means of promoting growth. They are not in conflict with growth but are an integral part 
of a programme to accelerate growth. We refer to expenditures on primary health care, 
water and sanitation facilities, guaranteed employment (as an alternative to 
unemployment compensation), redistribution of assets (as an alternative to tax and 
transfer programmes designed to reduce poverty and inequality) and food security. These 
expenditures can be justified in a growth context because they have high rates of return, 
i.e., rates of return at least as high as investments in physical and natural capital.  
These are essentially measures intended not to promote human development but to 
protect people from the vicissitudes of life. Under this category come expenditures on old 
age pensions, widows' benefits, assistance to the permanently handicapped and disabled. 
The only potentially costly item on this list is old age pensions. Assistance to the disabled 
will almost certainly be a minor item of expenditure, except in countries which have 
suffered high casualties in a war. Widows' benefits, too, will not be costly since young 
widows will have income from a job (under the guaranteed employment programme) plus 
some productive assets (from the asset redistribution programme); old widows should be 
entitled to a pension. Hence the residual need to help widows is likely to be small and 
will consist primarily of assistance to widows with young children.  
Developing countries should seriously consider, perhaps in stages, financing and 
implementing a pension scheme in which all working people participate, not just urban 
residents employed in the formal sector, as is often the case. The age at which women 
and men become eligible for a pension and the monthly payment obviously will have to 
reflect the demographic, economic and fiscal circumstances of the country, but in 
principle it should be possible to provide a measure of economic security to the elderly 
even in very poor countries. Thirdly, if this is too ambitious in the first instance, then one 
can begin by providing a pension to the lowest income groups, rather than to the upper 
income groups as is almost always the case.  
Fourth, public expenditure on a pension scheme can be justified in part on economic 
grounds. It is now widely recognized that one of the motives for having children is 
provision of economic security in old age. Children, once they become adult workers, are 
a form of insurance for their parents--not just insurance against the infirmities of old age, 
but insurance against many of the catastrophes that can occur without warning. Children, 
thus, are a substitute for economic security measures that protect the livelihood of people, 
and in particular they are a substitute for old age pensions. It follows from this that state 
funded pension schemes in developing countries are likely to result in a reduction in the 
demand for children, a decline in the fertility rate and a slower rate of growth of the 
population. This in turn is likely to lead to a faster rate of growth of income per head. 
Thus measures such as pensions that are intended to increase economic security, to 
protect people's incomes and capabilities, also contribute indirectly to promoting human 
development. Protection and promotion often go hand-in-hand.  
Lastly, there is the empirical observation that in fact a number of developing countries 
have given priority to expenditures on economic security. Among the socialist developing countries there is China and Cuba and among the more market oriented countries there 
are the well known cases of Sri Lanka, Costa Rica and Kerala, India. In each of these five 
cases public expenditure has contributed to impressive gains in human development and 
in none has expenditure on human development resulted in unacceptably slow rates of 
growth. If there is a conflict between growth and economic security, it must be a very 
mild one. Probably no such conflict exists.  
Some corroboration for these views is provided by a study of a less celebrated case, 
namely the state of Tamil Nadu, India. 84 In Tamil Nadu, as in India as a whole, 
protective measures for economic security are available to those who work in the formal 
sector, i.e., for the government or for large scale industry. The entitlements include old 
age pensions, maternity benefits, injury and invalidity benefits, survivor benefits and a 
number of health and sickness benefits. In most of India, however, comparable 
entitlements are not available to the poor, and specifically to those who work in the rural 
areas or in the informal urban sector. Thus expenditure on economic security is 
regressive, favouring those who are relatively better off.  
Tamil Nadu is an exception. In addition to the standard programmes for formal sector 
workers, the state has a history of providing some economic security to the unorganized 
poor and in 1989 the various entitlement schemes were liberalised and expanded to 
provide a fairly comprehensive range of benefits. A distinctive feature of Tamil Nadu's 
programme is that only those identified as "destitute" are eligible to receive public 
support. The support for which they are eligible, however, includes an old age pension 
(starting at age 65), a pension for the destitute who are physically handicapped (starting 
at age 45), pensions for destitute widows (age 40) and deserted wives (age 30), maternity 
assistance for women from poor households, survivor benefits for women (or men) who 
have lost the primary breadwinner and a marriage grant for girls from poor households.  
The benefits necessarily are meagre--the old age pension, for example, is Rs. 50 per 
month--and not all eligible recipients in fact receive their entitlements, but a good start 
has been made and economic security for the most vulnerable groups in the community 
undoubtedly has increased. The cost in 1989/90 was very modest, only 1.5 per cent of 
total state expenditure. Thus it certainly is feasible to provide a measure of state funded 
economic security to the poorest of the poor. This support, however, should not be seen 
as standing on its own but rather as supplementing support provided by the family and 
traditional local institutions and charities.  
Based on the experience of Tamil Nadu, it has been estimated that it would be possible to 
provide a basic minimum package of protective economic security for India as a whole at 
a cost the country could readily afford. 85 Only those poor persons classified as destitute 
would be eligible for the five types of benefit included in the basic package, namely, an 
old age pension (from age 65), a pension for widows and deserted wives (from age 40), 
maternity assistance, disability payments (from age 20) and compensation for 
occupational injuries. This basic package for the very poor need cost no more than 0.3 
per cent of gross national product or one per cent of the combined current revenues of the 
state and central governments.  Tamil Nadu, a major state of India with a population approaching 50 million, shows what 
can be done to increase the economic security of those on the margin of survival. What is 
feasible in Tamil Nadu (and Kerala) surely is feasible in the rest of India. And if 
economic security is a feasible human development objective in India, one of the poorest 
countries in the world, then it is equally feasible in all other developing countries. The 
time has come to put the prevention of severe deprivation, the protection of people's 
capabilities to lead a minimally acceptable life, high on the list of priorities for public 
action.  
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Resources for human development  
One of the recurring themes of this study is that a decision to adopt a human development 
strategy does not imply an unusually large state or an unusually heavy burden of taxation. 
Human development is more concerned about spending priorities than about the total 
volume of expenditure. How the state spends its money is more important than how much 
money the state spends. Given that the total resources available to the government in 
most developing countries is a fifth to a quarter of total income, it should be possible to 
finance the state's contribution to human development by reallocating expenditure within 
exiting revenue ceilings without the necessity to raise additional revenues through 
taxation.  
In many countries however the extent of reallocation will be quite considerable. Human 
development is an overall strategy of development and successful implementation of the 
strategy does not imply merely adding a few human development activities to the existing 
array of government spending programmes but, on the contrary, it implies a profound 
change in public policy and in the composition of state spending. Reallocations are likely 
to be necessary both within sectors (e.g., health) and between sectors (e.g., reduced 
spending on fertilizer subsidies and more spending on family planning services). These 
reallocations, once completed, often will result in a budget with a radically different 
shape from that found in the majority of developing countries.  
There is of course no such thing as an ideal or optimal pattern of public expenditure that 
applies universally, independently of the circumstances of particular countries, and it 
would be fatuous to suggest otherwise. None the less, it might be useful to draw together 
the threads of the analysis in previous sections and present some orders of magnitude in 
order to visualize the broad contours of the strategy as a whole. This is presented in Table 
2.  
In constructing the "model budget" in Table 2 it is assumed that government revenue is 
equivalent to 25 per cent of gross national product. This is higher than the average in 
developing countries but below the ratios that can be found in countries such as Egypt 
(35.9 per cent), Zimbabwe (35.6 per cent), Tunisia (31.8 per cent), Chile (31.1 per cent), 
Malaysia (28.9 per cent) and Uruguay (28 per cent). Thus the assumption, while a little 
optimistic, is not unrealistic. Turning to the expenditure side, total spending has been 
dissaggregated into seven categories, four of which are directly concerned with human 
development (categories 1-4) and three of which are not (categories 5-7). The 
classification of expenditure used by the World Bank has been followed except for the 
guaranteed employment programme (category 4) which has been listed separately.  
The allocations within the "model budget" are presented in two ways, namely, 
expenditure in each category expressed as a percentage of GNP and as a percentage of total government expenditure. The actual composition of central government expenditure 
in Indonesia is also presented so that comparisons can be made between the "model 
budget" and the revealed priorities of a large developing country following a more 
conventional strategy.  
Note that in the "model budget" 66 per cent of government expenditure is allocated to 
human development activities (categories 1-4) whereas in Indonesia only 11.9 per cent of 
central government spending is channelled to these areas. Thus if Indonesia were to adopt 
a human development strategy and were to change its spending priorities to reflect new 
objectives, the share of expenditure allocated to education, health, social security and 
employment would have to rise by a multiple of five in order to approximate the 
priorities embodied in the "model budget". The changes contemplated are thus far from 
marginal.  
   
 
Table 2  
Government Spending for Human Development  
A Model Budget 






1. Education ,training  5.0  20  8.4 
2. Health,family 
planning,etc  5.0 20 2.0 
3. Social security,  
food security,  
















programme  2.0 8 0.0 
5. Economic services  3.0  12  27.6 
6. Defense, etc.  2.0  8  8.0 
7.All other expenditure  3.5  14  52.4 
TOTAL  25.0  100  99.9 
Within the "model budget" equal priority is assigned to education, training, research and 
related activities (category 1) and to public health, nutrition and family planning 
(category 2), each accounting for about 20 per cent of total expenditure. Social security as 
a whole (category 3) is allocated 18 per cent of the budget, eight per cent assigned to food 
security, two per cent to economic security and eight per cent to all other programmes, including housing, sanitation and clean water. The guaranteed employment scheme 
(category 4) also is expected to account for about eight per cent of total government 
spending. Thus the three major structural reforms discussed in Section 4 which require 
sustained support--guaranteed employment, food security and economic security--absorb 
only 18 per cent of the budget. (It is assumed that asset redistribution--the other major 
reform--is a once-for-all measure which does not have recurrent budgetary implications. 
If it does, e.g., in the form of interest payments on government bonds used to compensate 
landowners, this would be funded from the allocations in category 7.)  
It is envisaged in the "model budget" that 34 per cent of government expenditure (or 8.5 
per cent of GNP) would be devoted to activities not directly connected to human 
development (categories 5-7). This is a much smaller proportion than one would expect 
to find in countries following a more conventional strategy of development. Indeed it is 
the sharp reduction in resources allocated to categories 5-7 that makes it possible to 
increase expenditure on human development. It is impossible to be specific about which 
programmes should be cut or eliminated, but it is clear in general that budgetary savings 
will largely arise from a combination of (i) a reduction in outlays on defence and related 
activities, (ii) the elimination of government subsidies to physical inputs, credit and 
services consumed by upper income groups, (iii) a sharp reduction and preferably the 
elimination of deficits in state economic enterprises and (iv) a contraction of expenditure 
on other government activities of relatively low priority. In addition, it is suggested 
below that human development is consistent with a more streamlined central government 
bureaucracy. Considerable savings may arise from doing away with the costly and 
unnecessary administrative machinery established to deliver goods and services to 
passive beneficiaries. These cuts and savings will not be easy, but they are essential 
because otherwise it will not be possible to reallocate government spending in favour of 
human development within a fixed revenue ceiling.  
It has been assumed so far that government revenues are adequate and in the "model 
budget" specifically that total revenues are sufficient to finance an expenditure 
programme equivalent to 25 per cent of gross national product. In some countries 
however government revenue may not be sufficient to finance a human development 
strategy and it will consequently be necessary to raise additional funds.  
Ignoring the possibility of external financing, there are several options from which to 
choose. First, the state could raise prices charged for the goods and services it produces 
for the public. This includes the prices charged by state economic enterprises as well as 
the charges levied by public utilities for power, water, drainage, telecommunications, 
etc., when these industries are in the public sector. This possibility was touched upon 
above in connection with eliminating the deficits of state enterprises, but the general issue 
is broader than this. In principle efficiency requires that the price of state produced goods 
and services cover long run marginal costs, including the opportunity cost of capital, and 
purchasers should expect to have to pay this price. In some cases this implies that state 
enterprises should behave in a more commercial, profit oriented way but without abusing 
their monopoly power. In other cases it may be better to transfer some of the state 
enterprises to the private sector by direct sale or auction. Provided the goods and services being supplied are consumed directly or indirectly by upper income groups, there is no 
conflict between allocative efficiency and distributive equity. However even when there 
is a conflict between the two objectives, policy makers should consider whether it would 
be possible to achieve the distributive objective in some other way, e.g., by increasing 
expenditure on human development activities oriented toward the poor.  
Second, the government could consider imposing or increasing user charges to help 
recover some of the costs of supplying government services that often are provided free 
of charge. The main candidates here are health and education services. While favouring 
the introduction of user charges when this can be done without incurring heavy 
administrative costs or worsening the distribution of income, the efficacy of differential 
rate structures is doubtful because they tend to become overly elaborate and cumbersome. 
The objective should be to keep the structure of user fees simple, preferably with a single 
uniform rate and, where this is desired on grounds of equity, an exemption for members 
of a well defined group. User charges are perhaps most effective when the users are 
predominantly upper income persons and the costs of supplying the service are high. 
Examples include tertiary education and services provided by large urban hospitals.  
Finally, the government can raise additional revenue by introducing new taxes or 
increasing the rates (up to a point) of old taxes. Here again, however, one should try to 
keep the tax system as simple as possible. There are numerous examples of governments 
in developing countries attempting to use the tax system to achieve multiple objectives, 
such as redistributing income, promoting investment, encouraging savings, accelerating 
growth and increasing efficiency. Most of these attempts have been unsuccessful and the 
country has been encumbered with a tax system that is complex, costly to administer and 
easy to evade. Experience therefore suggests that the wisest course, even for a human 
development strategy with a strong redistributive element, is to use the tax system 
primarily for what it does best, raising revenue. Taxation cannot by itself eliminate 
poverty or accelerate human development. These objectives are better addressed from the 
expenditure side of the budget. The role of the tax system is to raise revenue while 
making certain that the poor are not further impoverished and that human development is 
not impeded by government taxation.  
One of the distinctive features of a human development strategy is that it is not intensive 
in the use of foreign aid or, indeed, of foreign capital in general. Human development is a 
strategy that mobilizes domestic resources and above all the energy, skills, talents and 
creativity of a nation's own people. Given that foreign aid and other forms of foreign 
capital are likely to be less readily available in future than in the past, human 
development is well suited for those countries which by choice or faute de mieux wish to 
become more self-reliant. Similarly, human development is not a strategy that is intensive 
in the use of foreign exchange: it does not rely heavily on imported capital and 
intermediate goods to sustain investment or production. The strategy is likely to be most 
successful where governments are committed to an open economy, biased neither 
towards export promotion nor import substitution.  Finally, a human development strategy does rely intensively on certain types of 
government services and support, above all on services that are in close contact with the 
grass roots: primary education, village health clinics, guaranteed employment on locally 
selected investment projects. This has implications for the administration of development 
and the empowerment of people. In the final analysis, if human beings are the end of 
development, if enhancing their capabilities and enlarging their choices is the ultimate 
objective, then empowerment must be central to what development is all about. 
Unfortunately the structure of governance in many developing countries--a structure 
often inherited from the colonial era--is antithetical to empowerment. The reason is that 
the state apparatus originally was designed to serve the purposes of a colonial 
administration, maintaining political control over a subject people, exploiting the 
territory's resources and extracting an economic surplus with the minimum amount of 
investment. Power was consequently highly centralized. This resulted in efficient 
administration in its own terms, but the structure of governance was inconsistent with 
political democracy and participatory development.  
Governments in developing countries now have, or should have, new purposes but these 
new purposes have seldom been reflected in a restructured public administration. There is 
a strong case in many developing countries for bringing government closer to the people 
by devolving authority to lower levels of the administration, to provincial, district and 
local government. There is however a paradox here. Where once a highly centralized 
administration was an instrument of (colonial) tyranny, today the greater tyranny often is 
to be found at the local and provincial levels, where large landowners and their allies are 
able to exercise enormous power. Central government, in comparison, may be relatively 
benign and far sighted, more inclined to support human development in opposition to the 
entrenched forces that dominate the countryside. Thus decentralization is not an unmixed 
blessing or a goal in itself and it does not necessarily result in empowerment of the 
people. Decentralization is most consistent with the goals of human development when it 
is preceded by measures which redistribute wealth and income in favour of the poor and 
break the monopoly of power of local vested interests.  
Decentralized government is not necessarily cheaper government. Indeed decentralization 
in support of human development could well result in a larger civil service and higher 
expenditure on general administration. The case for decentralization is not based on 
smaller government or lower costs but on improvements in the quality of government 
supplied services and on increased participation of the population in determining what is 
to be supplied. The intention, certainly, is to get a heavy handed central government "off 
the backs of the people", not in order to reduce costs while leaving the people to fend for 
themselves but in order to provide the essential public services needed to accelerate 
human development and increase the well being of the people.  
   
Public sector prices, charges and costs  
The public sector in many developing countries is quite large and supplies a wide range 
of goods and services from luxury international airline travel to nitrogenous fertilizer. The state enterprises that produce these goods and services often have to be subsidized 
because their receipts from sales fail to cover their total costs. Some of these subsidies, as 
discussed in Section 3, can be justified on efficiency grounds, because social costs and 
benefits differ from costs and benefits as measured by the market. Subsidies to state 
enterprises with important training, education or scientific research functions might fall 
under this category. In other cases the subsidies could perhaps be justified on grounds of 
equity, as a way of improving the distribution of income, but subsidies to state enterprises 
will almost always be a second best way to achieve distributive objectives. The remaining 
subsidies however, which account for most of the losses, can be justified neither on 
grounds of market failure nor on grounds of equity. State enterprises which incur such 
losses should be required to reduce their costs or raise prices or else they should be shut 
down or sold off.  
Increasing the price of goods and services supplied by state enterprises can reduce claims 
on the exchequer to finance enterprise deficits and release funds for activities directly 
connected with human development. Similarly the government can impose user charges 
or fees for the services it provides. User charges however are likely to be appropriate only 
for certain types of services. In some cases, e.g. parks, beaches and other recreational 
facilities, nominal fees may be all that is required to prevent excessive use of the facilities 
and cover most of the day-to-day running costs. In the case of other natural resources 
which constitute part of the natural capital of a country, the issues are rather different, 
e.g. the optimal rate of exploiting fishery or timber resources, or the optimal rate of 
depleting petroleum, gas and other mineral deposits. Questions of conservation and the 
transformation of natural capital into physical and human capital come into play here. 
Some of the relevant principles were touched upon in section 1.  
The case for user charges for government produced services, as opposed to charges for 
the use of government owned natural assets, is similar to the case for full pricing of 
products produced by state enterprises. The qualifications--externalities and equity--also 
are similar. Equity considerations suggest that user charges are highly appropriate for 
public services which benefit mainly middle and upper income groups. Tertiary education 
is a prime example and it is noteworthy that in South Korea user charges in higher 
education cover about 46 per cent of operating costs. The case for user charges for 
primary and secondary education is weak, although in China even the poor must make a 
token payment towards the cost of primary education and basic health services. 
Considerations of equity may tempt policy makers to introduce differential user charges 
for health and education based on the ability to pay. Such systems normally should be 
avoided: they are administratively costly and cumbersome and often fail to affect the 
target groups in the way intended.  
Apart from increasing prices and imposing user charges, governments should attempt to 
lower costs of public sector activities. A human development strategy by its very nature--
people-centred, participatory, democratic--is well suited to low cost methods of 
production and supply. The administration of primary schools and health clinics, for 
example, can be delegated to the local level, i.e., to the villages, small towns, 
communities and neighbourhoods where the facilities are located. Decentralization as such does not guarantee that costs will be lower--and in fact the advantages of economies 
of scale can sometimes be lost--but it does create a possibility for mobilizing locally 
available low cost resources, increasing the influence of intended beneficiaries, giving 
them a voice in what services are most needed and how they can best be supplied, and 
hence increasing the likelihood that the quality of the public services will improve. In this 
sense decentralization can be very cost-effective.  
Participation is of course an end in itself; it is also a way of enhancing people's 
capabilities. Participation and its corollary, empowerment, enable people to exercise 
more control over their own lives. In allowing people to exercise control, governments 
help to unleash their energies, their commitment, their productivity and creativity. At the 
local level where people are most able to manage their own affairs, democracy clearly 
can help to enhance efficiency. In such a context, for example, teachers are more likely to 
become part of the community instead of a representative of an outside administration. 
Local people are more likely to be willing to supplement the salaries of teachers (possibly 
with payments in kind), to pay for some school supplies or to donate their own labour and 
materials to build and maintain a school. In such a context people cease to be objects of 
development and become the instruments of their own development, donating their time, 
energy and funds because they, their families and their friends will benefit directly.  
In some cases the physical facilities, where they exist, can be used more intensively. For 
example, double shifts may be used in schools, thereby reducing the cost per student of 
physical capital. In other cases, less qualified workers, quickly trained, can be substituted 
for highly qualified workers whose training is lengthy and costly. The so-called barefoot 
doctors in China are an early example of how health workers with few formal medical 
qualifications can be used to extend the coverage and the effectiveness of an entire health 
care system. Teaching assistants or helpers can play the same role in primary schools. 
These are illustrations of how the costs of public services can be reduced.  
   
Taxation and human development  
Two additional points are critical: how can taxation be used to raise additional revenues 
when existing resources are inadequate and how should the tax system be reformed if it 
acts as an obstacle to human development. Governments usually have greater control 
over the allocation of expenditure than over the ways expenditure is financed. In 
particular governments in developing countries have found it difficult to tax people in 
accordance with their ability to pay. Upper income groups have been able to use their 
power and influence to get governments to subsidize activities of interest to themselves 
while at the same time ensuring that they are taxed relatively lightly. Thus both the 
income and expenditure sides of the state budget tend to favour the rich. The tax system 
often is regressive and upper income groups are able to escape paying their share by 
taking advantage of tax exemptions, income deductions and tax credits included in the 
revenue code as well as, of course, by outright tax evasion. It has turned out to be 
especially difficult to tax capital, in part because the valuation of capital assets such as 
land is difficult and in part because of the international mobility of financial capital.  Few tax systems in developing countries have succeeded in bringing about a significant 
redistribution of income by imposing a heavy tax burden on the rich. The richest five or 
ten per cent of the population almost always manage to avoid paying a large portion of 
the taxes for which they would appear to be liable. As a result, the post-tax distribution of 
income has a tendency to reflect the underlying distribution of wealth. Hence one reason 
for the emphasis on asset redistribution in Section 4. Some progressivity can be achieved 
however by exempting the lowest income groups from the payment of some taxes, 
notably income taxes. Given the administrative and political difficulties of using the tax 
system for redistributive purposes, a government pursuing a human development strategy 
probably would be well advised to concentrate on the distribution of the benefits from 
public expenditure and use the tax system to ensure that adequate revenues are available 
to finance planned expenditures. (i) import duties and export taxes  
The base of a tax system can be almost anything--wealth, income, consumption, domestic 
or foreign trade--but many developing countries place heavy reliance on import duties 
and export taxes. The proportion may have fallen in the last decade or so, but many 
developing countries still obtain between a quarter and a third of their government 
revenue from taxes on international trade. Heavy taxation of internationally traded 
commodities--by increasing the cost of exporting and shielding import substituting 
industries from competition--tends to weaken the competitiveness of developing 
countries and makes their fiscal position vulnerable to fluctuations and instability 
originating abroad.  
In Indonesia in the late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, two-thirds of tax revenue 
came from taxes on the export of oil and liquified natural gas. Had it not implemented a 
major tax reform before international oil prices fell sharply in the late 1980s, Indonesia 
would have encountered a fiscal crisis and been forced either to cut government 
expenditure sharply or tolerate huge fiscal deficits. 86 Similarly, two-thirds of 
Venezuela's public expenditure is financed by taxing exports of petroleum but unlike 
Indonesia, Venezuela did not introduce a tax reform and consequently the country ran 
into severe revenue problems when oil prices fell. A combination of low oil prices and 
depleted oil reserves does not augur well for the fiscal future of the country. 87  
Other countries are highly dependent on revenues from import tariffs. The situation could 
be improved--revenue stability increased and international competitiveness enhanced--if 
governments were to shift the tax base toward domestic sources of revenue while 
maintaining low, uniform tariff rates on imports and exports. (ii) income taxes  
In principle income taxes, and in particular taxes on personal incomes, should be 
attractive to governments which have adopted a human development strategy. In practice 
however personal income tax systems usually have not worked well in developing 
countries. Income taxes are attractive, first, because they can be made to be progressive 
and, second, because, if progressive, revenues rise faster than national income thereby 
imparting a degree of elasticity to the entire tax system. Progressive personal income tax 
systems, however, work best in countries where price inflation is low or moderate, the 
economy is fully monetized and accurate business records are kept, administration is honest and technically competent, literacy is universal, capital is immobile across 
international borders and tax compliance is voluntary. These conditions rarely are found 
in developing countries and as a result the revenue yield of income taxes has tended to be 
low. Income taxes are much more difficult to administer than indirect taxes on 
consumption and in those developing countries which have personal income taxes, 
seldom more than five per cent of the population is covered, primarily salaried persons 
working in the urban formal sector. 88 Income from property--retained profits, dividends, 
interest, rent--frequently is taxed at very low rates if at all. The tax system thus has a bias 
in favour of investments in physical capital (the income from which escapes taxation) and 
against human capital (the income from which, if sufficiently high, may be liable to 
income taxation). Erosion of the income tax base because of avoidance and evasion is 
common and severe, especially in the case of income from property. In Jamaica, for 
instance, it is estimated that because of inability to enforce tax legislation fully, actual 
revenues are only 54.4 per cent of potential revenues. If to the loss of revenue due to non-
reporting of income one adds revenue lost because of loopholes in the tax code, then 
actual revenue falls to 38.2 per cent of potential revenue. 89 It is the self-employed who 
are in the best position to evade taxation and the incidence of evasion tends to increase 
with the level of income. As a result, a notionally progressive income tax system in fact is 
transformed into a regressive tax system.  
Personal income taxes in developing countries thus tend to discriminate against income 
from human capital and to be inequitable. Income from physical and financial capital 
escapes most taxation. Income from labour, in contrast, is taxed relatively heavily 
particularly when taking into account the fact that the cost of accumulating human 
capital--the costs of education and training--are not allowed to be deducted from taxable 
income.  
Taxes on corporate incomes and profits are easier to administer than taxes on personal 
incomes and in principle it should be possible to raise large revenues from a relatively 
small number of corporate taxpayers, domestic and foreign. However governments must 
beware of imposing very high average or marginal tax rates lest the after-tax rate of 
return on assets be pushed below what can be obtained abroad. This would almost 
certainly precipitate capital flight. The mobility of capital, in other words, imposes a limit 
on the extent to which taxation can be used for redistributive purposes. It is partly for this 
reason that the income tax system in most developing countries taxes physical and 
financial capital rather lightly compared to human capital. This introduces a bias against 
labour and human capital relative to other factors of production. (iii) taxes on wealth  
Many of the problems that arise in taxing income also arise when taxing wealth. Since 
wealth and political power often go together, wealthy taxpayers in developing countries 
often succeed in shifting the tax burden from wealth to consumers or workers. The least 
difficult wealth taxes to collect are those on highly visible and immovable assets such as 
urban real estate and agricultural land. Taxes on urban property are sometimes said to be 
regressive, but this is unlikely to be true in most developing countries. Property taxes in 
fact are likely to be a more progressive way to cover the cost of providing urban services 
than progressively differentiated user charges. The reason for this is that the income elasticity of demand for housing (and other urban property) is greater than the elasticity 
of demand for the services themselves and hence spending on housing rises 
proportionately faster as incomes increase than spending on urban utilities and other 
services. The problem for the tax authorities is how to obtain and maintain accurate 
estimates of the value of urban property. Inevitably there is a conflict, on the one hand, 
between accuracy and fairness and, on the other, the administrative costs of valuation and 
tax collection. Once again, it is appropriate to keep it simple and use rough methods of 
valuation in order to keep administrative costs low.  
Turning to the rural sector, the greatest difficulty policy makers confront in taxing 
agricultural land is undoubtedly political: the power of the landowning class. Where land 
is distributed highly unequally--a common phenomenon--the best solution, as argued in 
section 4, is a land reform. If land taxation were to accompany land redistribution, as we 
recommend, an equitable agricultural tax system could readily be established. Such a 
system, moreover, would be very broadly based and would provide revenue that could be 
collected at low cost.  
Where land reform is impossible, it still is worthwhile introducing a land tax, provided of 
course that it is politically feasible. Even a very simple land tax can contribute 
significantly to government revenues while also being equitable. The key to land taxation 
is to base it on information that is readily available or that can be obtained at low cost. 
The revenue authorities need to know only four facts in order to design an effective 
system of agricultural land taxation: the area of the property, its location, its soil quality 
classification and the name of the owner. 90 In some countries the most difficult piece of 
information to obtain might appear to be soil quality, but recent developments in satellite 
imaging have made it much easier to estimate the potential fertility of the soil. In practice 
it may be more difficult to discover the name of the owner!  
The easiest land tax to administer is one with a flat rate per unit of land with an 
exemption for holdings below a threshold size. If it is desired to have a progressive scale, 
then several rates per unit of land will have to be introduced with the rates rising with the 
total area of the property. This can quickly become complex to administer--particularly 
when landowners have several properties in different regions with different soil qualities-
-and we suggest that the fewer the number of tax rates, the better. Exemption of small 
holdings from taxation can go a long way toward making the system of land taxation 
moderately progressive. Exemption also ensures that the poor are not further 
impoverished by taxation. In Indonesia, for example, the property tax reforms of the 
1980s included an exemption of US $1600 for all buildings, rural and urban, and the 
effect of this was to exclude from taxation virtually all houses in the rural areas and most 
houses occupied by low income families in the urban areas. 91 (iv) indirect taxes  
During the last 10 to 15 years indirect taxes on consumption have become the principal 
means of raising revenue. Indeed in the 1980s indirect taxes accounted for more than half 
of government revenue in two-thirds of the developing countries. Value added tax in 
particular has been prominent in many of the most recent tax reforms and has been 
successful in raising revenue. The main concern about value added tax and other forms of indirect taxation is their effects on the post-tax distribution of income. Indirect taxation 
tends to be regressive.  
The poor in developing countries, while usually not subject to income and wealth taxes, 
do nevertheless pay a significant amount of taxes. The urban poor, for instance, pay taxes 
equivalent to about 10 per cent of their income and much of this is accounted for by 
indirect taxes. A study of the Jamaican tax system revealed that the taxes which had the 
greatest impact on the poor were taxes levied on food and taxes on intermediate and 
capital goods used to produce food. Exemption of a few basic items such as cornmeal and 
condensed milk from the value added tax could go some way toward reducing the tax 
burden on low income households. 92 Thus it is possible to combine the efficiency of 
indirect taxes in raising revenue with measures to temper their regressive effects. 
Exemption from taxation of basic foods consumed largely by the poor would be 
consistent with human development and its goal of nutritional adequacy; it would also be 
desirable on grounds of distributive justice.  
Excise taxes, such as those on beer, spirits and tobacco, pose interesting problems for a 
tax system concerned with poverty and human development. Excise taxes are very good 
for generating revenue because of the low price elasticity of demand of the goods taxed, 
but it is this low price elasticity which tends to result in a regressive impact of the taxes 
on the incomes of the poor, who buy large quantities of the taxed items. It sometimes is 
argued that high excise taxes on beer, spirits and tobacco reduce the ability of the poor to 
purchase basic necessities, including nutritious food. Against this is the argument that 
consumption of beer, spirits and tobacco produces large negative externalities (violence, 
death, accidents, illness) and the poor are no more entitled than the rich to inflict these 
heavy costs on the rest of society, including other members of the consumer's household. 
93 Moreover, immoderate consumption of these items has the unfortunate effect of 
markedly depreciating the stock of human capital, reducing longevity, productivity and 
capabilities, and hence high excise taxes are not inconsistent with a human development 
strategy. (v) tax administration  
There are many examples in developing countries of taxes with considerable revenue 
potential failing to deliver as expected simply because of weak tax administration. Part of 
the problem is technical: the taxes are too complex to administer or too difficult and 
costly to collect. Tax simplification often goes hand-in-hand with good tax 
administration. An obvious way to simplify a tax system is to eliminate many of the 
deductions, exemptions and credits that tend to become imbedded in the tax structure 
with the passage of time. If there are to be exemptions, the beneficiaries should be the 
poor rather than the rich. Yet unfortunately it commonly is the other way round.  
Tax simplification can also be achieved by not incorporating non-revenue objectives into 
the tax system. Tax preferences given to favoured economic activities reduce total 
revenues while making the tax system more complex. They often conflict with one 
another or have effects which are incidental to or contradictory with the original 
objectives. Again, the rich invariably are in the best position to lobby for and benefit 
from preferential treatment. Governments which have adopted a human development strategy may be tempted to use the tax system to encourage human capital formation, e.g. 
by allowing deductions for the cost of training or formal education, but this objective 
probably can be better promoted by expenditure policies rather than tax policy. Tax 
gimmicks seldom are successful.  
Ultimately the main reason tax administration often is weak and ineffective is political. 
Just as upper income groups are able to ensure that they receive a disproportionate share 
of government subsidies, so too they are able to ensure that they escape much of the 
burden of taxation. This pattern of subsidy and taxation occurs not by accident but by 
design. Experience has shown, however, that this inequity is easier to remedy by 
changing the composition of government expenditure than by changing the structure of 
the tax system. Governments wishing to promote human development are therefore well 
advised to concentrate their attention on the expenditure side of the budget, not only 
because human development objectives can be achieved this way with less difficulty but 
also because politically it may be unwise to fight a battle on two fronts simultaneously. 
The first priority should be to assemble a powerful political coalition to support a human 
development strategy on the basis of benefits arising from changes in government 
expenditure. Once this has been achieved, it should be possible to address the inequities 
imbedded in the tax system and by correcting these to bring about further improvements 
in the distribution of income and wealth. Governments which enjoy broad popular 
support are in the best position successfully to implement progressive tax reforms.  
   
Foreign aid  
During the last 45 years many developing countries have come to depend on external 
funds to finance their development programmes. Most of this external capital has 
consisted of some form of foreign aid--untied grants, bilateral tied grants and loans, 
surplus food products sold for local currency, multilateral loans provided at a subsidized 
interest rate, technical assistance--although in the 1970s loans from international 
commercial banks were significant and in a small number of countries direct private 
foreign investment has played a role. The results of foreign aid programmes, whether 
bilateral or multilateral, have in general been disappointing: they have done little to 
promote growth and even less to promote human development. 94  
The rationale for foreign aid is that it is essential to compensate for an assumed shortage 
of domestic finance in developing countries. That is, foreign capital (in the form of 
foreign aid) supplements inadequate domestic savings and permits a country to have a 
higher rate of investment than would otherwise be possible. Greater investment, in turn, 
leads to faster growth. This chain of reasoning however is based on a false assumption, 
namely, that the chief obstacle in developing countries is a deficiency of physical capital 
and modern technology. The contrary view, the one advocated here, is that the principal 
obstacle to vigorous, sustainable growth in developing countries is the inadequacy of 
human development. Foreign aid has not in general been aimed at human development 
nor has it in practice encouraged human development indirectly. Inflows of foreign capital have tended to reproduce and reinforce the misallocations of domestic public 
expenditure that have been such a prominent feature of most government budgets.  
Even if one believes, contrary to the accumulating evidence, that the engine of growth 
consists solely or primarily of investment in physical capital, it does not follow that 
developing countries are incapable of generating sufficient savings to finance that 
investment. Again, the evidence is clear that developing countries do have the capacity to 
attain high rates of savings and many have in fact done so. In 1990, for example, gross 
domestic savings in countries classified by the World Bank as low-income economies 
were 28 per cent of gross domestic product whereas the savings rate in the high-income 
economies (including the OECD countries) was much lower than this, viz., 22 per cent. 
95 The problem in developing countries has not been an inability to generate savings for 
capital formation but to retain their capital domestically and prevent it from leaking 
abroad. There is a tendency in developing countries for capital to emigrate to more 
developed countries where it can obtain a higher rate of return. This tendency applies 
both to finance capital (liquid savings) as well as to human capital in the form of 
managerial, professional and technical personnel and of highly skilled and educated 
workers. 96  
The meagre flows of foreign aid received by developing countries have sometimes had 
perverse effects, reducing the domestic rate of savings and encouraging capital flight by 
lowering the real rate of interest and temporarily appreciating the exchange rate. Hence 
foreign aid has contributed to the problem it was intended to correct. 97 Aid has been 
concentrated on a small number of countries. It has often been used to finance military 
expenditure, to enlarge the bureaucracy or to reduce the need for increased taxation. 
Where aid has resulted in increased investment in physical capital, it has typically 
financed large, capital intensive projects with relatively low rates of return. Where it has 
been directed at human development activities, concentration usually has been on the top 
of the expenditure pyramid, e.g., financing highly visible and expensive university 
facilities and urban hospitals. The social rates of return on these projects have been 
relatively low and the benefits have largely bypassed the poor.  
Thus foreign aid is neither necessary in theory for a human development strategy nor has 
it been effective in practice. One can of course always hope that aid policies will be 
reformed and aid flows increased, but history provides little basis for such hopes. Human 
development, in contrast, permits a more self-reliant pattern of development. It is a 
strategy that mobilizes local resources, that concentrates on enlarging the latent 
capabilities of all people and that can be financed domestically without the need to 
depend on external subventions or charity. Indeed one of the attractive features of a 
human development strategy, for those governments which seek it, is that it liberates a 
country from dependence on foreign aid.  
   
Decentralization and empowerment  It goes without saying that a human development strategy cannot be implemented if the 
revenues available to the government from domestic and foreign sources are inadequate. 
In addition, human development requires a public administration that is well adapted to 
the strategy and capable of implementing the tasks for which it is responsible. This essay 
has touched on several issues concerning the structure and role of state institutions in a 
human development strategy: the overall size of the state, the degree of decentralization 
and its relationship to participation and empowerment, the administration of tax reforms, 
etc. The following section pulls together the threads of the analysis and examines public 
administration in the round.  
The central conclusion is that while the volume of work would be no higher, the 
intellectual demands placed on administrative capacities by human development will be 
greater than under more conventional strategies. The public administration will be asked 
to perform more complex tasks (e.g. to devise a calculus of benefits and costs of human 
development expenditure) and to relate to the public in a different way. The system of 
public administration consistent with a human development strategy is substantially 
different from that currently found in most developing countries. The strategy is not 
primarily concerned with social welfare intervention--the delivery of entitlements to 
passive beneficiaries--but with the empowerment of people and the liberation of their 
productive initiatives and creativity so that they can provide for themselves. Human 
development is about freedom and responsibility, liberation and self-help.  
This is the context in which the role of the state should be seen. It is common these days 
for the state to be viewed as a source of inefficiency and a bureaucratic obstacle to 
development. This view is a reaction to an earlier one in which a highly centralized state 
was advocated with responsibilities for central planning and the direct management of 
major industries. The pendulum has now swung to the opposite extreme: wholesale 
privatization of state enterprises and a decentralized administrative structure are 
advocated. Supporters of human development have also argued in favour of 
decentralization, but their objective is fundamentally different from those who wish to 
construct a nightwatchman state with minimal powers and responsibilities.  
As has been shown in this essay, human development requires an activist state, but an 
activist state which is able to enlist and mobilize people to promote their own 
development. The corollary of this is slightly paradoxical: insofar as the state pursues this 
objective successfully, it tends progressively to relieve itself of its traditional functions. 
The need for continuous intervention diminishes and with it the maze of bureaux required 
for monitoring, supervision and control that is such a prominent characteristic of state 
activity in most developing countries. In the long run, a human development strategy 
implies a gradual but decided reduction in the role of the state.  
This will not occur because human development is best left to the unrestricted operation 
of market forces. Indeed market processes on their own are not capable of generating 
correct signals, of producing an efficient structure of incentives, if for no other reason 
than the web of positive externalities, complementaries and linkages associated with 
human development expenditures. No, the role of the state should gradually diminish because human development is best left to human beings themselves, as the direct 
participants in expanding their own capabilities. Some of the functions of the state 
gradually will be replaced by the institutions of civil society. In the short run, however, 
the objective of human development can be served either by a centralized administration 
or a highly decentralized public administration depending on the configuration of 
economic and political power in the country concerned.  
Decentralization of the state should not be confused with empowerment of people. 
Depending on the circumstances, decentralization and empowerment can be in conflict, 
and in many cases they actually have been. It is perhaps useful to distinguish between 
administrative and political decentralization. 98 Most efforts to decentralize in 
developing countries have been administrative in character. That is, the primary purpose 
has been to increase the efficiency of government operations, not to enhance the political 
power of people. Political decentralization, in contrast, is not concerned primarily with 
increasing efficiency--improving the delivery mechanism of government services, 
removing bottlenecks and reducing delays, increasing the ability to recover costs--but 
with the devolution of power to the grass roots. Empowerment may result in greater 
efficiency, e.g., by mobilizing people in support of government initiatives and 
programmes, but that is not its purpose. Empowerment is an end in itself and should be 
judged in those terms and not in terms of its functional relationship to other worthy 
objectives such as cost-effectiveness or efficiency.  
Decentralization cannot be divorced from the political context in which it occurs. If the 
people do not exercise democratic control over the central apparatus of the state, it is 
unlikely that decentralization of the state will be accompanied by increased political 
power of the people. If the political structure is undemocratic and authoritarian, 
administrative decentralization is likely either to maintain or even reinforce central 
authority. In the late colonial period, for instance, decentralization sometimes was used as 
a device to enlist the cooperation of local leaders and broaden the base of support for 
colonial rule. Similarly in South Africa, under pressure to become more democratic and 
less authoritarian, the apartheid state responded in the 1980s by introducing a programme 
of regional and urban decentralization. While ostensibly democratic, the real intent of the 
administrative reforms was to increase the power of the centre over local government, 
depoliticize the black population and produce a new group of political collaborators. 99 
Those who opposed apartheid and aspired to a democratic society resisted administrative 
decentralization and concentrated their efforts on gaining control of the central state 
apparatus itself.  
Consider a less extreme case, that of Nepal. Decentralization within this country of 18.9 
million persons frequently has been recommended both by outside consultants and 
officials within the government. One reason for the recommendation is the many 
inefficiencies that arise from attempting to administer a very backward economy through 
a highly centralized political authority. Yet the experience of Nepal illustrates why 
administrative decentralization is doomed to failure in the absence of a devolution of 
political power.  Nepal is highly stratified, economically, socially and politically. About 90 per cent of the 
labour force is engaged in agriculture and lives in rural areas. The ownership of land 
however is highly concentrated and the top three per cent of landowners possess nearly 
40 per cent of the land. As a result, the distribution of income in Nepal is one of the most 
unequal in Asia. Decentralization in Nepal has historically been supported by two groups: 
populist opponents of the regime and modernist administrators in government. The 
populists supported decentralization because they believed it would result in a reduction 
in the power of the central bureaucracy in the capital and encourage grass roots 
development. The modernizing administrators supported decentralization as a way to 
respond to pressure for more local participation without having to legalize opposition 
political parties. That is, administrative decentralization was viewed as a tactic to defuse 
demands for more radical social and political change.  
Not surprisingly, decentralization in Nepal has done little to encourage popular 
democracy. Villages and districts have little voice and exercise little influence over 
national policies. Such grass roots participation as exists is controlled and manipulated by 
the rural elite and local government officials. At the village and ward levels the political 
system is dominated by rich farmers. 100 If the distribution of wealth and income at the 
local level are highly unequal and political authority is highly concentrated, as in Nepal, 
administrative decentralization is unlikely to result in political decentralization and the 
empowerment of the population. Conservative landed elites usually dominate local 
politics in agrarian societies. The outcome of a policy of decentralization in such societies 
normally is doubly disadvantageous, namely, very little actual administrative 
decentralization plus the capture by large landowners of whatever political 
decentralization occurs. Compared to this, a centralized administration may be preferable.  
In the final analysis human development cannot be separated from participatory 
development. The goal of human development is to help people realize their own 
potential, to develop their intellectual, technical and organizational capabilities. Thus 
human development inescapably is development by the people if it is to be development 
for the people. 101 In order to fulfil their potential people must participate actively in 
constructing their own autonomous, democratic organizations, including of course their 
political organizations. Political empowerment is an integral aspect of participatory 
development. Those from outside the community--whether representatives of government 
or non-governmental organizations--who help people construct their grass roots 
institutions can be most effective when they function chiefly as facilitators, catalysts or 
animators. An activist state can encourage or animate human development but it cannot 
engineer it. That must be done by the people themselves and experience suggests that 
direct democracy at the local level is the best way to foster it. The role of catalyst or 
animator, depending on the configuration of political power, can be played either by the 
institutions of local government or by a centralized state operating through mass 
mobilization campaigns, i.e., mass literacy campaigns, mass immunization campaigns, 
mass rural construction campaigns and the like. It would be wrong to assume that local 
bureaucracies are more sympathetic to grass roots democracy than centralized 
bureaucracies. Experience suggests however that a programme of decentralization is most successful when local government works in concert with active institutions of civil 
society, such as community organizations, trade unions and peasant associations.  
The connections at the local level between direct democracy and human development are 
fairly clear. Difficulties arise when large scale projects are considered and the 
geographical area encompasses a number of communities or villages. The administration 
of secondary schools or regional hospitals are examples of what we have in mind. Once 
one moves beyond the local level more complex institutions become necessary and direct 
democracy inevitably has to give way to representative democracy. That is, once one 
moves beyond the local level it becomes necessary to delegate authority to leaders who 
are entrusted to safeguard and advance the interests of a fairly large group. Decision 
making inevitably becomes more centralized but this need not be in conflict with direct 
democracy at the community level. Indeed, the centralization necessary for the minimal 
coordination of governmental activities should be used to facilitate local democracy.  
While the historical evolution of national institutions and the concrete political and 
economic realities of each country will differ, the model which would appear to be most 
supportive of a human development strategy is one which promotes democracy "from the 
bottom up" rather than "from the top down". This is because a human development 
strategy places special emphasis on small, widely dispersed, labour intensive investment 
activities such as primary schools, community health clinics, micro-irrigation schemes 
and local sanitation systems. Since it is at this grass roots level that direct democracy is 
most likely to flourish, it makes sense on both economic and political grounds for a state 
committed to human development to direct its efforts toward strengthening the basic 
organs of self-government in the rural villages and urban neighbourhoods. The local 
institutions of civil society in conjunction with local government organizations can 
function as "schools of democracy" in which people acquire experience in taking control 
of their own lives, individually and collectively. Once the foundation is secure, other 
floors in the edifice of democracy can be constructed at ever higher levels.  
The opposite approach is to try to promote democracy "from the top down". This 
approach has become widespread in developing countries in recent years and the 
experience of Bangladesh is illustrative of the consequences. The central government has 
decentralized some decision making and revenue generating functions to intermediate 
regional levels, namely, to districts and sub-districts, but it has not increased the 
responsibilities and authority of the basic unit of local government, the Union Council, 
although it has a long history. Local government, in other words, continues to be of 
marginal significance even after decentralization. Grass roots organizations have in the 
past filled part of the void and have taken responsibility for the maintenance of local 
roads, small irrigation systems, primary schools, local water supply and village health 
and nutrition services. Rather than build on these embryonic institutions and use them to 
promote human development, the central government has ignored and neglected them 
and in many instances allowed them to die. Despite this unfortunate history new NGOs 
have emerged and in some cases have achieved considerable success. The best known 
examples are the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, the Grameen Bank and 
Proshika. Evidently the tradition of local, self-help organizations has not disappeared completely and with support from government local institutions could perhaps be revived 
and used to accelerate human development. 102  
The central government in Bangladesh has tended to distance itself from the non-
governmental organizations whereas it should instead regard the efforts of NGOs as 
complementary to its own. With a little encouragement it is likely that NGOs could 
provide even more assistance to grass roots organizations than they do at present. As it is, 
55 per cent of the total budget of NGOs in Bangladesh is allocated to human 
development activities. A vigorous civil society consisting of independent organizations 
such as NGOs, trade unions, farmers associations, women's associations and youth 
organizations can contribute much to a broadly based programme in support of human 
development. In Bangladesh however the success of the NGOs in advancing human 
development merely underlines the government's own lack of initiative. As far as human 
development is concerned, decentralization in Bangladesh has been a red herring.  
It is often claimed that administrative decentralization results in a more efficient delivery 
of public services than is possible under a centralized system. This claim however should 
be regarded with scepticism. Decentralization in practice often consists of little more than 
an enlargement and extension of the government's bureaucracy, a multiplication of posts 
and offices at lower levels of administration. Problems of coordination and 
communication often become worse: delays increase, costs mount. Decentralization is 
associated not with streamlined administration but with a proliferation of bureaucracy. 
There is thus a danger that decentralization will promote neither democracy nor 
efficiency. Empowerment, on the other hand, is not only democratic, it may also be 
efficient. It calls for a streamlined central administration which devolves authority as 
much as possible to the local level. By enlisting the active participation of the people 
instead of relying on a cumbersome bureaucracy to "deliver" services to beneficiaries 
who have little voice in what is delivered and how it is delivered, empowerment may 
actually be more cost-effective than the alternatives. The experience of West Bengal, 
India suggests that this may have happened there. 103 Where this does occur, 
empowerment, human development and economic efficiency are inextricably intertwined. 
They are the principal components of a strategy that puts people first.  
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Appendix 1.  
The human development index  
Construction of the human development index (HDI)  
The HDI has opened new perspectives on measuring and analysing development. But 
there can be no doubt that the work in this area is still at its beginning. Much more 
research is needed as is more experience with using the HDI for various practical 
purposes of assessing, planning or programming development. UNDP would welcome 
any contributions to this topic, to be taken up in next year's Human Development Report, 
from interested development research scholars and practitioners.  
The HDI includes three key components: longevity, knowledge and income, which are 
combined in a three-step process to arrive at an average deprivation index (for a full 
technical description, see Human Development Report 1991, technical note 1, pp. 88-89). 
Longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth as the sole unadjusted indicator. 
Knowledge is measured by two educational stock variables: adult literacy and mean years 
of schooling. The measure of educational achievement is adjusted by assigning a weight 
of two-thirds to literacy and one-third to mean years of schooling:  
For income, the HDI is based on the premise of diminishing returns from income for 
human development using an explicit formulation for the diminishing return. A well-
known and frequently used form is the Atkinson formulation for the utility of income:  
Here, W(y) is the utility or well-being derived from income, and the parameter measures 
the extent of diminishing returns. It is the elasticity of the marginal utility of income with 
respect to income. If =0 there are no diminishing returns. As approaches 1, the equation 
becomes:  
The value of rises slowly in the HDI as income rises. For this purpose, the full range of 
income is divided into multiples of the poverty line y*. Thus, most countries are between 
0 and y*, some between y* and 2y*, even fewer between 2y* and 3y* and so on. For all 
countries for which y < y*_that is, the poor countries is set equal to 0. There are no 
diminishing returns here. For income between y* and 2y*, is set equal to 1/2. For income 
between 2y* and 3y*, is set at 2/3. In general, if a y* y (a+1) y*, then = a / (a+1). This 
gives:  So, the higher the income relative to the poverty level, the more sharply the diminishing 
returns affect the contribution of income to human development. Income above the 
poverty line thus has a marginal effect, but not a full dollar-for-dollar effect. This 
marginal effect is enough, however, to differentiate significantly among industrial 
countries. This method does not take = 1, but allows it to vary between 0 and 1.  
For example, Singapore has a real GDP per capita of $15,108. With the poverty line set at 
$4,829, there are four terms in the equation to determine the well-being of Singapore:  
In calculating the HDI of Singapore using the improved variables and applying the 
methods described here, the following steps are taken:  
 
Maximum country life expectancy  = 78.6 
Minimum country life expectancy  = 42.0 
Maximum country educational attainment  = 3.00 
Minimum country educational attainment  = 0.00 
Maximum country adjusted real GDP per capita = 5,079 
Minimum country adjusted real GDP per capita = 380 
Singapore life expectancy  = 74.0 
Singapore educational attainment  = 2.04 
Singapore adjusted GDP per capita  = 5.039 
Singapore life expectancy deprivation 
=(78.6-74.0)/(78.6-42.0)  = 0.126 
Singapore educational attainment deprivation 
=(3.00-2.04)/(3.00-0.00)  = 0.320 
Singapore GDP deprivation 
=(5,079-5,039)/(5,079-380)  = 0.009 
Singapore average deprivation 
=(0.126+0.320+0.009)/3  = 0.152 
Singapore human development index HDI 
=1-0.152  = 78.6 
 
Making the HDI gender-sensitive  
Of the many inequalities in human development, the most striking is that along gender 
lines. Women typically live longer than men once they have gone beyond the age when 
differential treatment of boys and girls makes life shorter for girls. They work harder and 
more hours than men, but they often do work that is unpaid or underpaid. Women cook, 
take care of children, the elderly and the sick, look after the upkeep of the house and 
work on the farm or in the shop. Only a small proportion of women find that their work 
gets paid and recorded as participation in the labour force. Labour force participation as a concept and in its measurement grossly understates women's work even in the productive, 
commodity-producing sphere. It completely leaves out much work that is useful to the 
continuing existence of the household.  
Any attempt to measure gender inequalities is thus bound to err on the low side. Even 
allowing for that, the inequalities are striking. An attempt is made here to calculate the 
ratio of female income to male income. We do not have suitable data on income, but for 
33 countries we do have comparable data on the relative wage ratios and the relative 
ratios for labour force participation.  
These data reveal a remarkable pattern of discrimination. The female-male wage ratio for 
these 33 countries ranges from a low of 50% (Japan) to a high of 89% (Sweden).  
In labour force participation, the lowest female-male ratio is 40% (Costa Rica) and the 
highest is 92% (Sweden). Multiplying these two ratios gives the female-male wage-
income ratio.  
This wage-income ratio combines two identifiable correlates of gender discrimination. 
The male wage is greater than the female wage, and the gap in labour force participation 
rates is even wider. When this is translated into absolute income levels, we see the 
profound consequences. To do this, a basic assumption has to be made that is clearly 
gender-biased: that the ratio of non-wage income to wage income is the same for men 
and women. This ratio therefore understates the inequality.  
In adjusted real GDP per capita, female incomes as a percentage of male incomes range 
from a low of 26% (Costa Rica) to a high of 82% (Sweden). But of the 33 countries for 
which we have comparable data, only nine have a ratio of 60% or above, while 10 are 
below 40%. So, even in a statistic that understates the inequality, the differences are 
stark.  
The female HDI gains from the near-equal or better ratio in life expectancy but loses 
somewhat from unequal access to education, particularly in the developing countries. In 
education, the developed countries show very little gender difference: though the value 
for female achievement, as a proportion of male, never goes above 102%, in five 
countries it goes below 98%. In poorer countries the differences become substantial. 
Women's educational attainment in Kenya shows a low ratio of 53%. In Myanmar it is 
74%, and in Hong Kong 75%. Costa Rica shows a figure of well over 100%.  
The overall HDI for men and women calculated separately reflects this pattern. Much of 
the data, 22 of the 33 countries, relate to the industrial countries. So, technical note table 
1.1 does not capture the full extent of gender inequality. Even then, the female HDI as a 
percentage of the male HDI is as low as 59% in Kenya, 66% in the Republic of Korea 
and 69% in Swaziland. Of the 33 countries, 10 have ratios below 75%, and only five 
countries Sweden, Finland, Norway, France and Denmark have ratios of over 90% No 
country attains full gender equality even in this biased measure, though Sweden comes 
close with a ratio of 96%.  How should this inequality be reflected in the overall HDI for any country? A simple 
approach is to multiply the overall HDI for any country by the ratio of female-to-male 
HDI. If a country has full equality, its HDI is unaffected. Although Japan has the second 
highest overall HDI (0.981), its low female-to-male ratio brings it down to being 18th of 
the 33 countries with a gender-adjusted HDI of 0.761. Sweden, by contrast, has a very 
high female-to-male ratio and moves from fifth to first position with a gender-adjusted 
HDI of 0.938. Whereas Japan has a high overall HDI with a high degree of gender 
inequality, Sweden has a high overall HDI with a low degree of gender inequality. 
Among the 11 developing countries, there is usually both a low HDI and a high degree of 
gender inequality.  
Adjusting the HDI for income distribution  
The HDI is a national average, just like real income per capita, one of its components. 
The use of any such overall average hides the considerable differences in the distribution 
of the basic indicators, whether by gender, race, region, ethnicity or simply among 
individuals. The HDI therefore needs to be made sensitive to these distributions.  
The HDI has the advantage that two of its three basic variables life expectancy and 
educational attainment are naturally distributed much less unequally than is income, the 
third variable. Thus, life expectancy in any population is not likely to be distributed more 
unequally than, say, three to one. A rich person cannot live a thousand times longer than 
a poor person, though their incomes may be in that ratio. Across countries, the range of 
life expectancy is 42 to 79, less than 2:1.  
The same is true in educational attainment. The range of the percentage of adults who are 
literate varies from 18% to 99%, a range of under 6:1. Mean years of schooling show a 
variation from 0.1 to 12.3, more unequal than life expectancy, and hide even greater 
variations in the within-country distribution.  
Apart from per capita income, all the variables used in the HDI have an obvious 
maximum. Life expectancy will rarely go beyond 100, literacy never beyond 100% and 
mean years of schooling seldom beyond, say, 15. Income, however, has no upper bound. 
For GNP per capita the intercountry range is $80 to $29,880, a range of 375:1. As for real 
GDP per capita, the range is $380 to $20,998, or 55:1. Such inequalities in income are 
reproduced just as sharply within countries.  
So, a high average value for life expectancy or educational attainment can be obtained 
only by a reasonably equitable spread among individuals, a result of the fixed maximum 
possible. Although it is of great interest to know the distributions of those variables, an 
average is a better statistic for these variables than for income, where it can be very 
misleading.  
The ranking of countries by per capita income could be adjusted if per capita income 
were multiplied by a factor indicating distributional inequality 1 minus the Gini 
coefficient. This method can be extended to all the countries having statistics on distributional inequality. Some 41 countries have data on the ratio of the income share of 
the highest 20% to the lowest 20%. Of these 41 countries, 17 have data on the Gini 
coefficient as well, and there was found to be a very strong association between the two 
the logarithm of the ratio being a good predictor of the Gini coefficient. This regression 
result was used to interpolate the Gini coefficient for the remaining 24 countries. Some 
countries had data only on the Gini coefficient. In all, 53 countries with directly estimated 
or interpolated Gini coefficients were available.  
A word of caution. The Gini coefficients are registered for various years between 1975 
and 1988, and the ratios of the top 20% to the lowest 20% are for years between 1980 and 
1988. This is not a serious problem, since these coefficients are unlikely to change 
quickly. But the Gini coefficient is not always truly representative of the entire country. It 
is sometimes only for a subsection, such as the urban population.  
Adjusted income was multiplied by (1 - G) with G being the Gini coefficient to modify 
income even further. Because this was done for the adjusted income, W(y), rather than 
for the actual income, the diminishing return effect could be incorporated before the 
distributional adjustment modifies incomes further. This modified income W(y)[1 - G] is 
then used as the third variable in addition to life expectancy and educational attainment to 
compute a distribution-adjusted HDI.  
For all but two countries, the HDI is reduced by making it sensitive to income 
distribution, and in a half of them, it is reduced by 4% or more. This is particularly 
marked in the developing countries, where 24 of the 32 developing countries have a 
reduction of 4% or more and seven show a reduction in excess of 10%.  
Much better data are needed to pursue the sensitivity of income distribution more 
thoroughly. The analysis shows that caution is needed in interpreting a country's HDI 
value as a measure of achieved well-being for all its people.  
Measuring progress in human development over time  
The human development index (HDI) ranks countries relative to each other for a 
particular period. The maximum and minimum values that define the maximum distance 
to be travelled for each variable are specific to that year. Over time, the actual achieved 
values of life expectancy, literacy and income change, as will the maximum and 
minimum values of these variables across all countries.  
For example, Ruritania's life expectancy in year 1 may be 40, halfway between a 
minimum of 20 and a maximum of 60. By year 10, Ruritania may have improved its life 
expectancy to 50, but the minimum may now be 30 and the maximum 80. In such a case, 
the numerical value of the index indicating Ruritania's life expectancy will drop in the 
HDI calculations from 0.5 [ = (40 - 20) / (60 - 20)] to 0.4 [ = (50 - 30) / (80 - 30)], despite 
the 25% improvement in life expectancy.  So, improvements in the components of human development in any country over time 
may be reflected as a decline in its HDI value, if in the meantime its relative position has 
deteriorated. To combine a measure of progress over time with intercountry comparisons 
at one point of time, the HDI has to be modified.  
The way to tackle this problem, without changing the logic of the HDI, is to say that the 
minimum and maximum should be defined, not for each point of time, but over a period 
of time. Thus if we are measuring progress between 1970 and 1990, the minimum would 
be the minimum of all values of, say, life expectancy for all countries over the 20 years. 
Similarly for the maximum. The distance to be travelled is thus stretched out as the 
maximum over the 20-year period.  
In the example of Ruritania, the minimum stays at 20 but the maximum is now 80. In 
year 1, the life expectancy variable is 0.33[(40 - 20)/(80 - 20)], and in year 10 it is 0.5 
[(50 - 20)/(80 - 20)].  
With this adaptation, the human development index becomes comparable over time as 
well as across countries. The difference in the value of the human development index 
over time can be shown to be a weighted sum of the growth rates in the three variables: 
the weights are given by the ratio of the initial value of a variable to the maximum range.  
To express this algebraically with X1 as life expectancy, X2 as literacy and X3 as income 
the contribution of each variable to the HDI can be written as Zi, where:  
In the formula, j denotes country, t the time period. Note now that the denominator will 
remain unchanged for all time periods and for all countries.  
MHDI stands for the modified HDI since we have a new definition of the maximum and 
minimum. Countries are ranked by the size of the difference between the 1970 and 1990 
values for the MHDI. These differences range from 0.301 for Saudi Arabia to -0.076 for 
Jamaica. Jamaica is, however, a country where the HDI in 1970 was already quite high, 
0.797, and the lack of change does not reflect absolute deterioration.  
A summary of the differences between the 1970 and 1990 HDI values follows:  
HDI difference  Number of countries
>0.300 1 
0.250 to 0.299  3 
0.200 to 0.249  3 
0.150 to 0.199  9 
)0.100 to 0.149  27 
0.050 to 0.099  29 0.000 to 0.049  28 
< 0.000   10 
Total  110 
At the bottom, with Jamaica, are 10 countries that register a negative change, and above 
them is a group of 28 countries that register a change between 0 and 0.049. Twenty-one 
of these 38 countries are from Sub-Saharan Africa, seven from Latin America and seven 
from Asia. These low achievers are usually countries with a comparatively low initial 
HDI value. Only Poland (0.829 in 1970), Romania (0.798) Jamaica (0.797) and 
Argentina (0.784) would qualify as such. The remainder are poor initially, and 23 of them 
remained below 0.300 in 1990. Many of these countries experienced low rates of growth 
of real GDP per capita over this period, or even had a negative growth. So, income 
growth may not be sufficient for achieving a high HDI, but it cannot be dispensed with.  
Fifty-six countries show a moderate improvement, between 0.05 and 0.15, 16 show a 
greater improvement and 43 show a total increase in excess of 0.10. Since the maximum 
distance to traverse is 1.00, some 40% of the countries, starting at different levels, 
covered 10% or more of the maximum distance. Almost all the countries with high HDIs 
in 1990 are in this group. They have continued to improve despite their already high 
levels for 1970. But, a few countries in this fast-moving group began in 1970 with low 
levels of HDI, notably Yemen (0.093 in 1970), Kenya (0.253), Morocco (0.268) and 
Indonesia (0.316).  
As should by now be apparent, the HDI is a flexible tool of analysis which can be useful 
in monitoring the progress of human development. It can readily be disaggregated, 
assuming the data are available in the required form. In large countries with considerable 
geographical diversity, it might be useful to produce regional HDIs, using the same 
method applied to country HDIs. In pluralistic societies with ethnic diversity, it might be 
useful to produce an HDI for each ethnic group, using the same method used to produce 
female and male HDIs. In other words, the HDI can be disaggregated in a number of 
ways and each country can adapt it to suit its own policy purposes.  
Source: Human Development Report 1992, published for the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), by Oxford University Press, New York  
 
Appendix 2. 
Target setting versus a calculus of benefits and costs  
We have advocated in the text that expenditures on human development should be based 
in part on a calculus of benefits and costs. We are of course aware that it often is difficult 
to measure accurately the benefits of investing in people--the costs are relatively easy--
but none the less we believe that all investment projects, be they additions to the stock of 
human, physical or natural capital, should be subjected to similar scrutiny and should be required to pass the same test. The intellectual discipline required by a calculus of 
benefits and costs forces analysts to make hidden assumptions explicit, enables policy 
makers to compare on an equal basis the alternative uses of public funds and can help 
prevent a waste of scarce investment resources. Whether the decision rule is a benefit-
cost ratio greater than one, or a positive net present value or an internal rate of return 
greater than a predetermined value is a secondary matter. The important thing is that a 
genuine effort be made to calculate benefits and costs rather than rely on intuition, 
common sense or political expediency.  
The alternative approach, common in international circles as well as in individual 
countries, is to set specific targets and then in effect attempt to minimize the cost of 
attaining the target. The United Nations, for example, has elaborated an "international 
development strategy" for each of the last four decades, beginning with the 1960s. The 
international development strategies specified global or universal targets that set identical 
standards for all countries regardless of circumstances, e.g., "free education at all levels". 
Moreover, the targets became increasingly numerous, rising from four in the first 
Development Decade (the 1960s) to more than 23 in the third Development Decade (the 
1980s). Finally, the targets became increasingly ambitious and even unrealistic. For 
example, the growth target for the 1960s was 5 per cent; in the 1970s it was raised to 6 
per cent; and in the 1980s it was raised again to 7 per cent. Actual rates of growth 
diverged increasingly from the targets.  
Targets tend to proliferate because they specify levels of specific benefits desired--rates 
of growth, levels of literacy, extent of health coverage, school enrollment rates, degree of 
industrialisation, share of world trade, etc.--and there is no limit to the number of good 
things that can be desired. Similarly, targets tend to be excessively ambitious because 
there is nothing in the process of target setting that forces planners to estimate the cost of 
meeting the target. Target setting, in other words, does not require planners to compare 
alternative goals and to weigh the benefits against the costs.  
It is often implicitly assumed when setting a target that the unit cost is constant. In the 
case of a mass literacy campaign, for instance, it is assumed that the additional or 
marginal cost (MC) of providing literacy is independent of the size of the programme. 
The unit cost (or cost per person included in the programme) is the same whether the 
programme aims for universal adult literacy or, say, aims at a more modest target of only 
80 per cent of the eligible population. This assumption is depicted in Figure 1(a).  
In practice, however, unit costs are likely to rise as the size of the programme expands. 
And as one approaches complete coverage of the eligible population, the marginal cost 
may rise sharply. Returning to the case of a mass literacy campaign, some individuals 
may be more strongly motivated than others and hence may put more effort into learning 
to read and write, some groups (e.g., the young as compared to the elderly) may be able 
to learn more quickly and easily than others, and some people (e.g., those living in 
remote locations) may be more difficult to reach than others. If so, the marginal cost 
curve of a mass literacy campaign will begin after a point to rise, as depicted in Figure 
1(b).  In Figure 1(b) the marginal cost more than doubles when the literacy campaign is 
enlarged from 80 per cent coverage to universal coverage. As a result, the total cost of the 
campaign rises more than proportionately. Policy makers in circumstances such as these 
should ask themselves whether it is worthwhile aiming for 100 per cent coverage, or 
whether instead the extra funds needed to achieve universal adult literacy would be better 
spent on some other programme, such as a programme to reduce the infant mortality rate.  
The answer depends on the expected benefits of the additional expenditure. Once again, it 
is often implicitly assumed when setting a target that the marginal benefits (MB) are high 
and constant, easily exceeding the marginal costs. On this assumption it clearly is 
worthwhile to aim for universal coverage. This is the situation depicted in Figure 2(a).  
It is not difficult to imagine however that just as marginal costs tend to rise as coverage 
increases, so marginal benefits tend to fall. Some people need literacy skills more than 
others to earn a living; some people obtain more pleasure from leisure reading than 
others; some people in the early stages of life will benefit longer from the possession of 
literacy skills than those who are well past the prime of life. For all these reasons the 
benefits on the margin of expanding the coverage of a mass literacy campaign are likely 
to decline. This is the situation depicted in Figure 2(b).  
Note that in Figure 2(b), if the target is set at universal adult literacy, the marginal costs 
will exceed the marginal benefits. Total benefits from the programme will be greater than 
total costs, but the last dollars spent will have been wasted: they yielded fewer benefits 
than costs. The optimal size of the programme occurs where marginal benefits and costs 
are equal. This is point T in the figure. At this point net total benefits, i.e., total benefits 
minus total costs, are at a maximum and any additional resources that might become 
available would be better spent on some other programme. A target of T, rather than 
universal adult literacy, would therefore be ideal.  
Target setting, in other words, is not incompatible with a calculus of benefits and costs. 
Targets have their virtues--they are clear, easy to understand and can be used to mobilise 
public support--and these virtues can be preserved, but the targets should be set after the 
benefits and costs have been calculated and not plucked arbitrarily out of thin air. If the 
targets are set where net total benefits are maximized, policy makers can have the best of 
both worlds.  
 
Appendix 3. 
Human development and sustainable development  
Historical patterns of economic development have produced rapid economic growth in a 
number of countries for an extended period of time, but these patterns of development 
also have caused the stock of natural capital in the world to contract considerably and 
often to become degraded. In addition, there has been a rapid loss of biodiversity. Lastly, there has recently emerged a serious threat of global warming. In the last two decades 
people have become increasingly aware of the social costs associated with production 
processes and consumption patterns that harm the environment and this has given rise to 
demands that henceforth growth should be sustainable.  
At the same time historical patterns of development have been criticized for their failure 
to put people first and this has led to demands for a change to a human development 
strategy. There is a danger that human development and sustainable development will be 
seen as competing strategies, as alternatives between which we must choose. This would 
be a mistake, for if development is seen as a process that widens people's choices and 
increases their capabilities, then it must do so not only for the current generation but also 
for future generations. In this sense, development must be sustainable. Human 
development thus embraces sustainable development, the latter being particularly 
concerned with the environmental and inter-generational aspects of human development.  
There are indeed environmental dangers inherent in current rates and patterns of growth 
in global production and consumption. Yet there is no inherent conflict between 
development and the environment, between the reduction of poverty and the maintenance 
of the stocks of natural, physical and human capital at optimal levels, between sustaining 
biodiversity and increasing the capabilities of people. Insofar as the stock of natural 
capital is damaged or consumed at an excessive rate, the prospects for future 
development are reduced. In that sense good environmental policies are part of good 
development policies. This is true whether one is concerned with degradation of the 
environment at the local level (such as pollution of fresh water supplies), at the 
international level (such as damage to forests in neighbouring countries downwind of 
factories emitting sulfur into the air), or at the global level (such as destruction of the 
ozone layer in the upper atmosphere caused by high emissions of CFCs). Sustained 
development requires that the basis of life on this planet be preserved and that any 
depletion of the natural stock of capital be transformed into an equivalent value of human 
or physical capital. The central point is that if the value of the aggregate stock of capital 
falls--natural, physical and human--the prospects for development are reduced, but if the 
value of natural capital falls, development prospects can be maintained provided physical 
and human capital are increased in compensation. 104  
Damage to the environment is not caused by human activity as such, i.e., consumption, 
production and reproduction--any more than it is caused by the activities of other species-
-but by a set of incentives which induces humans to neglect or overlook some of the costs 
of economic activity, be it production or consumption. All environmental problems--all 
apparent conflicts between development and the protection of the environment--can be 
seen as arising ultimately from either (i) government failure, (ii) market failure, (iii) 
missing markets arising from undefined property rights, or (iv) high discount rates of the 
poor because of their inability to sustain life without depleting the stock of natural 
capital.  
Government failure and class bias  Government failure in the context of sustainable development refers to actions taken by 
local, provincial or national governments which create incentives to use the natural stock 
of capital wastefully and inefficiently. These defective incentives may reflect ignorance 
on the part of policy makers, but they may also reflect a class bias in policy making. That 
is, government intervention may be designed to serve particular economic interests and 
policies conventionally described as "government failure" may be quite successful in 
their own terms. In what follows we shall use the phrase government failure in the 
broadest sense to cover errors committed out of ignorance as well as waste and 
inefficiency knowingly created while favouring the interests of particular classes or 
groups in society. Examples of government failure in this broad sense include policies 
which subsidize the cost of water to users, policies which subsidize the cost of land to 
ranchers and agriculturalists and often encourage otherwise unprofitable economic 
activities in areas where the resource base is fragile or marginal, and policies which 
subsidize logging, and provide little incentive for replanting, in the tropical forests of 
developing countries.  
Correction of government failure would automatically reduce the incentive to over-
exploit the environment and make investment in physical and human capital relatively 
more attractive. That is, adoption of a more sustainable path to development would tend 
to accelerate human development.  
A special case of government failure concerns the failure of the standard national income 
and production accounts to record the depreciation of the value of natural capital. The 
standard accounts consequently overstate both the rate of growth of the economy and the 
level of capital formation. In Costa Rica, for example, it is estimated that unrecorded 
depreciation in the value of the country's forests, soils and fisheries was on average five 
per cent of GNP per year between 1970 and 1990. 105 In Indonesia, the unrecorded 
depreciation of its forests, soils and petroleum resources was about nine per cent of its 
GDP between 1971 and 1984. 106 These failures to record the consumption of natural 
capital mean that the official national accounts can be highly misleading, giving a false 
picture of the level of development.  
Market failure  
The second source of defective incentives arises not from government subsidies and other 
forms of government failure but from market failure. This was discussed at some length 
in the main body of the text in the context of market signals failing to reflect accurately 
the costs of land use and the benefits of increasing the stock of human capital. In the 
context of sustainable development, market failure occurs whenever prices generated by 
the market mechanism fail to reflect fully the costs to the environment and the natural 
stock of capital of production and consumption activities. In such cases negative 
externalities ("bads") are produced as well as goods. Where environmental costs are 
understated by market prices, producers and consumers have an incentive to use 
resources wastefully and to over-produce those goods that use intensively natural capital.  Unfortunately, many economic processes generate negative externalities and this is 
particularly true in technologically advanced economies. Examples include the pollution 
of the air by trucks and automobiles, pollution of rivers and lakes by factories dumping 
noxious waste in inland waterways, salination of the land in areas where irrigated 
agriculture unaccompanied by proper drainage is practised, and pollution of coastal 
waterways by the discharge into the sea of untreated sewage from large cities. Market 
failure is widespread in the industrialised countries and this accounts for the fact that 
most global environmental damage is the result of past and current production and 
consumption patterns in the advanced economies. The industrialised countries, for 
instance, account for about 75 per cent of the carbon and 90 per cent of the CFC 
emissions, the two gases believed to cause global warming. In addition, the industrialised 
countries consume about ten times as much energy, water, minerals and biomass as do 
the developing countries. Thus the developed countries bear primary responsibility for 
the present global environmental problems and it is they who have the major obligation to 
repair the damage. This is a straightforward application of the polluter pays principle.  
Note however that the existence of negative externalities and market failure do not imply 
that either developing or developed countries should reduce their rate of growth in the 
name of sustainable development. If an economic activity produces a negative 
externality, the activity in question (say, the output of a specific product) should be 
reduced. Efficiency in resource allocation requires a changed composition of output, not a 
reduction in aggregate output. The implication of market failure is that governments 
should intervene to correct market prices so that producers and consumers respond to a 
set of incentives that accurately reflects all costs, including of course environmental 
costs. If this were done, human development activities would become even more 
attractive than they are now. The general point, however, is that market failure is a cause 
of defective incentives not a symptom of excessive growth. The solution is to correct the 
incentive system, not to restrain the level or rate of growth of net output and income. 
Indeed, well conceived environmental policies--sustainable development--would enhance 
the overall rate of growth, provided the national accounts are improved and growth is 
measured correctly by taking into account all benefits and all costs of production.  
Missing markets  
The third source of defective incentives occurs whenever a market for an environmental 
service is missing. As explained in the main body of the text, these so-called missing 
markets arise when property rights are undefined or unenforced. Examples include 
unclaimed forest land, common pastures under the control of no particular group or 
individual, fresh water aquifers from which anyone may extract water by digging a well, 
and at the global level, the high seas, the upper atmosphere and the polar regions. In cases 
where property rights are undefined no one has an incentive to manage the natural asset 
to ensure a sustained flow of income and everyone with access to the asset has an 
incentive to extract maximum benefit as quickly as possible. The results are over-cutting 
of forests, over-grazing of pastures, withdrawal of water in excess of the recharge rate, 
over-fishing the oceans, destruction of the upper atmosphere, etc. Here again, however, 
the solution to the problem of missing markets is to correct the incentive system, by creating enforceable property rights--either individual, collective, state or supra-national--
not to retard the process of human development or diminish efforts to reduce poverty.  
High discount rates  
A major cause of environmental problems in developing countries is restricted access by 
the poor to income earning opportunities, including opportunities arising from ownership 
or control of sufficient natural capital to sustain life above a subsistence level. It is 
becoming widely recognized that in many cases the alleviation of poverty by providing 
greater access by the poor to resources and employment, and by promoting human 
development, is probably the most effective policy of sustainable development. A 
guarantee to the poor of employment, a redistribution of land through a land reform, and 
a substitution of human capital for natural capital are illustrations of how human 
development is intimately connected to sustainable development.  
Land degradation and desertification are concentrated in areas where poverty leaves the 
population with little alternative to the excessive exploitation of resources. Deforestation, 
too, is often the last resort of people who cannot find other ways to generate a minimum 
level of income. Over-fishing of coastal waters and inland lakes and rivers often occurs 
because poor fisherfolk have no alternative means of support. That is, because of their 
very low levels of income the poor often have high discount rates. Their concern is 
immediate survival, not maintaining the stock of natural capital so that it can generate a 
sustained flow of income for the indefinite future. As long as acute poverty persists, the 
interest of future generations will be ignored and the natural stock of capital will be 
consumed and damaged. Rural poverty and environmental damage thus often go together, 
and the solution to the latter is to eliminate the former by adopting a human development 
strategy.  
In conclusion, provided sustainable development is interpreted to mean the preservation 
of the natural stock of capital at a level which is capable of sustaining indefinitely the 
human population at current standards of living, there is no conflict between sustainable 
development and human development. Of course one aspires to more, namely, a 
substantial reduction in poverty achieved either through a redistribution of income or 
through growth of average incomes per head. Sustaining the present population at current 
standards of living is too modest a goal. This does not detract from the fact however that 
sustainable development is necessary to permit long run human development. Equally, 
human development is essential if the damage currently being inflicted on the 





104. This leaves unanswered the difficult question of how changes in the stock of natural capital are to 
be valued. Various techniques have been developed, e.g., estimates of how much people would be prepared to pay for an environmental service or how much they would be prepared to accept for the loss 
of an environmental service, none of which are fully satisfactory. The crucial point however is a 
conceptual one: changes in the stock of natural capital should be subject in principle to what we have 
called in the text the calculus of benefits and costs.  
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